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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
The German Jewish Post-Holocaust Novel: Narrative and a Literary Language for Loss
by
Corey L. Twitchell
Doctor of Philosophy in Germanic Languages and Literatures
Washington University in St. Louis, 2015
Professor Erin McGlothlin, Chair

This dissertation investigates how a constellation of German Jewish post-Holocaust novels
confronts the paradox of recovering and recuperating lost stories of Holocaust victims. I analyze
how works by Edgar Hilsenrath, Jurek Becker, and Fred Wander reveal a preoccupation with the
innumerable stories and testimonies of the individuals who did not survive the Nazi Judeocide to
contribute to the archive of experience. These novels gesture toward an epistemological
alternative to this loss: they consider possibilities for recovering the unarchivable. These German
Jewish authors employ a particular cluster of varied narrative strategies: the dialogic, linguistic
and cultural elements of Eastern European Jewish culture, and a literary trope I term the “almost
lost story,” as components of a narrative practice that allows the novels’ narrators—and by
extension, the readers—to imagine a discursive space for this disnarrated testimony, or “antiarchive.” This study uncovers the extent to which post-Holocaust German Jewish literature is
underpinned by a conception of Ashkenaz that encompasses both German Jewish and Eastern
European Jewish culture and thought. My dissertation shows that the problems of trauma, loss,
memory, and memorialization in post-1945 German Jewish fiction are above all problems of
narrativity.
vi

Introduction:
The German Jewish Post-Holocaust Novel: Narrative and a Literary Language for Loss

1

“This is also a way—perhaps the only way—to listen to what is unsaid.”
--Giorgio Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz1

Tynset
German Jewish author and visual artist Wolfgang Hildesheimer’s 1965 novel Tynset
features an anonymous, melancholy insomniac narrating-I that relates his search for nocturnal
diversion by thumbing through a stack of nighttime reading options, none of which prove to be
sufficiently soporific to lull him to sleep. Instead of slumber, this series of reading materials
engenders one digression after another, all of which cumulatively make up the novel’s narrative.
Ensconced in his “Winterbett” (7), holed up in an ancient, drafty domicile that creaks and moans
with every movement of the wind, Hildesheimer’s narrator reaches for a 1963 Norwegian
railway guide consisting of page after page of train schedules for destinations never visited.
While flipping through this “Kursbuch,” he ponders at length images evoked by the phonetic
quality of the names of several Norwegian locales, including the eponymous town Tynset’s
“metallen” two-syllable moniker (25), distinguished by the presence of the letter “y” that is
“noch nicht einmal recht aussprechbar” (26). As if fueled by the Latin proverb “nomen est
omen,” the narrator engages in something akin to a vespertine game of nominative determinism,
extrapolating elaborate, discrete descriptions of various Norwegian hamlets based on what he
assumes he can glean from appellation alone. This epistemological inquiry into the significance
of the interplay between sign and referent propels him to interrupt his monologue on the
acoustics of Norway’s place names, as he recalls his former habit of turning to a German
telephone book during periods of sleeplessness when he previously lived in Germany. Shifting
from the present tense to the past tense and from a Norwegian reference work to a German one,
the text’s narrating-I transfers, by way of analepsis or narrative flashback, his enthusiasm for
1
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Giorgio Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, 14.
In “Antworten über Tynset,” Hildesheimer specifically identifies
these figures in the text as perpetrators who
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nomenclature from one target to the next, switching from the designations for geographical
locations to the names of German citizens. As a result of this analepsis, the reader learns what
compelled the narrator to leave Germany in the first place.
After having perused the seemingly innocuous telephone book, the narrator endeavored
to interpret the copious pages filled with generic German surnames. He explains how he
concluded that “die Dokumentation ist nicht vollständig, es klaffen Lücken, in denen jene sitzen,
die kein Telefon haben” (29). Here, he concerns himself with both the narrated and the
disnarrated, with what the text reveals and what it also simultaneously obscures. He recounts
how he had imagined the names that do not appear in the pages of the telephone book and the
reasons for their absence, which range from the benign to the potentially sinister:
Es fehlt das schadenfrohe Lächeln einer Geheimnummer, der abgewandte Blick des
Außenseiters, der das Telefon verschmäht, und die Gefallsucht des feinsinnigen
Verächters, der schon seit je auf seinen Anschluß verzichtet hat, um sich seiner
Mißachtung rühmen zu können, alle diese sind von den Tintenfingern der Ämter nicht
erfaßt. (29)
Devising something akin to a thought experiment regarding the sociological landscape of
postwar West Germany, Hildesheimer’s narrator attempted to profile the various personalities or
social types that might desire to remain so anonymous as to never appear in the local telephone
directory. Some individuals may simply wish to lead lives of peaceful seclusion; others, the
narrator suggests here, coquettishly thumb their noses at the governmental authorities charged
with the task of keeping tabs on the Federal Republic’s citizenry. While pondering the sort of
West German citizen who might wish to remain unattainable by way of a public telephone
directory, Hildesheimer’s narrator, gesturing toward “das Verdrängte” (29) in postwar German
3

society, found himself compelled to orchestrate acts of telephonic revenge against individuals
whom he identified as criminals, “die verjährten und pensionierten Verbrecher im Kreise ihrer
Schwiegerkinder und Enkel” (30).
Hildesheimer’s narrator reminisces about how he, while flipping through this telephone
book, stumbled upon a name that he recognized as belonging to a neighbor with whom he shared
barely a passing acquaintance. Pondering the name “Huncke,” while peering out at his
neighbor’s window and desiring to test the accuracy of the information provided by the
telephone book, the narrator impulsively dialed the phone number. Having successfully roused
his neighbor, as evidenced by both the sudden illumination of an apartment window across the
street and a drowsy voice announcing the name “Huncke,” the narrator improvised a line of
conversation, engaging the man in an impromptu dialogue about guilt. The narrator asked
Huncke whether the man suffers from feelings of guilt. While the narrator claims that he for his
part could answer the question with a simple negative, Huncke’s voice betrayed an individual
both riddled with guilt and incapable of coping with the complex emotions arising from having
perpetrated some unspoken deed. The narrator received a highly emotional response from his
interlocutor that quickly escalated from hesitant wavering to staccato virulence: “Seine Stimme
zitterte, als er nun sprach, seine Schuld war aufgerufen, war plötzlich ins Unermeßliche
angewachsen, er zischte unter dem Atem: ‘Warte nur! Bald sind wir wieder da! Dann geht es
Euch an den Kragen!’” (32-33). Huncke initially addressed his interlocutor in the singular,
before immediately shifting to the plural. Provoked by specific circumstances to which the
narrator was not privy, Huncke delineated an ostensibly clear boundary between two sets of
entities in his deployment of the plural first- and second-person pronouns “wir” and “Euch,”
referring to a population apparently divided into two distinct groups: “we” and “you.” The
4

antagonism imminent in the threat of violence that the man predicted would be ushered in when
the “we” group, to which he claimed to belong, returned to power resembles an us-versus-them
mentality. During this telephone conversation, Huncke claimed allegiance to a group that has
unfinished business with this unidentified group labeled as “you,” establishing a strict dichotomy
between the two subject positions.
The episode then escalated further when the narrator, thrilled by a sense of momentary
triumph in compelling his interlocutor to admit his feelings of guilt, replied to Huncke’s
belligerence with a threat of his own. Though he claims not to know to whom Huncke’s “Euch”
exactly referred (“Ich weiß nicht, wen er mit ‘Euch’ meinte” [33]), Hildesheimer’s narrator
occupied the “you” subject position in opposition to his German interlocutor’s “we,” at least
rhetorically. The narrator, continuing the performance, exclaimed into the telephone receiver,
“‘Herr Huncke, hören Sie mir jetzt bitte gut zu: es ist alles entdeckt. Alles, verstehen Sie? Ich
möchte Ihnen daher raten: fliehen Sie, solange Ihnen noch Zeit bleibt!’” (33). As if engaging in a
game of poker, the narrator called Huncke’s bet and raised the stakes, claiming that Huncke’s
“we” will be stymied by the loss of anonymity and some other external authority that has been
allegedly “discovered” or been alerted to their identity. The narrator stated that flight from his
home (and perhaps exile) would be Huncke’s only avenue for avoiding what he implied would
be the German’s detection, imprisonment, and possible prosecution for some unnamed criminal
act. And the narrator’s ploy proved successful. Shortly after both parties had ended the call, he
observed from his window how Huncke’s apartment became the site of a flurry of late-night
activity that culminated in an obscured figure evacuating the building accompanied only by two
suitcases and speeding off in a taxi (33). Huncke failed to realize that his mysterious interlocutor
clandestinely observed his midnight departure.
5

What may at first glance appear to be a willfully malicious prank has specific historical
implications when we consider the larger socio-cultural context in which this nocturnal telephone
conversation is situated. The narrator clearly explains that he placed the telephone call while
residing in West Germany, a few years prior to the time of narration, and the 1963 date of the
Norwegian “Kursbuch” further establishes the setting as the second decade following the end of
World War II. Though the narrator did not explicitly accuse Huncke of being a Nazi, his inquiry
regarding guilt most certainly evokes one of the dominant discourses that defined postwar
German engagement with the recent National Socialist past—namely the “Schuldfrage”
(Brockmann 21). When Hildesheimer’s narrator mentions “Schuld” in a text published in 1965,
while embroiled in an antagonistic telephone conversation with a randomly selected West
German citizen, he implicitly references a larger historical framework of which the highly
charged postwar debates in the Federal Republic regarding German guilt were a constitutive
component. As Robert C. Holub explains, “In the immediate postwar years, guilt was not an
abstract concept, and while the Allies were in a position to decide how to deal with the most
abhorrent Nazi criminals, the Germans were left to themselves to confront the appalling crimes
undertaken in their name” (825). By introducing the question of guilt, the narrator invites the
reader to ponder who belongs to the two groups “we” and “you” to which Huncke referred. For a
narrating-I that demonstrates himself to be preoccupied, if not obsessed, with ascribing meaning
to the names of people and places, Hildesheimer’s narrator appears to skirt the issue of historical
particularity in favor of an open-endedness derived from the lack of precisely articulated
nomenclature—but only at first. As the episode unfolds and the narrator depicts how he had
placed a number nighttime phone calls, each conversation with a different interlocutor, it
becomes evident that he had been engaged in tracking down former Nazis and had been situating
6

himself, in the context of these conversations with Huncke and those that followed, in the subject
position of a Jewish Holocaust survivor and witness to Nazi crimes. We soon realize that Huncke
used the pronoun “we” to describe a cohort of Nazi criminals and the pronoun “you” to refer to
their past and potentially future Jewish victims.
Taking pleasure in this thrill, Hildesheimer’s narrator repeated this act of revenge on
several additional occasions, enjoying his ability to intimidate his interlocutors. After Huncke, he
telephoned, among others he can no longer remember, men with last names such as Kabasta,
Malkusch, Obwasser, and Selbach. All these recipients of the narrator’s phone calls fled as a
result of the conversation, with the exception of Kabasta. The phone call to Kabasta, the last one
that the narrator made of this sort, distinguished itself by the fact that the narrator had been
personally acquainted with this interlocutor in some way prior to the conversation.
Hildesheimer’s narrator explains that he knew Kabasta to be capable of violence or criminal
deeds (“Er war der einzige Partner in meinem Spiel, von dessen Existenz—einer furchtbaren
Existenz—ich vorher gewußt, and dazu der einzige, den ich jemals gesehen hatte” [42]). At an
earlier moment in the postwar period, the narrator had once sat at a table next to Kabasta in a
German inn and had observed him carousing with fellow members of a hunting party, drinking
copious amount of beer and liquor, devouring “etwas Schreckliches,” and raucously recounting
detailed war stories (43). Kabasta’s loud and boorish behavior at the inn reminded the narrator
that he had been seen the man at some point previously, during the war (we assume that the war
to which he refers is World War II). The narrator had once witnessed Kabasta murder an
acquaintance named Bloch. Hildesheimer’s narrator explains that Bloch “war, soweit ich mich
jetzt erinnere, der einzige Mensch, den ich jemals gekannt habe, der sich buchstäblich sein Grab
selbst schaufelte” (63). After Bloch had been forced to dig his own grave, Kabasta shot him in
7

the back of the head, letting the man’s body crumple and fall into the freshly dug pit. What
unfolds here in the text is an doubled act of witnessing: the narrator had witnessed Kabasta kill a
man in cold blood and then witnessed him some years later living in apparent impunity, enjoying
German village life and serving as the local “Landrat” (42).
Though Hildesheimer’s narrator does not explicitly name the circumstances in which the
murder of Bloch and his witnessing of it took place, he nonetheless provides clues that link this
murder to the Holocaust. In the same paragraph that he relates the fate of his acquaintance Bloch,
the narrator also discusses a woman named Doris Wiener who perished “in einer Gaskammer . . .
installiert von der Firma Föttle und Geiser” (63). What emerges with this overt reference to a gas
chamber, in conjunction with the narrator’s recollections of perished comrades and his erstwhile
habit of placing phone calls to perpetrators like Kabasta, is the self-portrait of a Holocaust
survivor representing, in stream-of-conscousness fashion, his struggle not only with the past, but
also with the present in postwar Germany. The narrator implies that he had been a fellow
prisoner along with Bloch, perhaps in a concentration camp where Kabasta had served as a guard
or some other figure of authority. The narrator is perhaps the sole witness in West Germany who
could attest to the grisly circumstances of the man’s death. Additionally, the narrator reveals that
he once beheld “Lampenschirme . . . aus heller menschlicher Haut, verfertigt in Deutschland von
einem deutschen Bastler, der heute als Pensionär in Schleswig-Holstein lebt” (139), thus
referencing grisly deeds perpetrated by Nazi officials against Jewish victims. Details such as
these provide the reader clues that Hildesheimer is actively engaged in depicting, explicitly and
implicitly, “die unmittelbare deutsche Vergangenheit und Gegenwart” (Lea 43). A subsequent
reference to the narrator’s family further establishes him as a Jewish Holocaust survivor. In
Encrypting the Past, Kirstin Gwyer argues that “[e]ven the narrator’s own father is included in
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the ranks of the victims [discussed] in Tynset” (190). His father, who “nicht sanft ins Jenseits
hinübergeschlummert [ist], sondern erschlagen von christlichen Familienvätern aus Wien und
Weserland” (156) perished as a result of “Christian” brutality. In opposition to these Christian
patriarchs from throughout the German-speaking world meting out violence and death, the
narrator and his father emerge as non-Christian, i.e. Jewish, victims of Nazi violence. At a
subsequent moment in the text, the narrator remarks that, while envisioning a jaunt through a
German city called Wilhelmstadt, he feels the architecture of the city come to life, forcing him
step by step into the “Judengasse, wo ich hingehöre” (118). The narrator reveals himself to be a
German Jew who can provide eyewitness testimony to events associated with the Holocaust. And
the men whom he calls on the telephone all have a past as Nazi perpetrators.2 The narrator’s
recollections of these phone calls and the moments of witnessing that engendered them form a
Holocaust testimony.
After having furtively observed Kabasta living in impunity in postwar West Germany,
Hildesheimer’s narrator felt compelled to add him to his list of phone call recipients. He explains
how he had hoped to produce “in einem solchen Mann auch nur das geringste Schwindelgefühl”
(42). While Huncke, as well as several additional conversational partners, was ultimately
intimidated into fleeing, Kabasta called his bluff, as it were, and threatened to track him down
(44-45). Fearing that he had stumbled upon someone without feelings of guilt or remorse, with
unknown resources and connections, the narrator hung up on Kabasta and put an end to his game
of revenge. The narrator, suffering great anxiety as a result of his conversation with this man,
chose to leave Germany shortly thereafter. It is only in the act of exile that the narrator claims to
2

In “Antworten über Tynset,” Hildesheimer specifically identifies these figures in the text as perpetrators who
played a role in the Nazi Judeocide: “Obwasser und Kabasta existieren tausendfach, ich kenne sie, ich war
Simultandolmetscher in Nürnberg, war auch bei außergerichtlichen Verhören zugegen, und ich weiß auch, wer frei
ausging und noch geht. Auch den Lampenschirmen aus menschlicher Haut—und Schlimmeres—habe ich gesehen.
Ob der Verfertiger heute noch in Schleswig-Holstein lebt, weiß ich nicht, halte es aber für wahrschelinlich” (384).
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have been able to escape this feeling of dread caused by the presence of these men—only after
he had fled the country (“Heute hat sich diese Angst gelegt, seit ich mich ihnen entzogen habe”
[39]). Although the narrator claims that he relished these few moments in which he was able to
intimidate this series of Holocaust perpetrators (with the exception of Kabasta), their seemingly
ubiquitous presence in postwar Germany leaves him feeling perpetually unsettled. In Tynset, “the
most important thematic nexus,” Gwyer argues, “is made up of variations on the theme of
persecution, which are played out in reference to an ever-growing assortment of so-called
‘Häscher,’ shadowy figures from the past” (189). The narrator feels as if one of these “Häscher”
could at any moment emerge to do him harm. With these “Häscher,” the narrator conjures both
the idea of Nazi perpetration and the presence of former Nazi officials and agents of varying
degrees of complicity in the National Socialist regime who often lived in postwar West Germany
in a state of ostensible legal indemnity. The narrator also depicts himself as a Jewish Holocaust
survivor whose attempts to live postwar Germany leave him unable to shake the sensation of
being persecuted.
While the cultural discussion surrounding German guilt in the immediate years of the
postwar period often failed to address Jewish victimization in particular, Germans found
themselves increasingly confronted with the atrocities associated with the Holocaust. By the time
Hildesheimer published Tynset in 1965, Germany’s “Schuldfrage” negotiated questions of
German guilt and the Nazi past in light of a burgeoning discourse surrounding witness
testimonies of Holocaust survivors, nourished in part as a result of the widely publicized
prosecution of high-ranking Nazi official Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem in 1961 and the 1963-65
Auschwitz Trials held in Frankfurt. The polarizing division between the “we” and “you” that
Huncke evoked during the first nighttime telephone conversation, when considered within the
10

larger sequence of telephone calls and the information that the narrator reveals, resembles a
confrontation between a Nazi perpetrator and Jewish Holocaust survivor. Seen in this light,
Huncke’s “we” refers to the Nazis and his use of the “you” pronoun refers to Jews. Huncke
threatened the return of the Nazis to power and a continuation of the Nazi persecution of
European Jews. This conversation recalls the dynamic between and discussions regarding the
concepts of Täter and Opfer in postwar Germany. And because the confrontation and Huncke’s
flight are initiated and staged by the narrator who slips into the subject position of “you” in
opposition to the German’s “we,” the dialogue emerges as an act of revenge, specifically Jewish
revenge.
But rather than revenge in the form of physical punishment or imprisonment, the
narrator’s vengeance arises as a result of the act of witnessing—through the assertion of
knowledge of the past deeds of these “Häscher.” In Remnants of Auschwitz, Giorgio Agamben
outlines revenge as one of various reasons that drove Holocaust survivors to bear witness to their
experiences in Nazi-run ghettos and concentration camps in the form of testimony (15). The acts
of telephonic revenge in Hildesheimer’s novel, an extension of previous acts of witnessing such
as that of the murder of Bloch, employs the language of guilt, perpetration, and witnessing for
the purpose of exposing Huncke, Kabasta, and the others, with the intent of driving them from
their position of postwar bourgeois comfort in unidentified West German locales. Hildesheimer’s
narrator deploys the discursive tools of the perpetrator-victim dynamic to tease out the guilt lying
dormant in the psyche of an otherwise average German citizen (a tack that proved successful,
until the phone call with Kabasta). The telephone receivers into which the narrator and the
“Häscher” speak recall the electronic devices used for simultaneous translation and interpretation
during court cases. We are reminded of the images of Eichmann sitting behind a bulletproof
11

shield during his trial in Israel, intently listening to the German translation of the court
proceedings by way of a headset nestled against his ears. Other notable war crime tribunals also
come to mind, such as the Nuremberg Trials (at which Hildesheimer served as a simultaneous
interpreter). The narrator’s midnight phone calls resemble aspects of such courtroom scenarios.
By inquiring as to whether his interlocutors experience feelings of guilt, Hildesheimer’s narrator
seeks to provoke them to confess their crimes, to admit their past deeds as Nazi perpetrators.
But these technological devices—the telephone, the headset—also emphasize the act of
communication. The narrator’s act of revenge is made possible by dialogue, however fraught
with tension it may be. The narrator’s engagement with Huncke, Kabasta, and the others is both
confrontation and conversation. The interplay between two discrete voices, I argue, creates a
discursive space in the narration for the dialogical interaction between “we” and “them”—
between perpetrator and victim. This dialogical interaction interrupts the narrator’s monologue
(and his insomniac solitude), serving as a vehicle for a Jewish Holocaust survivor to begin to
address and come to terms with the Nazi past.
The German Jewish Post-Holocaust Novel
I take the example of Hildesheimer’s Tynset as a starting point for The German Jewish
Post-Holocaust Novel: Narrative and a Literary Language for Loss, because it encapsulates
many of the philosophical, historical, aesthetic, and linguistic concerns that German-language
Jewish writers confront in the post-Holocaust period. The novel also highlights many of the
narrative features that I identify and discuss in the four German-language Jewish post-Holocaust
novels that I explore in the following four chapters. The episode with the telephone calls
highlights part of what is at stake for German and Austrian Jews writing in the wake of the
Holocaust, in a language problematized on account of its implementation and instrumentalization
12

under National Socialism, for an audience often more concerned with the recent German past
and Germans’ own problems of guilt or notions of victimhood than with the experiences of the
victims of the Nazi regime. Hildesheimer’s novel gestures toward the problems inherent to
representing for a postwar German readership the survivor’s traumatic past and traumatized
present, including the difficulties posed by the act of witnessing in the framework of the German
language. These problems include the mode of address, the representation of voice, the search
for dialogue between perpetrator and victim, and anxiety regarding the possibilities and
limitations of narrative. Hildesheimer’s text reminds us that the problems German Jewish authors
face after 1945 are both mitigated by and further complicated through the act of narration. The
novels analyzed in this dissertation all reveal a preoccupation with narration and narrative, as
they self-reflexively, often by way of the figure of the narrator, call attention to the process of
telling and bearing witness to the Holocaust. The narrators, who often position themselves as
eyewitnesses to the traumatic violence of the Shoah, reflect on the act of relating not only their
own stories, but also stories belonging to others who perished.
This dissertation is a study of a constellation of post-Holocaust novels by German Jewish
authors that articulate, through particular narrative strategies, an alternative history or “antihistory” of the Nazi Judeocide. I analyze Jossel Wassermanns Heimkehr and Der Nazi und der
Friseur by Edgar Hilsenrath, Jakob der Lügner by Jurek Becker, and Der siebente Brunnen by
Fred Wander to demonstrate how the writers, all of whom survived the events of the Shoah,
respond through imaginative fiction to the loss of millions of lives and millions of stories—the
lost testimonies—of these millions of lives. Because these millions of Jews did not survive, their
stories in turn cannot contribute to the archive of historical experience. In grappling with this
disnarrated body of Holocaust testimony—the lost minute details of individual lives that cannot
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be recorded and therefore fall largely outside of the purview of history—these novels gesture
toward that which has been lost and thus resists representation on account of its very absence. In
constant tension with the historical reality of the Holocaust, the alternative history or “antihistory” articulated in these novels provides scenarios that both imagine the possibility of Jewish
agency through narrative and simultaneously underscore the limitations of narrative and its
inability to change the past.
This novelistic engagement with the Holocaust is, I argue, both commemoratory and
elegiac. In four chapters, each devoted to one of the four novels under consideration, I examine
how Becker, Hilsenrath, and Wander revive various aspects of the Eastern European Jewish
literary tradition prior to the Shoah, while simultaneously mourning the loss of Eastern European
Jewry. I employ the term elegiac particularly with respect to the ways in which Jakob der
Lügner, Jossel Wassermanns Heimkehr, and Der siebente Brunnen pay tribute to the lost world
of Ashkenaz.3 The elegy is an expression of grieving or lamentation that channels the emotional
process of mourning into an aesthetic form. For their part, these novels lament the near
eradication of Eastern European Jewish culture, and this lamentation pays tribute to this culture,
at least in part, by incorporating and aestheticizing in the German language elements of Yiddish
literary culture—Yiddish being one of the primary languages of Ostjudentum (especially in the
eyes of many German-speaking Jews). In these texts, Becker, Hilsenrath, and Wander tend to
focus on the experiences of Eastern European Jewry in the Holocaust rather than those of
German Jews, even though these texts were all written in German and by German-speaking
Jews. It is not that the history and culture of German Jews lacks relevance or importance for
these authors—quite the contrary. By highlighting elements of Ashkenaz, these texts explore
3

I use “Ashkenaz” here as a synonym for Eastern European Jewry, though the term can technically refer to
Germany as well.
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cultural, historical, and linguistic connections and links between German Jews and Yiddishspeaking Eastern European Jews. To some extent, these post-Holocaust novels present a German
Jewish articulation of the process of commemorating Ashkenaz, a version of German Jewish
memory of Eastern European Jews. By memorializing and mourning primarily the near
destruction of Eastern European Jewish life, these works engage, to various degrees, thematically
with the population that made up both the center of density of Jewish life in Europe and the vast
majority of Holocaust victims. In my view, these texts offer a meditation on the process of
seeking a sign for a referent that resists easy signification. I do not wish to suggest here that the
Holocaust is ineffable, for these novels, along with many other works of fiction and non-fiction,
demonstrate the contrary. But the near destruction of Ashkenaz as a result of the Nazi Judeocide
and the magnitude of this loss present a challenge in terms of representation. In other words,
these texts endeavor to articulate a narrative framework that can gesture toward that which was
and that which is no more: the presence of Eastern European Jewish life prior to the Holocaust
and its absence after. Additionally, these authors all have biographical connections to Eastern
European Jewry: Becker grew up in a Jewish family in Łódź, Poland and spent much of his early
childhood in the Jewish ghetto there after the Nazis occupied the city in 1939; Hilsenrath spent a
portion of his youth living in the shtetl Sereth in the Romanian Bukovina before being deported
to the ghetto Mogilev-Podolsk in 1941; and Wander grew up in Vienna in a working class Jewish
family, the son of recent immigrants from Galicia.
Their texts evince, in varying degrees, a preoccupation with Eastern European Jewish life
prior to the Holocaust that encompasses the following: the spaces associated with Ashkenaz,
such as the shtetl; cultural and literary practices such as storytelling; and Yiddish language and
literature. My investigation reveals how three of these novels, Jossel Wassermanns Heimkehr,
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Der siebente Brunnen, and Jakob der Lügner, specifically incorporate Yiddish modes of
storytelling and defining elements of Yiddish narrative style in the tradition of writers such as
Sholem Aleichem and Sholem Yankev Ambramovitsh (also known as Mendele Moykher
Sforim). In the case of all four novels, I explore the dialogic, or the interactions among various
voices and levels of narration, as well as a literary trope I term the “almost lost story.” All of
these narrative elements are deployed in various configurations to engage an active search for a
metonymical stand-in for the many stories and testimonies of Holocaust victims that cannot be
told. The “almost lost story” serves as a moment of resistance to an otherwise infinite ellipsis
that can never be truly filled in. Taking into account both historical analysis and critical insights
from the field of narrative theory, I pose questions about how these narratives operate both
thematically and structurally. Novelistic discourse allows for the emergence of a sustained use of
various rhetorical strategies in narrative. The long form of the novel provides these authors the
wide range of possibilities available in imaginative fiction to formulate an “anti-history” of the
Holocaust that privileges the personal minutiae of lost millions over an often seamlessly
constructed history that has no access to the anti-archival evidence of lost testimony. In the
German Jewish post-Holocaust novel, lost testimony can be accounted for and (at least partially)
documented and recuperated through imaginative fiction.
Voice
One of the principal concerns of my investigation into these texts is voice. For the
purposes of this dissertation, voice refers to two distinct, yet often interwoven or interlocking,
narrative components. Firstly, voice refers to the human voice as it is represented in narrative,
often in the form of reported speech. The novels that I analyze are all characterized by a
preoccupation with rendering voices, either in the form of the narrator’s own voice or in various
forms of reported speech placed into the mouths of various characters. These post-Holocaust
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novels represent the voices of a survivor-narrator who survives to bear witness both to personal
experience and to reconstruct the voices—and by extension, the lives and stories—of perished
friends, comrades, and fellow prisoners in ghettos and concentration camps. These narratorial
voices thus mediate the voices of others. In Der siebente Brunnen and Jakob der Lügner, the
principal narrators situate themselves as Holocaust survivors whose primary concern is
employing narrative as a mode for memorializing those who perished and cannot speak for
themselves. In this respect, the narrators deployed by Becker and Wander both rely on narrative
form to provide an avenue for representing their memories of individuals whom they once knew.
In Jossel Wassermanns Heimkehr, an unidentified narrator constructs a text with parallel
narrative strands. One strand represents the words of the eponymous Jossel Wassermman, who
survives the Holocaust after emigrating to Switzerland and leaving his hometown, the shtetl
Pohodna, behind, while another strand depicts the words and deeds of various residents of
Pohodna in the moment of their deportation by train to a concentration or death camp. The
devious narrator Max Schulz in Der Nazi und der Friseur represents his own voice, as both
narrator and as character, in the diegesis. On the extradiegetic level, he is the perpetrator Max
Schulz, and on the diegetic level, he speaks in the purloined voice and identity of Holocaust
victim Itzig Finkelstein. While inhabiting both subject positions, Max emphasizes the
representation of speech, often in the form of direct quotation.
Secondly, voice refers to narrative voice or narrative perspective. My investigation into
these four novels is underpinned by an understanding of narrative voice nourished by
narratologist Gérard Genette’s interrelated concepts of mood and voice. Genette famously
employs terms lifted from the field of structural linguistics and applies them more broadly to
narrative texts. According to his framework, “mood” and “voice,” which conventionally refer to
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aspects of verbal tense in language, help readers of narrative to formulate answers to “the
question who sees? and the question who speaks?” (186). For Genette, the otherwise ostensibly
“indicative” mood of all narratives, whose purpose is “simply to tell a story and therefore to
‘report’ facts (real or ficitive),” can be complicated by considering the manifold ways in which
narrators represent themselves and the characters for whom they are responsible (161). While
narrative itself is never conditional or subjunctive per se, what is narrated is communicated with
varying degrees of reliability and with various “voices.” Sometimes we encounter the voices and
perspectives of characters provided by a narrator who obscures his or her own presence in the act
of narration. At other times, the narrator plays a demonstrative role in showing the reader what
and how he or she narrates.
And because the narrators in the four novels under analysis here are all in the position to
tell stories belonging to victims of the Holocaust, we see an anxiety about their own role in
telling the stories and representing the words of individuals who, on account of historical
violence, cannot provide testimony in their own right. Genette’s hesitation regarding the “mood”
of narrative takes on particular contours, I argue, when considering Holocaust literature in
general and these novels more specifically. In their own way, the principal narrators in these
novels all raise the following epistemological questions: What would happen if I were not here to
tell these stories? Can my telling do justice, however incomplete it may be, to those whom I
endeavor to memorialize? How does narrative perspective occlude or reveal the essence of those
who cannot speak in their right? The “mood” of these novels, while indicative in a strict sense,
all border on the subjunctive or the conditional. Without the intervention of the narrator, the
stories related would be lost to oblivion. To combat this anxiety, these narrators emphasize the
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representation of speech and the voices of others, thus also highlighting the process of mediation
and the role of narrative perspective.
The Dialogic
The preoccupation in these texts with the representation of voices often expresses itself in
the interaction between two voices or among multiple voices. All the principal narrators in the
novels that I explore demonstrate a desire to represent the act of verbal communication with
other voices—other human subjectivities, be they real and remembered according to the logic of
the story world or imagined. This interaction produces, I argue, dialogical exchange between
discrete subjectivities, often between the figure of the character-narrator and other characters in
the text. In addition, the narrators of these texts often deploy metaleptic shifts back and forth
between diegesis and extradiegesis. These shifts in turn engender self-conscious reflection on the
extradiegetic level regarding the process of narration occurring on the diegetic level. This
metaleptic oscillation also energizes dialogical interplay among the structural levels of narration.
For the purposes of this dissertation, I propose an understanding of the terms “dialogical
exchange” and “dialogical interplay” that is consonant with Mikhail Bakhtin’s concept of the
dialogic. In discussing the term heteroglossia, Bakhtin explains the concept of double-voiced
discourse, in which we find “two voices, two meanings, and two expressions that are dialogically
interrelated [...]” (324). Though Bakhtin principally argues that double-voiced discourse involves
the voice of the author and that of the character, his discussion sheds light on the dialogical
interplay between narrators and characters in the four post-Holocaust novels that I discuss. What
we encounter in these texts are various constellations of voices in communication with one
another. At times, these exchanges resemble diaphony, while at other junctures a multitude of
voices in conversation with one another, such as in Jossel Wassermanns Heimkehr, have a
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multivocal character. The dialogic in the Bakhtinian sense emerges out of the interaction
between separate identities, orchestrated by the character-narrator.
Overview of Chapters
In my first chapter, I analyze how Hilsenrath’s Jossel Wassermanns Heimkehr establishes
metaliterary links to Sholem Aleichem’s Railroad Stories in his deployment of a poetics of
locomotive movement that creates a literary bridge between Yiddish-language depictions of
Jewish train travel prior to World War II and the ubiquitous post-Holocaust trope of the cattle car
associated with the “Final Solution.” What emerges is a post-Holocaust railroad story in the
tradition of Sholem Aleichem and other Yiddish writers. Although the world belonging to the
Jews from the Eastern European shtetl Pohodna, and by extension the entirety of Eastern
European Jewry, would, as the narrator elegiacally remarks, never again be the same after the
Holocaust, the novel is predicated on a narrative practice that attempts to represent literarily and
to recuperate facets of this lost world. This chapter investigates the mechanics of this
recuperation, demonstrating how Hilsenrath articulates in Jossel Wassermanns Heimkehr a
poetics of train transportation that makes overt intertextual overtures to pre-Holocaust Yiddish
writing, carving out a space for Jewish agency that arises precisely out of the practice of
imaginative fiction.
In my second chapter, I argue that the narrator Max Schulz’s “dialogues” with his
murdered Jewish friend Itzig are key to interpreting Hilsenrath’s Der Nazi und der Friseur.
These conversations, which occur only in his narration, come to the fore at the precise moment
when Max, who has taken on Itzig’s identity in order to evade prosecution for crimes he
committed as an SS officer, emigrates to pre-state Israel aboard a sailing vessel named Exitus.
While in the guise of Itzig, Max the Holocaust perpetrator depicts the story of the emigration of a
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European Jew to Palestine and his survival following World War II, but this story must remain,
no matter how attractive it may be to readers, an illusion, for Max persistently reminds his
audience that the real Itzig is dead and a counterfeiter inhabits the existence he might have had,
had he survived. I analyze how Max establishes a dual identity as both victim and perpetrator
with the practice of unreliable, injured narration that is ostensibly linked to sexual abuse he
suffered as a child. Taking Bakhtin’s notion of the dialogic as a point of analytical departure, I
also investigate how Hilsenrath’s devious narrator animates and manipulates a dialogical
interaction between his discrete identities as victim and perpetrator. Max’s deployment of this
dialogic articulates a post-perpetration self that constitutes a continuation of the former self that
perpetrates (i.e. the self that murdered) after the crimes have been committed and the
perpetration itself has ended. I assert that his elaborate strategy for evading detection and
responsibility in the post-Holocaust period by living in the pilfered guise of one of his victims
operates as a narrative iteration of the self that perpetrated war crimes in the Holocaust. While
Max’s manipulation of narration and performance of multiple identities are certainly not
tantamount to the original crime of murder, his self-contradicting narratorial habit of switching
between opposing subject positions for the purpose of evading guilt reinforces for the reader his
status as mass murderer and war criminal, thus reaffirming his identity as perpetrator.
In my third chapter, I illustrate how Fred Wander’s Der siebente Brunnen foregrounds
various rhetorical strategies that its narrator deploys for staging multivocality. I employ the term
multivocality to refer to the chorus of voices belonging to various characters that speak their own
words or tell their own stories over the course of the novel. These stories arise out of
conversation between the narrator and these other characters. Wander’s novel, I argue, is
fundamentally underpinned by dialogical interaction—interaction that creates multiple sites in
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the text for the cultivation of memory and the expression of mourning. My analysis focuses on
narration and the narrator’s portrayal of other characters who narrate either in their own words or
through the words the narrator recalls or imagines them uttering. I analyze three particular
characters and the narrative instances or configurations that allow the narrator to explore various
strategies for mediating the voices of others. An analysis of each of these configurations reveals
how Wander’s novel assembles both structurally and thematically multivocal discourse. I
investigate the narrator’s dialogical interactions with Eastern European Jewish storytellers, the
narrative’s deployment of Yiddish language and Yiddish literary techniques, and the narrator’s
development of a type of “midrash” that allows for the empathetic interpretation of the suffering
of others. The Buberian theoretical model of the “I-Thou” relationship, Bakhtin’s notion of the
dialogic, and narrative theorist Lisa Zunshine’s scholarship on theory of mind and the
representation of fictional characters’ mental states provide a theoretical framework for
investigating these three narrative figures. I demonstrate how Wander’s Holocaust survivornarrator repeatedly eschews purely monological narration in favor of animating dialogical
interaction that recuperates the memory of the dead.
My fourth chapter, devoted to Jurek Becker’s novel Jakob der Lügner, examines the
staging of language. I explore Becker’s largely monolingual representation of the historically
multilingual world of Jews imprisoned in a Nazi-run ghetto. Though this multilingual milieu is
represented in the novel nearly entirely in German, there are moments in the text in which
linguistic difference is installed on the semantic level, mostly as evidenced by the presence of a
scattering of Yiddish vocabulary throughout the text. Becker’s narrator struggles to find a way
for the experiences of others to come to the fore. While Becker’s narrator appears cognizant that
his perished friends and fellow ghetto internees can neither speak for themselves nor tell their
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stories in their own words (or voices), he nevertheless endeavors to find a narrative structure that
can speak in two voices at once, his and those of the characters whom he portrays. Despite its
monolingual representation, Becker’s narrator seeks a form and structure in his narration that can
approximate a “dialogic monologue,” or a blending of voices and perspectives. Echoing the
complex interplay between monologue and dialogue in the medium of radio, Becker’s narrator
develops narratorial strategies that gesture toward the dialogic within the framework of primarily
monologic discourse.
My investigation into these four texts reflects a desire to participate in the scholarly
conversation regarding German Jewish writing in general and German Jewish fiction about the
Holocaust more specifically. I situate this study into this larger conversation, which has a
complex and somewhat fragmented history, as postwar German Jewish fiction has often
occupied something of a blind spot, in both Germanistik and Anglo-American Holocaust Studies
respectively. In her 2014 study of German Jewish Holocaust novels written by members of what
she terms the “first generation,” Kirstin Gwyer insightfully summarizes the historical trajectory
of the scholarly reception of German Jewish writing about the Holocaust. She explains how
“[l]iterary scholarship in Germany came late to studying German-Jewish survivor writing in any
form and to this day rarely gives consideration to the Holocaust novel (as it has established itself
internationally, particularly in the US)” (2). She further outlines how postwar German literature
abounds with examples of representations of Germany’s National Socialist past, but most often
this past “has almost exclusively been presented from the perspective of the perpetrators and not
the persecuted,” in works penned overwhelmingly by non-Jews (2). As Gwyer explains it,
German Jews have, for the most past, been either excluded from Germany’s literary engagement
with the Nazi past or have been “subsum[ed], [such as] in the case of Peter Weiss [...] under the
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general heading of Nachkriegsliteratur” (2). Nevertheless, there have been important scholarly
works by German academics on German Jewish fiction about the Holocaust that aim to “counter
this incorporative or appropriative trend and make space for the viewpoint of the excluded
[Jewish] other” (Gwyer 3), such as Stephan Braese’s 2001 Die andere Erinnerung, Norbert Otto
Eke and Hartmut Steinecke’s 2006 edited volume Shoah in der deutschsprachigen Literatur.
Anglo-American Holocaust Studies has also failed, for the most part, to provide a fruitful
platform for scholarly engagement with German Jewish post-Holocaust fiction, as scholars in
this arena have often ignored German-language texts (Gwyer 5). In the realm of Anglo-American
German Studies, there have been several insightful contributions to the study of German Jewish
fiction on the Holocaust, including Verfolgung bis zum Massenmord: Holocaust-Diskurse in
deutscher Sprache aus der Sicht der Verfolgten by Dagmar Lorenz; Leslie Morris and Jack
Zipes’ 2002 study Unlikely History: The Changing German-Jewish Symbiosis, 1945-2000;
German-Jewish Literature in the Wake of the Holocaust: Grete Weil, Ruth Klüger, and the
Politics of Address by Pascale R. Bos; Katja Garloff’s 2005 Words from Abroad: Trauma and
Displacement in Postwar German Jewish Writers; and the 2008 volume Rebirth of a Culture:
Jewish Identity and Jewish Writing in Germany and Austria Today, edited by Hillary Hope
Herzog, Todd Herzog, and Benjamin Lapp. But there is still much scholarly work to be done in
the realm of Jewish fiction on the Holocaust penned by speakers of German, which often
“represent[s] a point of view that is too Jewish for the German literary canon but at the same
time too German for any international canon of Holocaust fiction, even though both the trigger
for, and the conditions of, [this] writing would absolutely warrant its inclusion into the latter”
(Gwyer 5). The study that I undertake here participates in drawing attention to this lacuna, to this
underresearched area of both German Studies and Holocaust Studies.
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Gwyer’s Encrypting the Past mirrors the scholarly impulse behind my study in many
ways, but with significant distinctions. Her study focuses on what she terms “first generation”
German Jewish writers who all personally experienced the Holocaust in some way and
responded to it, often obliquely, in works of fiction. While this designation allows her to
concentrate on German Jewish writers such as H. G. Adler, Jenny Aloni, and Erich Fried, who
have been almost entirely neglected by the general public and scholars alike, her use of the term
“first generation,” even though stemming from a desire to be inclusive, nonetheless performs an
exclusionary gesture of its own. The term “first generation” is, in my view, somewhat artificial in
the case of German Jews who compose works of fiction about the Holocaust. There are several
German Jewish authors, such as Jurek Becker and Edgar Hilsenrath, whose relatively young age
during the Holocaust would situate them, according to Gwyer’s model, somewhere in between a
generation of Jewish writers who survived the Holocaust and a subsequent, younger generation
whose members have no personal memories of the Shoah per se.4 Because it is first and foremost
a literary history, Gwyer’s study relies on this designation of “first generation” as an organizing
principle for defining and shaping a history of German Jewish literary output in the years
immediately following the end of World War II (roughly 1945-65). The analyses I put forth in
the following four chapters do not endeavor to comprise a literary history or an historical survey
of German Jewish post-Holocaust fiction. Instead, The German Jewish Post-Holocaust Novel:
Narrative and A Literary Language for Loss concentrates primarily on the features of narrative
in novels by Jurek Becker, Edgar Hilsenrath, and Fred Wander. Though I take into account the
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In Crises of Memory and the Second World War, Susan Rubin Suleiman proposes the term “1.5 generation” as a
way of re-thinking the concepts of “first generation” and “second generation” with respect to Holocaust survivors,
their children, and the complex processes of memory (178-214). Suleiman’s concept underscores the need for
nuance and (greater) precision when considering categories as seemingly unfluctuating as “Holocaust survivors” and
“children of Holocaust survivors.” Jurek Becker and Edgar Hilsenrath, among other Jewish authors writing in
German, arguably belong to this “1.5 generation.”
25

specifics of historical events of the Holocaust referenced in the four literary texts that I
investigate, my approach relies first and foremost on insights from the field of narrative theory as
a theoretical framework. My research into these German Jewish post-Holocaust novels reveals a
preoccupation with the processes and practice of narration. These novels all self-reflexively call
attention to their narrativity in marked and important ways. The tools of narratology help us
unlock the structural operations of these texts, in turn enriching our understanding of the
possibilities and limitations of narrative as a method for Holocaust memorialization and
commemoration. I have chosen to place these four novels into conversation with one another,
because they all point to narrative form and structure as essential components in registering the
experience of the Holocaust and conveying this memory to the reader.
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Chapter One:
Imagining Jewish Agency Through the Lens of a Yiddish Literary Past: The Poetics Movement
in Edgar Hilsenrath’s Jossel Wassermanns Heimkehr
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Introduction
The prologue to Edgar Hilsenrath’s 1993 novel Jossel Wassermanns Heimkehr
commences with a group of Jews from the fictional Romanian shtetl Pohodna who are in the grip
of preparing for the train journey that will most assuredly lead to their annihilation in a Nazi-run
concentration or extermination camp. In the opening paragraph, the unidentified narrator sets the
stage with an initially picturesque portrayal that takes on a foreboding tenor as the reader begins
to suspect the destination and purpose of this journey:
Es hatte die ganze Nacht geschneit, aber am frühen Morgen als die Schtetljuden mit ihren
Bündeln und Koffern zum Bahnhof gingen, lockerten sich die Wolken auf, und über dem
Bahnhof öffnete sich ein Stückchen blaßblauer Himmel. Es war ganz klar. Dort oben
hatte der liebe Gott ein Guckloch in die Wolken gebohrt, um die letzten Juden noch
einmal zu sehen, ehe sie fortzogen. Vielleicht wollte Gott auch das Schtetl sehen, zum
letzten Mal, denn es würde nie wieder so sein wie es war. (7)
In this instance, the reader has access to both a divine and human perspective, as we see a clear,
blue sky stretching all the way into the infinite heavens on a bitterly cold winter day as the “last”
Jews line up to board a train marks the moment of irrevocable change. The narrator’s depiction
of the Jews being observed in transit by God, who in this context appears not quite as omnipotent
or as omniscient as we might like him to be, recalls the image of the original Exodus. This
intertext does not, however, efface the historical particularity of the moment depicted in the
passage above. The image of a group of Jews boarding a train in a text written and published
after 1945 automatically conjures up the systematized and brutal deportations of the Nazis’
“Final Solution.” Nevertheless, the opening lines of the novel, while foregrounding a diegesis
predicated on actual historical events, clearly evince features of imaginative fiction, such as
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allusion, visually rich descriptions, and an ostensibly omniscient narrator. This initial setup
provides the reader with key tools for charting the work as a whole.
The intermingling of historical reference and imaginative literary detail present in the
prologue is illustrative of the novel’s overarching narrative project. While the novel is firmly
grounded in a specific historical moment, it is ultimately a work of imaginative fiction telling its
own story—its own version of this history. How Hilsenrath shapes this imaginative fiction both
structurally and thematically, with a nod to the Yiddish literary tradition (as well as Jewish
writing more broadly), forms the foundation for my investigation into his novel. What emerges is
a post-Holocaust railroad story in the tradition of Sholem Aleichem and Sholem Yankev
Abramovitsh, arguably best known by his nom de plume and literary alter ego, Mendele
Moykher Sforim. Although the world belonging to the Jews from Pohodna, and by extension the
entirety of eastern European Jewry, would never again be the same after the Holocaust, as the
narrator elegiacally remarks, the novel is predicated on a narrative practice that attempts to
represent literarily and to recuperate—however fleeting and ephemeral—facets of this lost world.
This chapter investigates the mechanics of this recuperation, as I demonstrate how Hilsenrath
articulates in Jossel Wassermanns Heimkehr a poetics of train transportation that makes overt
intertextual overtures to previous Yiddish writing, carving out a space for Jewish agency that
arises precisely out of the practice of imaginative fiction.
Imagined Possibilities: Narrative Movement and Jewish Agency
As post-Holocaust readers, we know, or can measurably infer, the nature of what is about
to befall this group of Jews about to board the cattle car; however, lest we forget, one of the nonJewish shtetl inhabitants observing the deportation informs his compatriots (in turn reminding
the reader): “‘ich habe gehört, daß die Juden ins Feuer fahren’” (7). Despite the terrible events
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that will have taken place by the novel’s epilogue, the prologue remains focused on the lives and
individual histories of the people on the train. Once the Jews board the train car with the few
belongings they have been allotted by Romanian authorities, the narrator shifts perspective away
from the exterior space of the small train depot to a depiction of the cattle car’s confining
interior. The reader “follows,” as it were, the Jews on their journey and “enters” the train car
along with them (at least temporarily). And by focalizing much of the depiction of the
deportation through individual characters (particularly Jankl) now locked in the cattle car, the
novel invites the reader to consider this experience specifically from the perspective of the
victims. In The Train Journey: Transit, Captivity, and Witnessing in the Holocaust, Simone
Gigliotti argues that the “debilitating effects [of the cattle car experience] were concealed behind
the Nazi propaganda image of trains in constant and circuitous motion to different wartime
destinations” (2). “Deliberately omitted from this vision,” she further asserts, “was the hidden
struggle of the deportees,” which could include “overcrowding, unwanted touch, unexpectedly
erotic moments, shame, nakedness, starvation, insanity, death, and affirmations of human will”
(2). The depiction in the novel’s prologue of Jewish shtetl inhabitants rounded up and deported
by train resists this kind of impulse to obfuscate the extent of human suffering in the context of
train deportations engineered by the Nazis, offering the reader instead glimpses inside a train car
that will contain the kinds of experiences that Gigliotti discusses.
Highlighting the train journey’s moment of embarking, the narrator reveals to the reader
what occurs inside the train car in the initial moments following departure:
Noch herrschte keine Panik im Waggon, denn sie waren kaum eine Stunde unterwegs.
Noch war genug Essen da und auch genug Wasser, denn jeder hatte vorgesorgt. Auch
mußte keiner dringend seine Notdurft verrichten. Der Güterwagen, in anderen Zeiten für
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den Transport von Gütern und Schlachtvieh bestimmt, war völlig überfüllt und alles
andere als bequem, alle wurden hin- und hergeschüttelt, und viele mußten aus
Platzmangel stehen, aber da die Fahrt erst angefangen hatte, murrte noch keiner. Man
versuchte, es auszuhalten. (8-9)
The narrator indicates that the horrors we have come to associate with these transports to
concentration and extermination camps—thirst, hunger, overcrowding, filth, etc., will eventually
befall the Jewish characters whom the narrator subsequently introduces—but not just yet. In
place of details relating suffering that has not yet begun to develop, the narrator portrays
something seemingly unexpected given the context: the shtetl Jews begin to tell one another
stories. In particular, the poor water carrier Jankl Wassermann narrates the story, in dialogue
with several other characters, of how he recently found out that he has been named heir to his
Uncle Jossel’s fortune. He received word of this astonishing development shortly before the
deportation decree. The shtetl’s other inhabitants desire the full story. We learn that Jankl’s
uncle, a former resident of Pohodna and the eponymous Onkel Jossel in the novel’s title, whose
life story will constitute the novel’s main narrative, has named a beneficiary—his last living
blood relative. From the outset, we suspect that Jankl will never live to enjoy his inheritance;
nevertheless, the narrator provides the opportunity for him to tell his story. Movement through
time and space in the story world, as we shall see, provides the catalyst for the act of narration.
The train car becomes a vehicle not only for transportation but also for the act of storytelling.
Jankl provides the lawyer Fischel Rosenkranz and the matchmaker Chane Sure with details
regarding his uncle Jossel’s testament, which in turn engender a conversation about what Jankl
might do with his windfall (9-11). He discusses with his compatriots his desire to marry. They
try to convince him that his newfound wealth would make possible a marriage to one of the
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rabbi’s daughters—a high honor in the community. Interspersed throughout their conversation
and storytelling, we find details regarding the movement of the train and its effect on Jankl’s
body: “Der Wasserträger sagte nichts mehr. Er blickte eine Weile in den leeren Raum über den
Köpfen der Menge. Sein riesiger Körper, an die Tür des Waggons gelehnt, fing das Rattern des
Zuges auf und zuckte beim Klicken der eisernen Räder” (13). After briefly mulling over their
advice in silence, Jankl insists that he would prefer to take the hunchbacked Rifke, daughter of
the cobbler Katz, as his wife (13). Like the rattling of the train car and the forward movement of
the locomotive, Jankl’s announcement of his plan to marry Rifke and the subsequent
conversation this news engenders carry his thoughts further, encouraging him to imagine a future
life with Rifke. Pondering a life after the war and energized by the hope such thinking brings, he
imagines: “Der Wasserträger war gar nicht müde. Je später es wurde, um so wohler fühlte er
sich. Denn er wußte jetzt genau, was er wollte. Er wollte Rifke [. . .] Es wäre ja gelacht, wenn
[der Schuster Katz] Rifke nicht hergeben würde. Und er konnte es jetzt wirklich sehen: Er und
Rifke unter dem Baldachin. Und später in ihrer warmen Hütte” (15). He imagines the life they
might have together, in which they love one another deeply, despite their respective physical
irregularities (15-6). Jankl’s private love story is encapsulated within the circumstances of the
journey. The narrative foregrounds how the Jews from Pohodna, trapped and helpless in the
grueling environment of the cattle car, resort to an activity that allows them some measure of
relief. Not only does this storytelling provide a means of imaginative escape, no matter how
temporary, it also provides a degree of agency, however limited in scope.
The trope of the enclosed space of the train car, along with the conversation and
storytelling that arise as a result of the circumstances of the railway journey, harken back to
famous stories by one of the masters of Yiddish literature, Sholem Rabinovitsh, also known by
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his pen name Sholem Aleichem. Written between 1902 and 1910 and published as a collection
for the first time in 1911 (Halkin xxxii), The Railroad Stories: Tales of A Commercial Traveller
(Di Ayzenbangeshikhtes) feature a principal character-narrator whose conversations with and
eavesdropping on various groups of Jews on train journeys throughout the Russian Empire
provide the impetus for narration. According to Leah Garrett, as a result of the spread of
modernization from Western Europe eastward (even into the poorest and least industrialized
corners of the Pale of Settlement), “for [Sholem Aleichem] and the Jews he was describing, the
railroad car became a setting for telling stories” (Garrett 106). In these stories, the narrator finds
himself time and again traveling in third-class train compartments occupied almost exclusively
by fellow Jews. The character-narrator, with one foot in the diegesis and another in the
metadiegesis, situates himself as observer of the interactions in these compartments and as
interlocutor who provides the opportunity for characters to “speak” to readers outside the
confines of the railway car. The characters he introduces tell their stories in their own words in
the presence of the narrator and other passengers, resulting in a web of stories embedded within
the larger narrative framework. David Roskies succinctly explains this phenomenon:
“Sholem Aleichem invented a new kind of topical tale that was open and closed at one
and the same time: framed within a narrative with an arbitrary ending was a story that
was structurally complete. The only one who could move in and out of the two frames
was the storyteller within the tale, which made him, by default and by design, the story’s
proper hero. To raise the stakes in the contest between history and story, Sholem
Aleichem transplanted the art of storytelling to the most secular and unstable setting yet:
the third-class compartment of a Russian train.” (177)
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The character-narrator’s metadiegetic preambles glide seamlessly into the principal story world
of the train car, which in turn blends effortlessly into the diegetic world of a new tale being told
by one of the character passengers. The shifting between metadiegeis and diegesis and from one
diegetic level to the next in Sholem Aleichem’s stories reflects the physical movement of the
train, which chugs along the tracks from one station to the next, back and forth across the
Russian landscape.
In one such tale, “Baranovich Station,” the narrator describes the raucous din of
conversation in a packed compartment, as several figures jostle to tell a story enthralling enough
to hold everyone else’s interest. Sholem Aleichem’s narrator evokes a dynamic space
specifically characterized by conversation and a communal desire for storytelling: “Everyone
tried to think of some fresh, juicy item that would make all the others sit up and listen, but no one
was able to hold the stage for long. The subject changed every minute” (Sholem Aleichem 152).
The conversation, like the scenery observed from the compartment windows, takes on its own
life as a result of the motion of the train car. But then one Jew among the crowd interjects,
interrupts the loquacious stream, and calls the rest of passengers “cattle,” thereby allowing the
narrator to shift focus exclusively to this particular figure, branded as the “Jew from Kaminka”
(152-3). This particular narrative, the subject of this story, is thus embedded into the larger
framework provided by the principal narrator, as the other Jews suddenly pay exclusive attention
to the Jew from Kaminka: “Having been unexpectedly branded as cattle . . . the whole car was as
dumbfounded for a moment as if a bucket of cold water had been poured over everyone’s head”
(153). The Kaminka Jew then proceeds to tell his story in the form of directly quoted speech.
The embedded tale dates back to the time of czar Nicholas the First and has been passed
down from generation to generation within the Kaminka Jew’s family. The story pertains to a
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loud-mouthed and stubborn Jew named Kivke who gets into trouble with the local Russian
authorities. Charged with blasphemy on account of some ill-spoken commentary overheard by
non-Jews in a tavern one night, he is sentenced to run the gauntlet. The narrator’s grandfather,
Reb Nissl Shapiro, intervenes to save Kivke’s life. Reb Shapiro, with skillful negotiation as the
town’s president of the Burial Society and with a few judicious bribes, informs the local
authorities that Kivke died in prison and needed to be buried immediately according to Jewish
custom. With Kivke playing dead, the Jews are able to sneak him out of town while pretending
to bury him. He subsequently settles in Brody and is free from the very real physical threat of the
gauntlet. Because the train in which the Jews are traveling reaches the Kaminka Jew’s
destination, Baranovich station, he must interrupt his tale. The character-narrator curses his bad
luck at missing out on the end to such a delightful story, exclaiming: “I wouldn’t mind if
Baranovich station burned to the ground!” (163).
In his analysis of The Railroad Stories, Todd Presner argues: “The railway compartment
frames the narratives, and the stories themselves are written as if told in the time between the
train’s departure and its arrival at a given destination” (107).5 The narrative structure of these
stories consciously reflects the particularities of train travel. The frequent metalepses between
one narrative strand and the next are occasioned not only by the interplay between various
narratorial voices, but also because of the train’s movement: characters hop on and off the train
as one person’s destination is reached and another’s journey begins. Sholem Aleichem’s storieswithin-a-story, with its interplay between the diegesis of the train car and that of the Kaminka
Jew’s tale, stages the impact of train movement on the process of narration.

5

Presner situates Sholem Aleichem’s Railroad Stories within a larger historical development of literature by
European Jewish authors writing in a variety of languages, in which the train and the railway car become a common
literary trope for negotiating both the freedom and radical social change brought by advances in technology during
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, particularly within Jewish communities in Eastern Europe.
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Representations of trains and their impact on Jews have been marked by a strong sense of
ambivalence since the trope began appearing in Yiddish literature. Leah Garrett explains the
complex impact of train technology on shtetl communities in eastern Europe and the tradition of
storytelling taken up by Yiddish writers like Sholem Aleichem: “A train would seem to be the
ideal locale for storytelling: group setting, disconnected from a grounded location, and
representing the archetypal Jewish community. Yet the train is also a symbol of the
encroachment of the machine on rural spaces. It is thus a space in which one can enact stories
that reflect the ascendancy of industry and the concomitant breakdown of the rural, enclosed,
isolated shtetl” (Garrett 106). We see traces of this complex relationship in tales such as
“Baranovich Station.” Nevertheless, such tales, I argue, also underscore a sense of agency
available to the Jews in the train car. Not only does the tale of Reb Shapiro illustrate a moment in
which Jews are able to intercede and alter the fate of one of their own, it also allows its narrator,
the anonymous Kaminka Jew, to claim narratorial authority, however briefly, over the
cacophony of competing voices that are divided between a desire to tell and one to listen to a
well-crafted tale. Sholem Aleichem’s salesman-narrator foregrounds the possibility for a type of
Jewish agency made possible through narrative, specifically through the intricate staging of
multiple diegetic layers held together by the principal’s narrators organizational wisdom.
The railway car in the prologue to Jossel Wassermanns Heimkehr operates in a fashion
strikingly similar to that depicted in Sholem Aleichem’s Railroad Stories, though with
distinctions made necessary by the historical specificities of the Holocaust. In Hilsenrath’s novel,
the cattle car functions as a space for the development of narrative, while simultaneously
becoming increasingly claustrophobic and dismal. Hilsenrath’s portrayal focuses on the moments
before the material deprivations of this particular kind of train journey become apparent. The
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imaginative possibilities of storytelling are caught within the boundaries of a much more
insidious train timetable: we know that there is limited time during which the Jews locked in
these cattle cars will be physically capable of sharing their stories. The storytelling and the
potential agency it makes possible, however, arises precisely out of the tension between the rapid
movement of the train and the rigid confines of the train cars in which the characters find
themselves.
In conjuring a Yiddish-speaking shtetl community’s train journey to extermination,
Hilsenrath’s German-language post-Holocaust novel overtly situates itself within the larger
context of eastern European Jewish literary history; his evocation of this trope establishes a clear
metaliterary link to his Yiddish-language predecessors. In doing so, he references larger
historical connections between Jews writing in both German and Yiddish (Schachter 84-120).6
Allison Schachter summarizes: “The railroad car itself is the quintessential Jewish space of
Yiddish literature” (98). Jossel Wassermanns Heimkehr articulates a connection between the
world of pre-1945 Yiddish storytelling and a post-1945 German-language text. In doing so,
Hilsenrath not only gestures towards the lost world of the eastern European shtetl but also reenacts these connections and overlaps in a post-Holocaust context.
Similar to the stories of Sholem Aleichem, vehicular movement in Hilsenrath’s text
emerges as a potent trope and organizing principle. We observe movement and mobility not only
thematically but also experience it structurally. The transportation of the Jews in the train car in
the story world runs parallel to the frequent and fluid metaleptic slippages. The narrator provides
the overarching framework that reports the speech of characters and character-narrators like
Jankl who tell their own stories; however, the introduction of an additional narrative element
6

Schachter discusses the historical connections between Yiddish- and German-language authors in the late
nineteenth- and early twentieth-centuries in the chapter “Yiddish Modernism in Weimar Berlin” (84-120).
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complicates this schematic. The shtetl’s rabbi, who stands among the members of his
congregation, has heard rumors about the destination to which these trains are taking the Jews,
and he has begun to suspect what will happen by the novel’s conclusion (Hilsenrath 17-18). He
becomes increasingly concerned for his community’s welfare and the survival of its history, and
he strives to find a way to preserve the memory of all these individuals (along with their
language and culture), lest their stories fall into the abyss of forgetting. He decides that the Jews
must hide their history. What follows is the stuff of legend. In response to impending danger, the
entire history of this community, including every single personal detail (each baby’s cry, each
bodily function—everything) escapes out of the train and hovers on top of its roof, where these
details take on a life of their own, transforming into a collective of innumerable voices called
“Quasselstimmen,” without bodies to bind them to the physical world. They chatter with one
another and become responsible for documenting the Jews’ history. These voices, situated on top
of the train car, are afforded a teichoscopic view of the Jews of Pohodna.
The verbal interaction between the shtetl’s rabbi and the wind further foregrounds the
novel’s articulation of Jewish agency through the literary imagination. The human rabbi has
direct access to these voices and can call upon them to intercede in the realm of human affairs—
at least where memory is concerned. The rabbi tells the wind that the non-Jews back in the shtetl
have not managed to plunder the Jews’ most precious possession: their history (17). The wind
initially believes that, like material goods, the Jews’ history must have been left behind prior to
their deportation, but the rabbi explains that only “die Spuren unserer Geschichte sind
zurückgeblieben” (18). In a metaleptic shift back to metadiegesis, the narrator interjects to
explain:
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Und auch das ist wahr. Die Spuren waren zurückgeblieben. Aber die Zeit würde
sie allmählich verwischen, und es würde nichts zurückbleiben. Nichts. Und so
sagte [der Rebbe] zum Flüstern des Windes: “Wir haben nur das Vergessen
zurückgelassen, and was wir mitgenommen haben, ist das Erinnern.” Und der
Rebbe kriegte plötzlich Angst, denn die Geschichte der Schtetljuden und das
wahre Erinnern, das war in großer Gefahr. (18)
What follows is the description of a plan to save this history. The rabbi decides to hide the
history of his community on the roof of the train car, since no non-Jew would ever think to look
for it there (18). The rabbi’s plan, formulated solely in his thoughts, turns into a viable course of
action through imaginative fiction: “und siehe da: Kaum hatte der Rebbe diesen Gedanken zu
Ende gedacht, da huschte die Geschichte der Schtetljuden aus den schlechtgelüfteten Waggons
und hockte sich auf das Dach des Zuges. Auf welchen Waggon? Na, wo schon. Auf den letzten
natürlich” (18). The historical reality is that countless Jewish communities throughout Eastern
Europe, both urban and rural, faced near—if not, total—destruction at the hands of Nazi
genocide. Not only millions of individual people, but also their individual voices and testimonies
vanished as a result of the violence of the Holocaust. Hilsenrath’s thematization of this very act
of annihilation and his particular rendering of history that diverges from the dominant historical
narrative of total destruction allows for a discursive space in which other ontological possibilities
can occur.
These voices in fact evoke a kind of agency through narrative, which they attribute to
Jewish culture. One of the “Quasselstimmen,” while discussing the various types of details they
are absorbing and their subsequent purpose for History writ large, instructs his fellow voices:
“Der Jude kennt immer zwei Möglichkeiten, eine so und eine so. Es könnte ja sein, daß dort, wo
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die Endstation ist, ein Geheimnis auf sie lauert. Vielleicht ist dort ein Sanitorium? Freundliche
Ärzte und Schwestern in blütenweißen Kitteln würden die Schtetljuden empfangen?” (23). We
know that this benevolent destination defies the historical reality of the Holocaust. Nonetheless,
the text emphasizes a particular capacity on the part of Jewish culture for employing narrative—
especially in the form of dialogic exchange—that stresses the need for imaginative alternatives.
We are reminded here of Sholem Aleichem’s Reb Shapiro’s finesse at shaping the narrative he
related to the Russian authorities regarding the “dead” Kivke; an imaginative fiction is able, in
that case, to save a life. A train journey that ends in pleasure rather than pain is presented in
Hilsenrath’s prologue as one possibility. But then the narrating voice interrupts this reverie,
remarking: “‘Aber es gibt noch eine zweite Möglichkeit,” sagte die Stimme. ‘Und wenn diese
stimmt, dann gibt es dort kein Sanitorium’” (27). The “Quasselstimmen” proceed to discuss
various potential outcomes, including a noodle factory in need of hard-working employees,
before reminding the reader of the historical reality of a train journey that ends in “Feuer und
Rauch” (28).
The “Jewish” Legend: The Salzhering and Jossel’s Emigration to Switzerland
This preoccupation with the narration of imaginative possibilities further frames the
transition from prologue to the novel’s main narrative. At the end of the prologue, one of the
“Quasselstimmen” requests that a fellow “voice” tell the story of Jankl’s uncle Jossel: “‘Dann
erzähle mir also Onkel Jossels Geschichte, die zugleich die Vorgeschichte der Erbschaft ist, die
für die Juden des Schtetls zu spät kommt ... oder auch nicht, falls ein Wunder geschieht” (33).
Though the voice knows what will happen to the Jews in the cattle car, namely that they will
never again return home, it nonetheless evokes the possibility of a miracle. Though the
likelihood of such a miracle that could intervene and rescue the Pohodna Jews from death
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following deportation is slim, Hilsenrath nonetheless emphasizes the act of imagining such a
possibility. The novel thus enacts, in the moment of closure prior to the beginning of the main
narrative, the practice of Jewish imaginative agency.
This practice, vividly present in the prologue, also appears over and over again in Jossel’s
autobiographical digressions. Following the prologue, the novel presents Jossel and his mania for
storytelling in two main segments that are further divided into discrete chapters. In these two
sections, the reader encounters Jossel’s account of his own life and that of his family’s rich
history. Uncle Jossel, who left Pohodna during World War I to serve in the Austrian military and
eventually became a wealthy Swiss factory owner, lies on his deathbed. Before he dies, his final
wish is to have his autobiography recorded and his fortune bequeathed to his closest living
relative, his nephew Jankl. Julian Preece summarizes the embedded narrative: “As Jossel lies on
his death-bed on 31 August 1939, he narrates his story to his two lawyers whose secretaries
commit it to paper. Stories are about the past, and Jossel’s autobiography begins—after an
invocation of Adam, his ancestor—with the first Jewish migrations eastwards” (31). The team of
lawyers and secretaries, along with the reader, provide the audience for Jossel’s string of tales.
In relating his life story, Jossel narrates his memories of his hometown, the shtetl Pohodna; the
unidentified narrator also allows the reader access to other perspectives in addition to Jossel’s,
including those of his parents, grandparents, and great-grandparents.
A crucial episode in the novel that borders on the legendary further underscores
Hilsenrath’s literary engagement with the idea of Jewish agency through imaginative fiction.
According to his narrative, Jossel’s grandparents moved from Polish Galicia to Pohodna, near
Czernowitz, to establish a life for themselves and subsequent generations (86-91). They opened a
modest tavern with the hope of anchoring themselves and their family in a small, albeit lucrative,
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business. Catering to both Jewish and non-Jewish clientele alike, the Schenke offered on its bill
of fare the alcoholic beverages distilled and favored by the various ethnic groups inhabiting the
area (“rumänischen Cuika, serbischen Sliwowitz, russischen und polnischen Wodka,” as well as
“jüdischen Schnaps”), in addition to onions, garlic, bread and salted herring (111). Jossel relates
a story about how the most important event in this history of the family business was an
impromptu visit by the Austrian emperor, Franz Joseph I. Told in its own chapter, this story, like
many others throughout the novel’s embedded Jossel narrative, takes on a life of its own. A
dialogue between Jossel and his lawyers regarding the specifics of the tale about to be told serves
as an introduction:
“Genau einundzwanzig Jahre vor meiner Geburt”, sagte Onkel Jossel, “passierte die
Sache mit dem jüdischen Salzhering und dem österreichischen Kaiser.”
“Welcher Kaiser?” fragte der Notar.
“Nicht Joseph der Zweite”, sagte Onkel Jossel, “sondern Franz Joseph der Erste.”
“Also der berühmte Kaiser Franz Joseph. War er schon damals an der Macht?”
“Ja”, sagte Onkel Jossel.
“Und was hatte Kaiser Franz Joseph mit einem jüdischen Salzhering zu tun?”
“Das wollte ich Ihnen ja erzählen”, sagte Onkel Jossel. (95)
The passage above introduces an anecdote that plays the role of a legend, in which the emperor
visits the Wassermann family’s tiny tavern. During an amusing, albeit implausible, turn of
events, Franz Joseph’s life is saved by Jossel’s elfish grandmother. Jossel describes how military
maneuvers taking place nearby bring the royal person and his entourage within the vicinity of
Pohodna (95). On account of this news and the rarity of such an occurrence, the shtetl Jews begin
to wonder about the possibility of the emperor making a stop in their own village. As luck would
42

have it, not only does the emperor visit Pohodna, but he also wants to take in the local flavor by
visiting an “authentic” Jewish tavern: “Und dann passierte, was alle vorausgesehen hatten: Der
Kaiser wollte eine landesübliche Schenke sehen. Und da es keine bessere gab als eben die
Wassermannsche, kamen, wie erwartet, zuerst zwei Gendarmen mit Federbüschen am Hut [...]
Und da waren sie schon: noch ein paar Uniformierte, und einer von ihnen, das war der Kaiser”
(109). The emperor takes in the sights and sounds of the locale, accompanied by his officers and
magistrates, including his treasurer and court physician, while Jossel’s grandfather and
grandmother attempt to serve the impromptu party. The rest of the family looks on in wonder:
“Und hinter dem Vorhang stand die Familie und guckte durch den Spalt, aber auch durch die
Löcher im Stoff, denn es war ein sehr alter Vorhang, der noch aus Kolomea stammte, aus der
Zeit, als die Familie noch in Galizien wohnte [...]” (110). Jossel as narrator imbues his familial
history with the same importance as that of the Austro-Hungarian Empire by placing them side
by side: Jossel’s grandfather had inherited the tattered curtain from his parents who had lived at a
time when Maria Theresia, “die Kaiserin von Österreich, nicht mal in ihren kühnsten Träumen
daran gedacht hatte, Europa unter österreichischer Flagge bis an die Grenzen der russichen
Steppen auszudehnen, nun, vielleicht nicht ganz so weit, aber immerhin. Also dort, hinter dem
Vorhang standen sie, auch die kleinen Kinder, und guckten” (110). In this tale, family memory
and national history are combined, literally taking up the same space in the locus of the tavern.
And the site of the tavern in particular situates the Wassermann family into the larger
history of Eastern European Jewish life. In his 2014 study Yankel’s Tavern: Jews, Liquor, and
Life in the Kingdom of Poland, Glenn Dynner discusses the historical phenomenon of Jewish
tavernkeepers and liquor distilleries, which started in the Kingdom of Poland-Lithuania and
continued even after the kingdom was gobbled up by various neighboring powers, including
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Austro-Hungary, between 1772 and 1795 (1). Dynner explains that Jewish tavernkeepers, at the
behest of the ruling powers, were overwhelmingly responsible for steering the manufacture and
sale of liquor to Polish peasants (1). Their “omnipresence,” he argues, “reflected a centuries-old
modus vivendi between Poles and Jews” (1). The Jewish tavern, such as the one depicted in
Hilsenrath’s text, which “often constituted a bar, distillery, country store, hotel, stable, post
office, and bank wrapped into one,” was a crucial component of life and commerce in Polish
territory (Dynner 17), and Jossel situates his family within its epicenter. In this scene, Jossel as
narrator of the events composes an historical addendum to this larger history of Jewish
tavernkeeping, but one that a traditional historiographical account of the Austro-Hungarian
Empire and the lives and deeds of its rulers would most likely not contain. Andecdotal evidence
of the kind Jossel provides has often remained disnarrated, as it tows the line between fact and
fiction, resembling more a story passed down within a family than archival evidence.
The rest of the family members observing this astounding event look on in wonder, as if a
miracle were taking place at that very moment in the confines of the inn. The characterization of
their gaze foregrounds the emperor’s visit as legend, so profoundly wondrous and strange is the
sight of the Austrian emperor sitting in their humble environs. Aaron Tate defines legend as “a
traditional narrative that provides an etiology (i.e., an account of the origin or cause) of some
extraordinary local detail or the narrative of a person, place, or event as if it were based on
historical actuality” (276). I argue that Jossel’s story about the emperor takes on the form of a
legend, in that it imbues the history of Pohodna with an element of the extraordinary through the
construction in narrative of a remarkable event that arises out of a particular spatial and temporal
context. Tate defines the legend further: “From the performative point of view, the telling of a
legend frequently leads directly to debate or discussion between teller and audience, thus
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complicating narrative authority and confirming the peculiar status of the legend” (276). The
manner in which Jossel introduces this anecdote in conversation with his lawyer highlights this
performative aspect—Jossel’s narration of the event is couched in a larger dialogue with his
interlocutor regarding the history of his hometown and why it is important. In this case, the
legend concerns the particular events of the Austrian emperor’s 1855 visit to one specific shtetl
among thousands throughout the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Hilsenrath employs a specifically
Jewish legend that makes possible a Jewish etiology. The extraordinary events in Hilsenrath’s
legend allow a Jewish origin story to come to the fore in which Jewish agency becomes a
possibility through narrative—particularly in the context of the historical persecution that Jews
faced in Europe. Similar to the Kaminka Jew’s story in Sholem Aleichem’s “Baranovich
Station,” Jossel’s anecdote highlights, as we will see, a Jew’s ability to intervene in a positive
fashion in the fate of his fellow Jews.
The legend that Jossel narrates is made possible by the juxtaposition of the everyday and
the extraordinary. The Wassermann family inn, one of countless Jewish-run taverns throughout
the Austro-Hungarian realm, serves as the site for the arbitrary confluence of what the reader
might justifiably assume to be the powerful (the royal personage and his entourage) and the
powerless (Jewish shtetl inhabitants in possession of relatively few rights and privileges). The
legendary quality of Jossel’s story arises from the possibilities that this confluence engenders.
The emperor places his order and begins to consume the local delicacies served by Jossel’s
grandfather: “‘Er soll mir was zum Lachen und zum Weinen geben und zum Niesen und zum
Husten und ein paar Salzheringe und Zwiebeln und Knoblauch und Brot’” (111-2). The emperor,
while enjoying his refreshments, begins to choke on the fare: “Der Kaiser fing plötzlich zu
husten an. Nun, husten ist gesund. Das Schlimme war nur, daß der Husten in ein gefährliches
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Röcheln überging and dann ganz aufhörte. Der Kaiser lief rot an, rang um Luft, blies die
kaiserlichen Backen auf, die mit einem Backenbart, und riß die Augen weit auf” (112). The
extraordinary character of this tale comes to the fore most clearly in the resolution of this royal
emergency. In the chaos of the attempts on the part of the court physician and other members of
the imperial retinue to relieve the emperor’s choking, all of them unsuccessful, “die alte Jente”—
Jossel’s grandfather’s mother—appears from the kitchen to save the day:
Es trug sich also zu, daß sie watschelnd aus der Küche kam, verhutzelt, aber
quicklebendig, mit wirrem Haar und warren, rollenden und immer wütenden Augen [...]
Die alte Jente kam also aus der Küche und fragte meinen Großvater: “Was hat dieser Goi
in seinem trefenen Maul?” (113-4).
Upon learning that the emperor (an anonymous non-Jew in the eyes of the great-grandmother) is
most likely choking on a tiny pickled herring, she reaches for the man’s mouth and forces it
open: “[sie] riß den Mund des Kaisers auf, streckte ihre alten, runzeligen Finger, die mit den
langen schmutzigen Fingernägeln, in des Kaisers Rachen und zog den Hering aus der falschen
Kehle” (114). Jossel’s great-grandmother saves the emperor’s life, thus preventing the certain
doom that would befall the Jews should the royal personage die on their watch (112-3). The
grandmother figure performs here a variant of the deus ex machina, appearing as if out of
nowhere to accomplish what no other character or figure can, including the emperor’s own
personal physician. The tale becomes even more unbelievable when the emperor, grateful to the
woman who saved his life, offers her a reward. After she refuses monetary compensation,
Jossel’s grandfather intervenes and requests that the emperor instead grant emancipation to all
the Jews of the empire (116-17). Although Franz Joseph initially forgets his promise, he
remembers many years later and puts his pledge into action: “Das war in den frühen
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Morgenstunden des neuen Jahres 1867. Im selben Jahr, durch den Ausgleich mit den aufsässigen
Ungarn, die Reformen und die Gründung der Doppelmonarchie, erhielten auch die Juden des
Kaiserreiches die vollen bürgerlichen Rechte” (118).
The legendary quality of this imaginative portrayal of an emperor visiting a humble
community is heightened only by the introduction of an even stranger and more miraculous
personage in the form of Jossel’s great-grandmother. Hilsenrath makes overt use of legend—
with its complex relationship to both truth and fiction—in this tale about the emperor and the
Wassermann family in order to establish through imaginative fiction a parallel ontological
universe in which Jossel’s great-grandmother is singlehandedly responsible for bringing about
the actual historical reality of Jewish emancipation in 1867 in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The
author’s portrayal of history offers the reader a lively alternative to the historical narrative more
readily associated with Jewish emancipation in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Dry bureaucracy
and slow-evolving political negotiations take a back seat to rapid efficacy of a legend that can
change the course of history in the time it takes to pluck a fish from the gullet of a choking
emperor. Jossel’s legendary tale from the annals of his family’s history further highlights the
novel’s commitment to staging Jewish agency through the imaginative. According to his version
of historical events, Jewish emancipation originated with the Jews, rather than with the nonJews. The legend, with its emphasis on an incredible (or nearly incredible) origin story cast in the
guise of “historical actuality” (Tate 276) offers a blend of fact and potential fiction that serves
Hilsenrath’s narrative practice of formulating a narrative alternative to the kind of historiography
that cannot take an anecdote like Jossel’s into account. The novel’s imaginative depiction of
history runs parallel to textbook history, offering readers the opportunity to imagine multiple
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versions of a particular historical episode—in this case, the emancipation of the Jews in the
Austro-Hungarian empire.
Jossel’s depiction of his “accidental” emigration from Pohodna to Switzerland also
operates as a Jewish legend that highlights agency through narrative. While serving on the Italian
front in the Austrian army in World War I, he and two other Jewish soldiers are sent on what is
believed to be a suicide mission to gather intelligence regarding enemy hideouts and supplies.
After surviving a salvo of gunfire by hiding in a wheat field, Jossel encounters a group of Italian
soldiers who take aim to gun him down. He throws his weapon down and surrenders, but is not
taken prisoner. On the contrary, Jossel is surprised to see the Italian soldiers also throw their
weapons away because they have grown weary of fighting. Jossel convinces them that life in
Austria (even if in a POW camp) would be comfortable, complete both with Austrian specialties
like Sachertorte and Italian staples like spaghetti and tomato sauce. With this extraordinary turn
of fate, Jossel turns an act of cowardice into one of heroism. He leads 254 Italian prisoners of
war back to his troop and is celebrated: “Die Presse bekam Wind von der Sache. Jossel
Wassermanns Bild machte Titelseiten. Ein österreichischer Held. Ein Soldat des Kaisers, tapfer,
beherzt, einer aus den Ostprovinzen, der Beweis, daß Österreichs Präsenz im Osten von Gott
bestimmt and das Kaiserreich nicht verloren war” (272). He is heralded as a model soldier, given
a silver medal for bravery, and made a corporal. In a final moment of recognition, he is granted
an official audience with the emperor—the same Franz Joseph who had granted the Jews equal
civil rights after being saved in his family’s inn.
In a comical twist, Jossel asks the emperor whether he remembers the episode with the
salted herring. The emperor, perhaps too old to remember, responds in the negative and remarks:
“‘Gut gemacht, Korporal’” (273). Jossel’s tale emphasizes his role as active agent in determining
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his destiny. The events he relates, rather than reflecting historical verisimilitude, function as a
legend that highlights his own agency. The Jewish soldier from humble circumstances wins a
silver medal and acclaim right before starting his life over again in Switzerland. But his renown
does not end there. When asked by a journalist what the emperor should do with the prisoners of
war, Jossel replies that they should be let free to return to their families, an act that would,
according to his “Jewish” logic, lead to the war’s end and “zu einem Stillstand der
Geschichtsschreibung” (275). Jossel advocates a version of historiography that, through an
imagined armistice, would put an end to hostility and the kind of political maneuvering that cares
little for human casualties. No one takes his suggestion seriously, and the reader knows that
people like Jossel will never write the history books.
After returning to the front a second time, Jossel is taken by the Italians and flees
captivity—this time away from his duties as a newly minted corporal. Upon reaching Lake
Lugano, Jossel pays smugglers to take him by boat over the border into Switzerland. But before
they reach the Swiss side of the lake, they rob him of all his belongings, including his clothing,
and throw him overboard. Despite suffering a concussion, Jossel survives and swims to safety.
He approaches a group of Orthodox Jews vacationing at a lake resort in a scene that is
reminiscent of Odysseus emerging from the ocean, except with minor details altered to make it a
Jewish story. Jossel describes, “Nackt kam ich aus dem Wasser. Die Juden erschraken, sagten
aber nichts und starrten gebannt auf mein beschnittenes Glied, dann auf mein Gesicht. Einer von
ihnen lachte auf, dann lachten auch die anderen. Ich redete sie auf jiddisch an. Die lachten aber
bloß” (282). The Orthodox Jews, amused at the sight of the naked, circumcised man emerging
from the water and fascinated by the explanation of his identity and his subsequent tales, agree to
come to his aid. He befriends Froike Honigmann, a Galician Jew who possesses both a Swiss
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passport and a successful matzah factory. He eventually marries Honigmann’s daughter and
inherits his father-in-law’s business and money, living out the remainder of his adventurous life
in the relative peace of neutral Switzerland. His tale of successful emigration is a legend of flight
and subsequent survival. The poetics of movement foregrounded in the prologue have a clear
analog in the peripatetic Jossel. His autobiographical project imagines a version of galut (Jewish
Diaspora) that transforms wandering and suffering through emigration into a stable and relatively
welcoming democratic state. If the prologue and epilogue remind the reader of the historical
reality that millions of European Jews died in the Holocaust, Jossel’s narrative of emigration and
survival stands in stark contrast to the Shoah, offering an alternative couched within the larger
practice of Hilenrath’s imaginative fiction. Jewish agency, in the form of anecdotes embroidered
with legendary qualities, provides a literary counterbalance to the stifling train car that the
Pohodna Jews are forced to occupy.
Jewish Agency and the Dialogic
With the introduction in the novel’s prologue of the non-corporeal voices of the
“Quasselstimmen,” the boundaries between various diegetic levels in the novel become
increasingly difficult to demarcate. The number of voices narrating multiplies, and the narration
bounces back and forth from narrator to character to “Quasselstimme.” The result is an emphasis,
as I have discussed above, on narratological movement or a poetics of mobility. The rolling of
the wheels down the track and the process of movement are thus mirrored in the novel’s
structure. The text’s trope of train travel mirrors this movement in the various diegetic and
metadiegetic levels. Instead of a monolithic narrator in charge of structuring the reproduction of
every minute detail, this choir of “Quasselstimmen” has the task of observing the minutiae of the
Jews in the train car below, and their figuration in the text underscores the importance of
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individual memory and experience for the project set forth in the novel. Coupled with the text’s
additional emphasis on reproducing conversations that take place among the humans and the
“Quasselstimmen,” the text’s multivocality evinces a strong tie to the dialogic. Hilsenrath’s
representation of speech, in the form of dialogue and the conversational, is closely related to the
idea of Bakhtin’s dialogic. Brian McHale explains the fundamental connection between the two
within the field of narrative theory: “In the light of dialogism and Textinferenz, speech
representation comes to be reconceived as only more or less discrete instances of the pervasive
heteroglossia of the novel, its multiplicity of voices” (440). We see this “multiplicity of voices”
both in Hilsenrath’s novel and in Sholem Aleichhem’s “Baranovich Station.” For Hilsenrath, the
dialogic forms an integral component in his practice of highlighting Jewish agency as
constructed in imaginative fiction. It is important to mention, however, that the emphasis on
representing individual characters’ thoughts, feelings, etc., recorded by non-corporeal voices that
seemingly exist outside of the story world’s temporal and spatial limits, does not, however, make
light of the historical realities of the Shoah. Hilsenrath’s novel is just as concerned with the
ethics of memorializing the dead as it is with foregrounding Jewish agency. The extraordinary
aspects of certain events that take place in the text, such as the grandmother’s legendary
interaction with the Austrian emperor, do not detract from the larger narrative of eastern
European Jewish history marked by persecution, pogroms, and the Holocaust.
Jossel Wassermanns Heimkehr foregrounds conversation not only among the human
characters, as we saw in Jankl’s discussions with fellow Jews in the train car and in Jossel’s
interactions with his lawyers, but also among these “voices,” whose sole mission it is to talk and
record. These voices are responsible for the kinds of personal details and historical information
for which there is no archive. The history of the Pohodna Jews in the train car cannot be written
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down and as such cannot become part of human memorialization. Hilsenrath’s narrative practice
in the novel makes possible an alternative to conventional history through these voices that are
able to do what no historian can do. They record that which has no referent in the post-Holocaust
world. The narrator enables these individual voices to come to the fore and emphasizes their
drive to converse with one another in order to preserve what will otherwise be lost to history:
Und da die Geschichte der Schtetljuden viele Stimmen hat, hockerten auch die Stimmen
auf dem Dach des Zuges, im Wind, im Schneegestöber. Sie quasselten erregt
durcheinander, denn sie erzählten alles, was in den Waggons passierte. Alles war wichtig
und nichts unwichtig genug, um nicht registriert zu werden. Natürlich schrieben sie nichts
auf, aber das brauchten sie gar nicht, weil Worte nicht verloren gehen auf dieser Welt,
und Worte des Erinnerns schon ganz und gar nicht. (21)
These “Quasselstimmen” are imbued with their own authority as character-narrators, who in turn
converse above—both figuratively and literally—the humans, whose thoughts, memories,
experiences, and potential futures they record. The narrator explains that, in leui of pen and paper
(“Natürlich schrieben sie nichts auf”), the “Quasselstimmen” possess a seemingly infinite
capacity for memory, particularly where the words of memory (“Worte des Erinnerns”) are
concerned. Although one might reasonably assume the spoken word, unless documented or
preserved in some fashion, to be an unstable or ephemeral piece of information or unit of
knowledge, the narrator insists that the “Quasselstimmen,” without the need for human
technology, create a repository that prevents words from disappearing from the world (“weil
Worte nicht verloren gehen auf dieser Welt”). According to the narrator’s description, these
voices appear to assemble an oral archive composed of information that one would otherwise
most likely assume to be unarchivable without the benefit of pen and paper or a tape recorder.
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Unburdened by such material concerns, the “Quasselstimmen” act as the custodians and
archivists of human experience, as it is expressed in every word, gesture, and thought, no matter
how ostensibly trivial.
And we must note here that Hilsenrath’s narrator describes these vibrant, loquacious
voices as the various voices of history, not as those of the people per se. While they are
seemingly connected to the voices of the individual Jews in the train car in some (heretofore)
unexplained manner, they also become characters in their own right. These “Quasselstimmen,”
who observe the Jews in the train car below, converse among one another, and in turn narrate
their observations. The voices call attention not only to the act of conversation and verbal
informational exchange, but also to the frequent metalepses from one diegetic level to another.
The novel’s structural and thematic concern with dialogical interplay, highlighting both
the representation of direct human speech and the communication between diegetic levels,
effects, as I have argued, a postwar recuperation of Yiddish narrative techniques. Hilsenrath’s
novel not only borrows obvious features of Yiddish literature, such as stock characters like the
shlemiel and the matchmaker and the use of Yiddish-language vocabulary and cultural terms,7
but it also adapts structural elements from Yiddish literature, as we saw with the comparison to
the stories of Sholem Aleichem. The structural similarities between Hilsenrath’s text and those of
his predecessors writing in Yiddish bear repeating. Anne Fuchs argues that Hilsenrath’s
intertextual references to the tropes of classic Yiddish literature firmly place the author in
conversation with the multifaceted, multilingual tradition of Eastern European Jewish writing:

7

In an attempt to explain various aspects of Jewish culture to his Swiss lawyers (and thus to readers of German most
likely unfamiliar with the nuances of traditional Eastern European Jewish life), Uncle Jossel routinely employs
Yiddish vocabulary throughout the narration of his will and testament. Among many others, he explains the terms
“Pessach” and “Matzekloß” (55-7), “Mikwe” (59), “Apikeurim” (63), “Tefillin” (65), “Balegules” (68),
“Bakschisch” (104), “Naches” (122), “Chupe” (126), “Kaddisch” (127), “Chevre Kaddische” (150), “Parnusse”
(162), “Schmatte” (171), “Chumez” (188), and “Schofar” (232).
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Jossel Wassermanns Heimkehr continues the tradition of Jewish ghetto writing in that
Hilsenrath’s stories recall a world which is peopled by quaint characters and loveable
types who display wit and ingenuity in managing their daily lives. Like the great Yiddish
narrators, Hilsenrath employs what one might call a poetics of insignificance which
evokes a concrete sense of the life in the shtetl.” (188-9)
While Fuchs is, in my view, correct in pointing out the general connection between Hilsenrath’s
novel and Yiddish writing, we must expand upon her observation. Firstly, her observation
remains general, as she does not cite specific examples of Yiddish authors or “great Yiddish
narrators.” Secondly, we should take care lest the notion of a “poetics of insignificance” be
employed without an understanding that narrators in modern Yiddish literature often selfreflexively makes use of this “quaintness” or “folksiness” as a specific rhetorical strategy
(Schachter 32-7). We would need to employ the term “poetics of insignificance” in such a way
as to avoid obscuring the narrative complexity of this poetics. That being said, Fuchs’ term
rightly highlights the parallel between the aestheticization of the quotidian in works of (modern)
Yiddish literature and the use of a similar technique in Hilsenrath’s novel.
Abramovitsh’s novella Fishke der krume (Fishke the Lame, 1869) provides an example
of this “poetics of insignificance” that further deepens our understanding of Jossel Wassermanns
Heimkehr. The author’s loquacious, wandering narrator, Mendele Moykher Sforim (Mendele the
Book Peddler) is reminiscent of and provides a kind of blueprint for Hilsenrath’s peripatetic,
verbose narrator, Jossel Wassermann. In Fishke the Lame, Mendele begins his tale by addressing
the reader directly, in an off-hand conversational manner that deemphasizes the distance between
narrator and narratee (and reader). Before we encounter the narrative strand that focuses on the
figure of Fishke, Mendele, while on one of his many peripatetic commercial excursions from one
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Jewish community to the next, engages in conversation with Reb Alter, a fellow traveler and
connoisseur of storytelling (21-6).8 The conversation between Mendele and Alter gives rise to
the story about Fishke through reciprocal speech acts in the form of loquacious and lively banter
(27-53). Their friendly, jocular rapport underscores the emphasis on dialogue as the birthplace of
storytelling:
Alter gave me a glare. Then he nodded his head angrily, grumbling the whiles, as if
addressing himself only:
“Talk about your Jewish rogues, by golly! For here’s a man sits afore him, weighed down
so cruel by afflictions, so his guts is near fit to bust for it; and why’s even pouring his
griefs out to him [...] Though, what’s it to him anyhow? Why, ain’t naught! For no; he
won’t turn a hair. Thinks only of his own precious self. ‘Aye!’ says he, ‘fit for a
bathhouse’! Only fancy! Why tush! Sun’s got the poor thing all hot ‘n’ bothered.
Bathhouses—Humph! [...] Oh, don’cher worry, sir! For I do know all about sudden
dainty airs, put on by Jewish gents what’s backing outer deals, on account t’other feller’s
got no cahs, an’ won’t turn him no profit!”
“Gracious! No, but Reb Alt [...],” I’d cried out in protest, and gave Alter’s beard a
friendly tug—as is only the custom amongst us—saying: “No, but Reb Alter, how can
you think such a thing of me? For I’d something very different on my mind. On my
honor! Was only the end of your story put me in mind of a yarn what happened on a time.
In a bathhouse. Can’t seem to get the thing out of my head. And it is a first-rate yarn [...].
(52-3)

8

Similar to Sholem Aleichem’s Railway Stories, many of Abramovitsh’s Mendele the Book Peddler stories also
employ a poetics of movement. Like the travelling salesman in the Railway Stories, Mendele is constantly on the
move and his travels provide the impetus for the stories he relates and hears related to him (Garrett 27-30).
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The embedded narrative concerning the principal protagonist Fishke begins immediately after
this dialogic exchange. Mendele’s conversation, which evokes the cadence of human speech,
provides the narrative fuel for the portrayal of the figure of Fishke, who exists within a diegetic
realm separate from that of Mendele and Reb Alter, at least at the beginning. Fishke, a poor
orphan, grows up in a tiny shtetl community, travels from yeshiva to yeshiva, becomes
apprenticed as a cantor singer, and subsequently meets one misfortune after another. The tale of
Fishke is born out of this meandering conversation, jostling between the character Mendele and
the character Reb Alter as they travel. Mendele exists both inside and outside the story world he
creates, as a figure that both speaks with his fellow characters and addresses the reader directly.
Alter, who has no obvious access to or awareness of the reader, occupies a metadiegetic level
and narrates, in conjunction with the figure of Mendele, the separate diegetic level inhabited by
the pitiable Fishke and the characters populating his environment.
These diegetic levels do not remain neatly separated from one another. The embedded
narrative concentrating on Fishke bleeds into the metadiegesis of Reb Alter and Mendele when it
becomes clear that Reb Alter is in all actuality Fishke’s long-lost father, who had previously
abandoned his mother before her death. The boundary line between these levels begins to
dissolve. The separate diegesis concerning Fishke “crashes” into the metadiegetic/diegetic realm
occupied by Alter and Mendele, and two ostensibly discrete diegetic strands are thus merged
through a surprise turn of events. Boundaries are blurred; narrative levels, once distinct and
seemingly independent, grow hazy—all to the delight of the reader, or the listener, of such a tale.
Yiddish literary texts, such as those by Sholem Aleichem and Abramovitsh investigated in this
chapter, remind us that the boundary between character and narrator is a construct: one that the
narrative can either reinforce or call into question through multiple metaleptic slippages. I argue
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that this blurring of the lines between the diegetic levels also simultaneously underscores the
dialogic aspect of this entire narrative complex: the tale of Fishke is so close to the tellers of his
story—the raconteurs Alter and Mendele—that the very act of its telling brings about the
realization that one of the character-narrators is in fact Fishke’s long-lost father.
Similar to Fishke the Lame, Jossel Wassermanns Heimkehr provides us at the outset with
multiple levels of diegesis and metadiegesis: the realm of the narrator who initially sets the stage
and depicts God’s atmospheric peephole, out of which he looks down on the shtetl, that of the
Jews in the train car struggling with conditions that worsen by the hour, and the separate
ontological plane occupied by the “Quasselstimmen.” I emphasize here that the reader
encounters a dialogic exchange between these various levels of narration that is remarkably
similar to the complex interplay between levels of diegesis in Abramovitsh’s Yiddish-language
text. As we have seen in Jossel Wassermanns Heimkehr, the rabbi’s initial conversation with the
wind catalyzes the history of the Pohodna Jews, in the form of countless individual voices, to
flee to the roof of the train car. Jossel also foregrounds the use of the dialogic in his own brand of
narrativity: his dialogue with his lawyers is reminiscent of Mendele’s on-going conversation with
Reb Alter. The diegetic level on which Mendele and Alter exist is in a dynamic state of constant
flux with the many other character-narrators they encounter and the separate tales (and
subsequently, separate diegetic levels) that these encounters engender. These conversations that
give rise to tales and stories form an extended dialogic exchange in the form of direct speech in
the written narrative.
The framing story and the embedded narrative of texts such as Fishke the Lame and
Jossel Wassermanns Heimkehr stand in dialogic exchange with one another. One of the
hallmarks of Yiddish writing—an aspect toward which Hilsenrath gestures in his post-Holocaust
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evocation of Yiddish literary tropes—is an emphatic gesture toward leaving the story or tale
open to further acts of narration. Practically speaking, Yiddish-language tales often leave the
reader (or listener) wanting more. As we saw in “Baranovich Station,” the Kaminka Jew
suddenly departs the scene to reach his destination, leaving the salesman-narrator eager for the
end of the story. In Fishke the Lame, we are similarly left craving additional information in our
desire to connect all the dots as the boundaries between diegetic levels disintegrate and we learn
of Reb Alter’s paternity. Again and again, we encounter a non-totalizing effect9 in narrative.
These various conversations—the sustained informational and cultural exchanges that occur
across diegetic levels—demonstrate a hesitation to conclude the narrative once and for all. The
polyphony of conversations across multiple levels of diegesis signals a narrative that, from its
very structure, defies finality. Yiddish literature emphasizes a refusal to close off its narratives
and the various diegetic levels that make up said narratives; Jossel Wassermanns Heimkehr also
eagerly partakes in this tradition. The diegetic level occupied by the “Quasselstimmen,” who
resist taxonomic categorization, easily permeates the human realm of the Jews suffering in the
train car, but also maintains a certain amount of autonomy—the anti-Jewish elements in society,
be they Nazis or their collaborators, have neither power nor agency in the ontological realm they
inhabit. The only agency that comes to the fore in the text is Jewish.
This interplay among the characters and character-narrators and the interplay between
diegetic levels operate together to open up the possibility for the Jews and their words to be
memorialized outside of the confines of a conventional historiography that would otherwise
9

In Magic Realism in Holocaust Literature, Jenny Adams argues, “Dialogism as understood here refers to discourse
that is non-total in the sense outlined above, to the utterance that places itself in the context of other utterances,
subjectivities and worldviews and consequently participates in an (actualized or unactualized) dialogue. Central to
the concept of dialogism as interpreted here are two key interrelated attributes: dialogic discourse is both
unfinalizable and anti-totalizing” (56). While Hilsenrath’s novel is not an example of magic realist fiction, its
dialogic qualities allow for an open-ended-ness in accordance with her definition here.
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overlook the particularities that these conversations underscore. Karin Bauer argues that
individual stories in the form of these voices are integral to Hilsenrath’s literary representation of
a particular moment in Jewish history:
Jossel Wassermanns Heimkehr beschwört die Tradition von jüdischer Kultur und
Gemeinschaft noch einmal herauf und widersetzt sich somit der in der realen Welt schon
längst vollzogenen Zerstörung von Gemeinschaft, Erinnerungsvermögen und Erzählung.
Der Roman besteht aus erinnerten Erfahrungen, aus mündlich Erzähltem und Reflexionen
über das Erzählen, und Geschichte konstruiert sich hier nicht als universalgeschichtliches
Sinnkonstrukt, sondern aus erzählten Geschichten, deren Fokus zwar die individuelle
Lebensgeschichte ist, die diese aber in ihrer Verknüpfung mit dem Zeitgeschehen, d.h. im
Kontext der jüdischen Geschichte der Unterdrückung, Verfolgung und Hoffnung auf
Gleichberechtigung und ein friedliches Zusammenleben zeigt. Die Erzählstimmen
übernehmen die Rolle des Erzählers und Chronisten jüdischer Geschichte(n) in der
Verflechtung von individueller und gemeinschaftlicher Geschichte. (345)
Bauer’s observation here underscores both the limitations of conventional historiography and the
novel’s strategy of employing a multiplicity of voices as an imagined alternative to this
historiography.10 The writing of conventional history, based principally on archival evidence and
tangible documentation, by its very nature, cannot account for these kinds of details that are
necessarily lost to history. The point, however, is not to negate what Hilsenrath’s novel appears
10

Fuchs articulates a similar argument about the role of conventional historiography in Hilsenrath’s novel. She
asserts that Jossel Wassermanns Heimkehr “poses an alternative to historiography and its tendency to adopt a topdown perspective on historical development and change. For in clear contrast to the macro-level of historiography
and its marginalsation [sic] of the individual, the poetics of insignificance adopts a bottom-up perspective which
makes the individual’s experience of history its central concern” (189-90). With the “Quasselstimmen” that record
the minutiae of the lives of the Pohodna Jews trapped in the train car, Hilsenrath’s narrator gestures toward the
possibility of a multivocal, multi-perspectival approach to the writing of history of the Holocaust, one which
supplementswhat might be considered to be a more conventional approach to historiography that relies first and
foremost on archival material as its basis.
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to perceive as conventional historiography, but rather to supplement it—to bring additional
contours to it by way of imagined possibilities. I do not wish to construct here a false dichotomy
between literature and history; rather, I endeavor to tease out how the author’s use of these chatty
voices expands upon the idea of an approach to history that draws its conclusions and shapes its
narrative primarily as a result of engaging with the material archive. The words, thoughts, and
experiences of the Pohodna Jews imprisoned in the cattle car are a kind of anti-data to which the
archivist and historian have no access. Hilsenrath creates the ontological realm of the
“Quasselstimmen” in order to create a space in which these anti-data can be stored, preserved,
and valued. I argue that the interplay between these two ontological codes (that of the voices and
that of the humans in the train car) and the emphasis on the conversational further underscores a
reluctance on the part of the text to close off or finalize the fictional world.
The “Almost Lost Story” and an Elegiac Epilogue
We see the text’s anti-totalizing quality most urgently in its epilogue. Even though
Jossel’s function as character-narrator comes to a close at the end of the embedded narrative, the
epilogue begins with a conversation among the non-corporeal voices regarding Jossel’s fate
(267-9). They ponder his life and remind themselves of the particular details surrounding his
death. But Jossel’s story is not told with any sense of finality: the “Quasselstimmen” in charge of
recording the network of his tales and stories comment to the wind on the unfinished and
incomplete nature of their knowledge:
“Wo ist Onkel Jossel eigentlich begraben?” fragte der Wind, der die ganze Geschichte
vom Onkel Jossel aufmerksam verfolgt hatte.
“Vorübergehend in Zürich”, sagte die erzählende Stimme.
“Und wann wurde er begraben?”
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“Gleich nachdem der Krieg ausbrach. Am nächsten Tag.”
“Das ist aber mehr als drei Jahre her. Und das nennst du vorübergehend?”
“Man konnte ihn nicht nach Pohodna bringen”, sagte die Stimme. “Es war unmöglich
wegen der politischen Lage. Nach dem Krieg werden seine Überreste nach Pohodna
gebracht.” (269)
The voices speculate and leave open the possibility for future action. Jossel’s testament could
potentially be carried out in the postwar period; the reader knows, however, that were this
repatriation eventually possible, Pohodna and its residents will no longer exist. Although the
voices’ knowledge may be incomplete, or “unfinalizable,” this lack of totality does not represent
a weakness in their project of memorialization. The lack of an anti-totalizing impulse is also
connected to the articulation of Jewish agency. The novel leaves certain events open-ended,
allowing for the imagination of possibilities through narrative. We need only recall the
“Quasselstimmen” discussing “jüdische Möglichkeiten” in the prologue to see how this
reluctance to close off the events of the story world propels imaginative fiction forward rather
than denying closure. Similar to the Yiddish-language tales by Sholem Aleichem and
Abramovitsh, Hilsenrath’s narrative leaves the door open for possibilities.
We can find an emphasis on Jewish agency and the imaginative in an additional device in
the novel—one that I refer to as the “almost lost story,” which I define as the reproduction of
multiple, albeit often fragmented, stories within the novel, which self-reflexively highlights its
preoccupation with portraying the stories of individual people who perished in the Holocaust.
The individual stories of the Pohodna Jews in danger of being lost and thus silenced as a result of
Nazi terror are “saved”—or at least partially recuperated—through the intervention of the
narrator, even if the people themselves are not. I argue that this technique allows Hilsenrath as
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narrator to mark the delicate line between gesturing toward the historical absence of the millions
of stories that can never be told, i.e. the disnarrated body of human experience; and the desire for
a metonymical proxy, for a moment of resistance to an otherwise infinite ellipsis that can never
be truly filled in. Language—in the form of the stories told and the discussion surrounding
them—thus marks absence as much as it does presence. The “almost lost story” provides a
method for marking, through narration, that which cannot be narrated in its entirety. The
imaginative intervention of the “Quasselstimmen” allows the memory of the shtetl Jews trapped
in the cattle car to be saved.
With its deployment of the “almost lost story,” Hilsenrath’s novel underscores the role of
imaginative fiction in the larger practice of Holocaust remembrance. Bauer argues, “Jossel
Wassermann ist ein komplexes Geflecht individueller Geschichten, die sich im Prozeß des
Erzählens zu einer heterogenen, brüchigen Geschichte des Judentums zusammenfügen” (343).
The act of representing the multiple voices of the history of the Jews of Pohodna signals a deepseated concern regarding the actual historical loss of millions of individual human lives and the
countless narratives associated with those lives. In response, the text overtly thematizes this
anxiety and offers, as a gesture of consolation to the reader, the multi-stranded narrative of Uncle
Jossel and his nephew Jankl. While we as readers could never—or only with great difficulty—
process all the details recorded by the “Quasselstimmen,” we find ourselves actively entertaining
the possibility of rescuing the memory of the many Jews on their way to their deaths in the train
car, a gesture encapsulated within the narrative that does come to the fore. What we therefore
encounter is the thematization of the possibility of narrating through what has “almost” been lost.
Without the intervention of the text in the interplay between the realm of the human and the noncorporeal voices of history hovering above the train car, Jankl’s and Jossel’s stories would be
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most likely lost to the destruction that accompanies war, genocide, and human forgetting. They
thus play a metonymical function; they serve as fragments or pieces that strive to stand in for the
whole, i.e. the millions of lives and stories that were lost in the Holocaust. The trope of the
“almost lost story”—the story of Jankl and his path from inheritance to deportation, and, to a
certain extent, the stories of the many characters in Jossel’s narration—reminds the reader of
both the monumental loss associated with the Holocaust as well as the on-going project of
memory and memorialization surrounding this series of historical events.
Although the novel cannot reasonably reproduce all stories recorded by the voices it
creates, it thematizes the possibility of this kind of heterogeneous, multivocal approach to
historiography. The narrator distinguishes between the voices whose purview is the kind of
conventional history that appears in history books and the “smaller” voices in charge of an
alternative type of historiography: “Und tatsächlich: die kleinen Quasselstimmen erzählten alles,
was unter dem Dach des Zuges passierte. Kein Geräusch, nicht das geringste, ging ihnen
verloren. Nur jene Stimmen, die festhielten, was später mal in den Geschichtsbüchern stehen
würde, die schwiegen” (22). Rather than eschewing the writing of history altogether,
Hilsenarth’s novel foregrounds an additional historiographical project that can gesture toward the
individual stories and details that usually do not appear in a conventional, monological historical
narrative that aims to draw the larger brushstrokes of historical events. Jossel Wassermanns
Heimkehr calls our attention to the possibility of an alternative historiographical project that
emphasizes individual and specific histories. These histories are preserved in what Bauer terms
Hilsenrath’s “erzählende Umsetzung in eine reflektierende, vielstimmige Geschichte” (344). I
argue that Jossel Wassermanns Heimkehr constructs a web of dialogic exchange in response to
larger cultural concerns regarding representation and the mimetic tradition. That these levels do
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not remain hermetically sealed wholes, but rather often blend into and interact with one
another—à la Sholem Aleichem and Abramovitsh—further problematizes the notion of an
unwavering system of signification and meaning-making. The point bears repeating: Hilsenrath’s
novel, perhaps at first blush a naïve and homespun portrayal of shtetl life, belies a sophisticated,
multifaceted system made possible precisely through its complex implementation of narrative
structure and techniques, paired with a complex investigation of Jewish history and the telling of
the recent Eastern European Jewish past.
Hilsenrath’s novel articulates possible additions, addenda, and emendations to a
conventional historiography built principally on archival evidence. Jossel Wassermanns
Heimkehr employs a practice of storytelling as an alternative means for attempting to encompass
the sheer gravity and overwhelming breadth of an event as complex as a genocide. He
approaches the Holocaust not as something ineffable, but rather as a topic that, due to its very
nature, requires linguistic and narratological experimentation in order to at least attempt to render
the complexities of the human experience in words. The use of a mode of narrative dialogicity
inherited from Jewish culture, specifically Yiddish literature, coupled with the rich possibilities
offered by legend, provides fertile ground for an imaginative fictional engagement with
Holocaust representation.
But it is crucial to note here that Jossel Wassermanns Heimkehr does not use imaginative
fiction to deny the historical veracity of the Holocaust; the novel demonstrates its limits when
faced with the historical reality of the deaths of millions of people. The novel is, first and
foremost, a project about mourning and an elegy for the lost world of Eastern European Jewry.
Hilsenrath’s narrative practice remains ambivalent about the postwar culture of memorialization;
the “Quasselstimmen” save the history of the Pohodna Jews, but not the Jews themselves. The
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poetics of movement that characterizes the prologue and Onkel Jossel’s autobiographical project
comes to a standstill when the train stops in its tracks. In the epilogue, this poetics becomes
detached from the railway car when only the wind can leave the site of the railway car in search
of information. The “Quasselstimmen” remain on the roof of the train car, while the wind, with
which the rabbi of Pohodna spoke in the prologue, blows over forest and field in order to find out
when the train car can begin to move again, after the voices tell it their final two stories. When it
becomes clear that an answer to the question about when the train will move cannot be found by
asking other natural elements such as the sun, the wind takes leave of the Jews and the
“Quasselstimmen”: “ihr Ziel war unbekannt, und auf Dauer war die Nähe der Juden zu riskant”
(289). As if the wind were human, it exhibits anxiety over the looming fate of the Jews in the
cattle car.
The wind, however, like the “Quasselstimmen,” is not subject to the same physical rules
to which the humans in the novel are. The wind continues in its journey, this time searching for
the spirit of God. It speaks the novel’s final words: “‘Die Sonne verspricht einen freundlichen
Tag. Ich mache mich jetzt auf den Weg. Und ich mache mich auf die Suche. Vor mir kann keiner
was verbergen. Ich wette mit dir, daß ich den Geist Gottes irgendwo finde’” (290). The novel
ends on a dialogic note, though it remains unclear to whom the wind refers with the pronoun
“dir.” The confusion regarding whom the wind addresses invites us into a final moment of
conversation. The wind ends on an elegiac note; the novel’s last words are a plaintive call for
meaning in a world otherwise drained of order and justice. While the novel never actually depicts
the train car headed to its final destination, the wind reminds us that the voices preserve the
Jews’ individual stories so that they will not be lost with their deportation and death (319). With
the “Quasselstimmen” and a narrative practice that emphasizes Jewish agency, Jossel
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Wassermanns Heimkehr formulates an imaginative alternative to conventional historiography,
while simultaneously underscoring an ambivalence about the larger cultural project of Holocaust
memorialization and the nature of what and how we remember. The novel thus situates itself
within a larger tradition of Yiddish writing that recognizes the complex, often fraught and
sometimes dangerous, historical reality that many Eastern European Jews experienced. In a
manner similar to the Yiddish literartary texts that I explored in this chapter, Hilsenrath’s novel
evokes imaginative possibilities in narrative as a method for confronting and establishing a
degree of agency in contending with this reality.
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Chapter Two:
Max Has A Screw Loose: The Dialogic, Narration and the Articulation of a Post-Perpetrator
Identity in Edgar Hilsenrath’s Der Nazi und der Friseur
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Introduction
Edgar Hilsenrath’s second and arguably best known novel, the dark satire Der Nazi und
der Friseur [The Nazi and the Barber, 1971 in English translation, 1977 in the German
original]11 is a meditation on the consciousness of a perpetrator, specifically a Nazi perpetrator
named Max Schulz. The novel consists of six books, each of which chronicles a specific period
in his life: childhood and his rise in the Nazi party; his complicity in the murder of innumerable
Jewish victims of the Nazi genocide; his escape from the Red Army at the end of World War II;
his assumption of the identity of his former childhood friend, the German Jew Itzig Finkelstein,
whom he claims to have killed by his own hand; his immigration to postwar Palestine; and his
participation in the founding of the state of Israel as a Zionist freedom fighter, followed by a
successful career as a barber and a peaceful death by natural causes. Max owes his escape from
prosecution as a war criminal and his ability to live out his life under an alias to the theft of a
Holocaust victim’s identity, including this person’s past, present and future. As Erin McGlothlin
characterizes this heinous deed, “By murdering Itzig, assuming Itzig’s identity, and living out the
life that he brutally robbed of Itzig, Max commits a particularly vituperative act of identity theft,
a brutal expropriation of the life of one individual that functions as a synecdoche for both his
massacre of multiple victims and the Nazis’ project of destroying and effacing from memory
millions of European Jews” (“Narrative Perspective” 165). In narrating his many crimes, Max

11

In “Entstehungs- und Publikationsgeschichte des Romans Der Nazi und der Friseur,” Helmut Braun provides a
detailed description of the novel’s complex, circuitous publication and reception history. Braun explains how
Hilsenrath first wrote the novel under contract with the American publishing house Doubleday (41-43). Hilsenrath
composed the text, though it was originally intended for English-language publication, in German (44). Doubleday
commissioned an English-language translation, and the novel appeared for the first time in 1971 under the title The
Nazi & the Barber (44). Italian and French translations of The Nazi and the Barber appeared in 1973 and 1974,
respectively (44). Finding a German publisher willing to release the novel proved more difficult. Despite receiving
overwhelmingly positive reviews in the United States and elsewhere, Hilsenrath’s novel was rejected by more than
sixty German publishing houses, often on grounds that its content could potentially stir up anti-Semitic sentiment
(45-47). In 1977, Helmut Braun agreed to publish the novel, and it appeared under the auspices of his small literary
press under the title Der Nazi & der Friseur (47).
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demonstrates over the course of the novel a tendency toward flight, both physically and
psychologically. He flees the permanence of and culpability involved with self-identification as a
perpetrator by cycling back and forth between identities and subject positions, a tactic that assists
him in claiming at various points in the novel status as both Holocaust perpetrator and Holocaust
survivor. In constructing a character narrator who bifurcates his personality for the purpose of
avoiding what would be for him the trap of a fixed identity as perpetrator with the concomitant
guilt and responsibility, Hilsenrath appears to evoke, in satirical form, a pattern of behavior
common in postwar Germany among Nazi perpetrators (and among many other Germans with
varying degrees of complicity vis-à-vis the Nazi past) that Gesine Schwan terms “destructive
splitting” (728). Schwan argues that the failure to come clean regarding the exact nature of one’s
guilt and one’s participation in the crimes of National Socialism often led to a psychological
state that was marked (and harmed) by the strain of contradiction, by the split between the
acknowledgement of what one knew to be true and what one was willing to admit (727-8). One
significant distinction between Schwan’s real life subjects and Hilsenrath’s narrator is that Max
willingly narrates his past and refers to the crimes he commits. He does not, however, explicitly
accept responsibility for them. Max strives to force open an interstice between the categories of
victim and perpetrator, not because he endeavors to challenge critically the assumption of a
strictly dichotomous relationship between the two in order to uncover the lies maintained by the
society around him, but for the purpose of deferring rhetorically the repercussions of accepting
responsibility for his crimes.
Max’s creates this interstitial space through a specific articulation of the dialogic, or
perhaps more accurately, through various dialogical constellations. In the following chapter, I
analyze how Max establishes a dual identity as both victim and perpetrator within the larger
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context of a practice of unreliable, injured narration that is ostensibly linked to sexual abuse he
suffered as a child. Taking Bakhtin’s notion of the dialogic as a point of analytical departure, I
also investigate how Hilsenrath’s devious narrator animates and manipulates a dialogical
interaction between the discrete identities as victim and perpetrator. Max’s deployment of this
dialogic articulates, I will demonstrate, a post-perpetration self. This post-perpetration self is a
perpetuation12 of Max’s former self that perpetrated (i.e. the self that previously murdered). It is
this post-perpetration self that the reader encounters in the novel—an articulation of the self after
the crimes have been committed and the perpetration itself has ended. I assert that his elaborate
strategy for evading detection and responsibility in the post-Holocaust period by living in the
pilfered guise of one of his victims operates as a narrative iteration of the self that perpetrated
war crimes in the Holocaust. And while Max’s manipulation of narration and performance of
multiple identities are certainly not tantamount to the original crime of murder, his selfcontradicting narratorial habit of switching between opposing subject positions for the purpose of
evading guilt reinforces for the reader his status as mass murderer and war criminal, thus
reaffirming his identity as perpetrator.
Max’s “Loose Screw”: Injured Narration and Manipulation
The opening chapter of the first book of Der Nazi und der Friseur provides signposts key
for understanding how the text’s narrativity, in the ways it is practiced and structured by the
text’s principal narrator, at once reveals and conceals information. These signposts or narrative
cues provide the reader, as I argue, with tools necessary for interpreting the text as a whole. The
novel commences as the autodiegetic narrator, who identifies himself as Max Schulz,
“unehelicher, wenn auch rein arischer Sohn der Minna Schulz ... zur Zeit meiner Geburt
12

Here, I adopt Verena Hutter’s idea of perpetuation and apply it to Max’s perpetration and self-understanding. She
argues that Hilsenrath’s dark satire presents us with a diegesis in which “lies, hatred, and violence are blissfully
perpetuated” (1).
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Dienstmädchen im Hause des jüdischen Pelzhändlers Abramowitz” (Hilsenrath 7), sets the stage
for an “autobiographical account” (McGlothlin, “Narrative Perspective” 163)13 that will be
characterized by violence and deceit, couched within a practice of unreliable narration. Max’s
initial self-identification as a “pure” Aryan (i.e. non-Jewish) German who grows up in a social
milieu with German Jews immediately sets the stage for what follows, namely tension between
seemingly discrete and ostensibly oppositional subject positions, i.e. non-Jewish German versus
German-Jew, Nazi supporter versus Nazi persecuted, insane versus sane, etc. As I will
demonstrate over the course of this chapter, this tension between various constellations of
identities is often instantiated by way of dialogic interaction, constituted in the act of narration
itself. Max pokes and prods anxiety regarding identity (and self-identification) through the
conscious manipulation of narrative voice.14 Throughout the novel, the narrating-I habitually
flips back and forth between various identities—a practice that is foregrounded in Max’s
narration of his childhood. Within the first few pages at the novel’s outset, Max gestures toward
his inhabiting two (ostensibly) dichotomous subject positions, that of victim and perpetrator—a
gesture that will become a narrative tic that he often repeats throughout the novel.
We observe the first instance of this practice of dual identification as both perpetrator and
victim as Max recounts the details of his own birth and the nearly simultaneous birth of a
German-Jewish boy named Itzig Finkelstein, whose family is well acquainted with Minna
Schulz’s employer. While relating the details of Itzig’s circumcision eight days later, Max
interrupts himself to address his audience directly. He inquires: “Ich nehme an, daß Sie wissen,

13

Several scholars, including Andreas Graf, Bernhard Malkmus, Verena Hutter, and Erin McGlothlin, have
discussed Max’s deployment of various conventions associated with both the picaresque novel and autobiographical
discourse. I quote McGlothlin’s argument here because her work provides a helpful point of departure for discussing
Max’s use of narrative voice as this chapter progresses.
14
I employ here McGlothlin’s terminology, because an understanding of Max as purposefully manipulative has
provided crucial insight for the development of my analysis of Hilsenrath’s text (“Narrative Perspective” 10-13).
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was eine Bescheidung ist and daß Sie, wenn Sie Jude sind, Ihr eigenes verstümmeltes Glied nicht
nur betrachtet, sozusagen begutachtet, sondern sich auch zuweilen Gedanken über die
symbolische Ursache der fehlenden Vorhaut gemacht haben. Habe ich recht?” (Hilsenrath 10).
Here, in this first instance of direct engagement with the narratee, Max teases his interlocutor,
suggesting that he can predict how his audience will react to the topic of circumcision. The
seemingly playful teasing that we find in this paragraph quickly takes on a more sinister tone in
the following paragraph, when Max ponders the symbolic significance of circumcision, which he
terms “... eine symbolische Handlung, die ich als Massenmörder gar nicht genug loben kann”
(10). Here, Max’s narrating-I identifies himself as a mass murderer, thus implying that the
experiencing-I (the man who will become the adult version of the child described in this first few
pages of the novel) will grow up to become a perpetrator. This moment provides us an initial,
albeit uncontextualized, glimpse into the future: Max hints that he will occupy at some point in
the text the role of mass murderer after committing deeds that will justify this label. And we are
doubly confused as to what he intends to communicate regarding this revelation and its
connection to the concept of a “symbolic act” (“eine symbolische Handlung”) that he claims to
praise. Though Max positions himself as the protagonist of the life story that he has just begun,
he throws a metaphorical wrench—however temporary—into the mechanics of reading and
readerly expectations. Without further explanation, Max returns to the topic of Itzig’s brit mila,
leaving the reader to ponder what to make of this outrageous admission cast as a parenthetical
aside. The lack of further explanation at this point in the narrative forces the reader to assimilate
this piece of information without fully comprehending its significance. Max provides us at this
moment with a crucial autobiographical detail but fails to provide us the means to integrate it
into our comprehension, either with respect to the events related or with respect to his role as
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narrator. As readers, we rely upon the narrator to provide information necessary for filling in
epistemological gaps. The structure of narrative prevents the telling of all information at once,
and Max appears to exploit this aspect of it. This exploitation, as we will see, operates as part of
a larger constellation of rhetorical strategies that Max deploys throughout the text. This reference
to a later identity as mass murderer stands in stark contrast to and is complicated by what
follows.
After completing this troubling aside and relating the details of Itzig’s successful
circumcision, Max narrates how his mother Minna Schulz endeavors to repeat the ritual, though
in bastardized form. Upon witnessing Itzig’s circumcision, she convinces her five lovers—all of
whom are mentioned as possible fathers to Max—to help her copy the rite that she has just
witnessed (though entirely misunderstood on account of superstitions she holds regarding Jewish
religious practice), this time with her newborn son. Eager to participate, these men proceed to
grant her wish, even after she begins to express anxiety about the possibility of irreparably
harming the baby Max. In response to the adults’ irresponsible fumbling and the impending
violence of the situation, Max relates how “etwas Seltsames geschah” (13): the infant version of
himself refuses to allow one of his five potential biological fathers to play mohel and perform
what he also fears will turn out to be a botched brit mila.15 Max describes a momentary burst of
power and self-possession in evading the clutches of ill-meaning parental figures: “Ich, Max
Schulz, acht Tage alt, sprang dem Fleischer plötzlich mit einem Aufschrei an den Hals, biß
kräftig zu, obwohl ich noch keine Zähne hatte, ließ mich auf den Fußboden fallen, kroch in
Windeseile zum Fenster [...]” (13-14). Here, Max narrates an event that leaves the reader (at least

15

Max employs in his relation of this event the standard Hebrew terminology regarding the Jewish practice of male
circumcision, reflecting his subsequent close relationship with the Finkelstein family and participation in Jewish
religious practice, all of which lays the groundwork for his assumption of the identity of a Jewish Holocaust survivor
following the end of World War II.
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momentarily) incredulous, but he does so within the context of an act that, without this
unbelievable intervention, would surely constitute both physical disfigurement and child abuse
for the young Max. We are left to ponder a moment that is both incredible and chilling. We must
negotiate an overall account of the ominous threat of physical violence perpetrated upon the
body of an innocent child with the narrator’s tendency to contradict himself. Max insists that his
infant self, despite lacking teeth, bit down hard in an effort to impede his would-be assailants. As
readers, we struggle to reconcile the relief we experience as Max escapes the clutches of these
men and their dubious intentions with the unreliable manner in which the episode is narrated. In
contrast to Max’s previous reference to being a mass murderer, this scene of narrowly
circumvented child abuse could possibly evoke empathy in the reader, were it not for the seed of
doubt germinated by the unreliability of the account. From the beginning of the text, Max’s
narration is riddled with contradictions that underscore his narratorial impulse to reveal and
conceal simultaneously.
Max further complicates this moment of potential empathetic identification between
himself and the reader when he directly addresses his audience a second time. As if already
anticipating the difficulty that readers will likely find in believing that the infant version of Max
possesses superhuman strength and an acute awareness of his surroundings, Max interjects:
Sie glauben wahrscheinlich, daß ich mich über Sie lustig mache? Oder Sie glauben es
nicht, und Sie werden sich sagen: “Max Schulz spinnt! Er bildet sich ein, daß man ihn
umbringen wollte ... weil er ein Bastard war ... und das alles unter dem Vorwand einer
Beschneidung, so wie das bei den Juden üblich ist: am achten Tag nach der Geburt. Was
will Max Schulz? Was will er mir einreden? Wem will er die Schuld in die Schuhe
schieben? Seiner Mutter? Den Juden? Oder dem lieben Gott?—Und das mit der
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Selbstwehr des Säuglings, seiner Flucht ... Unsinn! Sowas gibt es nicht! Ein Alptraum!
Nichts weiter!” (14)
Here, Max tells us what he thinks we want to hear by addressing the issue of reliability in an
ostensibly direct and open manner. He feigns engaging in a dialogue with his audience, thereby
asserting (or reasserting) monologic control over the narration. He does not follow his reference
to his own unreliability with an explanation of why he narrates the way he does. This lack of
explanation, however, speaks volumes in its own right. Quoting this same passage, McGlothlin
aptly argues that “[n]ot only does Max figure himself [...] as the original victim of violence, a
claim that conflicts with his self-identification just a few pages earlier as a ‘mass-murderer’ [...]
but he also models to the reader how she should consume his text: with skepticism as to its
veracity and with an awareness of his psychological and narratorial instability” (“Narrative
Perspective” 164). McGlothlin pinpoints how Max, in self-identifying as both victim and
perpetrator in the novel’s first chapter, paints two images of himself that contradict one
another—not because a perpetrator can never be victimized nor because a victim can never
commit an act of perpetration—but because he fails to address the contradiction he constructs
here within the framework of his narration and to explain the connection between the two
identities as they pertain to his autobiography. Rather than helpfully deconstructing the
categories of “perpetrator” and “victim” and perhaps addressing the fluid nature of identity as the
result of a life filled with disparate experiences, Max litters his narration with puzzles that
frustrate the readers’ attempts to solve them as part of the reading process. In these opening
pages, Max foregrounds a pattern to which he returns repeatedly over the course of the novel: he
evacuates (temporarily) his perpetrator subject position in favor of occupying an identity as
victim—a narrative technique that allows him to defer guilt and deny complicity. This narrative
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tic, whereby he switches back and forth between identities, will repeatedly remind us over the
course of the novel of his crimes and his efforts to evade responsibility for them. Max’s tactic,
which serves as a method of flight, simultaneously reaffirms his status as mass murderer and
Holocaust perpetrator.
Directly following his interjection about how his readers might react to his unreliable
narration, Max muddies the water further. He sums up his narratorial approach: “Aber ich will ja
nur meine Geschichte erzählen ... in systematischer Reihenfolge ... drückt man sich so aus? ...
obwohl ich Ihnen nicht alles erzähle, sozusagen: nur das Wichtigste, oder das, was ich, Itzig
Finkelstein, damals noch Max Schulz, für ganz besonders wichtig halte” (Hilsenrath 14). In this
passage, Max’s asserts that he will narrate the events of his life according to a logical, systematic
unfolding of events. This assertion is unsettled by his insistence that he can be trusted to select
the most important, germane details and our burgeoning realization that “key features of Max’s
diseased narrative include his deliberate manipulation of narrative perspective and his
employment of a strategy of obscuration, both of which allow him to withhold from the reader
his true relationship to and motivations for his crimes” (McGlothlin, “Narrative Perspective”
164). At this point in the narrative, Max has only hinted at the crimes that will form the
foundation of his identity as mass murderer. But based on what and how he has narrated thus far,
we would be wise to be wary both of taking his utterances at face value and of presuming that at
the core of his narration lies an impulse toward an ethical engagement with both his audience and
the subject matter he depicts.
As if the novel’s narrator were not satisfied with complicating the reader’s process of
identification with the personality articulated in his autobiographical project, the passage quoted
above reveals an additional element that contributes to our overall sense of disbelief and
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confusion regarding our relationship with the figure steering the narration. Touching upon
McGlothlin’s argument that Max willingly endeavors to deceive, I wish to call our attention to
the narrating-I’s deliberate unsettling of identity. Up until this passage, we assume that the “I”
narrating the text is synonymous with the name “Max Schulz.” The assumption is justified, for
the narrating-I has identified himself as Max Schulz on three separate occasions thus far (7, 13,
and 14). At the end of this passage, however, the narrator de-stabilizes his identity, claiming two
separate names, both Max Schulz and Itzig Finkelstein. Again, the narrator refuses explanation
of the significance of a gesture that calls his identity into question. We must contend with the
possibility that the narrator’s “I” does not simply or unequivocally correspond to the name Max
Schulz. The discursive entity that narrates the novel introduces here a fundamental slippage
between the narrating-I and the notion of a static name that he employs for purposes of
identification. After establishing two discrete individuals and two separate identities, one
German and the other German-Jewish, this “I” makes use of both names and thus of both
identities simultaneously. Given that we have begun to recognize the unreliable nature of this
“I”’s practice of narration, this destabilization of the “I” that narrates the text foreshadows the
lengths to which Max the murderer will later go in order to obscure his identity and delay our
understanding of his intentions.
The specific brand of identity politics that the narrating-I, who up to this point in the
narration identifies himself primarily as Max Schulz, foregrounds in the first chapter of the first
book, with his problematic gravitation toward identifying as both perpetrator and victim, gains
an additional facet when the young Max, who was once able to avoid irresponsible adults and
their maleficent intentions, narrates an event during which he is unable to escape abuse. In the
subsequent chapter, the second of the first book, Max relates how the Abramovitz family fires
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his mother on account of her licentiousness, an action that provokes her to take up residence with
the barber Anton Slavitzki. Max’s depicts his new stepfather as a “Kinderschänder” (18) and his
place of business-cum-domicile as “schäbig” (20), more of a “Friseurstube” than a
“Friseurladen” (20), especially when compared to the proper Finkelstein family barber shop “Der
Herr von Welt,” located directly across the street. During their first night there, the man makes
sexual advances toward Max’s mother. Because he has offered Minna Schulz and her son a place
to live, he automatically assumes that sexual gratification will be offered him as recompense.
After being denied sexual satisfaction from his new “bride,” Slavitzki reacts in a grotesque
manner. Max explains: “Als Slavitzki schließlich einsah, daß er verspielt hatte, kannte seine Wut
keine Grenzen. Er stürtzte wie ein Wilder aus dem neuen Ehebett, nackt, mit gerecktem Glied,
Schaum auf den Lippen, Schweiß auf der flachen Stirn, verklebtem Haar ... und stillte Wut und
Juckreiz an mir” (22). Here, Max portrays Slavitzki as a man utterly lacking in scruples, whose
grotesque physicality (with his monstrous penis) is matched only by his seemingly boundless
libido.16 Unable to assert sexual ownership over Max’s mother (at least in this scene), Slavitzki
claims the powerless Max instead, victimizing him. But the description of this gut-wrenching
scene of traumatization does not end there. Max interrupts the portrayal of the crime perpetrated
against him with another address to the audience:
Können Sie sich das Ausmaß des Verbrechens vorstellen? Ich, Max Schulz, gerade
sieben Wochen alt, zukünftiger Massenmörder, zur Zeit aber unschuldig, lag wie ein
Engel in meiner neuen Wiege, dem Waschbecken, in das Slavitzki aus Gewohnheit
16

With the figure of Slavitzki, male potency becomes concomitant with violence and perpetration. This constellation
of potency and perpetration is later transferred to the Nazis in general, when Slavitzki becomes an ardent supporter
of Hitler (43-5). Slavitzki’s penis, with its grotesque proportions, serves as part of Hilsenrath’s satire of the Nazis.
Katharina Gerstenberger and Vera Pohland argue: “Die erzählerische Konzentration auf den Phallus ist satirisch
auffaßbar als Verfremdungsmittel” (84).
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pinkelte, das jedoch ganz trocken war, denn meine Mutter hatte es ausgewischt, lag
eingehüllt in warme Windeln … und dem Deckchen, schlief friedlich, träumte von
meinen Kollegen, den Engeln, träumte und lächelte ... wurde plötzlich aus dem Schlaf
gerissen, hochgerissen ... wollte die Engel um Hilfe rufen, konnte aber nicht schreien, riß
entsetzt die Augen auf, pisste vor Angst in die Windeln, verschluckte mich, bekam
Erstrickungsanfälle, kotzte Muttermilch auf Slavitzkis Hand, streckte Händchen und
Beinchen aus, wollte meine Unschuld verteidigen, sah das gewaltige Glied Slavitzkis,
dachte, es wäre ein reisiger Bandwurm, murmelte Stoßgebete, obwohl ich das Beten noch
gar nicht gelernt hatte, wollte sterben, sehnte mich zurück in den dunklen, aber sicheren
Schoß meiner Mutter ... und landete plötzlich bäuchlings auf dem Friseursessel, der vor
dem Waschbecken stand. (22)
Here, Max invites his audience to imagine the magnitude of a crime (“Ausmaß des
Verbrechens”) that arguably most, if not all, readers would find unimaginable: the anal rape of a
male infant perpetrated by a paternal figure. Anticipating that his audience will find the topic
anathema and taboo, Max supplies the scene above. He follows up his call for the reader to
imagine this scene—and thus empathize with him—by providing a detailed depiction of his
physical and emotional reaction to what Slavitzki does to him. Max depicts the panic he
experiences upon seeing the naked Slavitzki approaching his makeshift crib. Before falling to the
barber chair in the prone position, Max expresses a yearning to return to the relative safety of his
mother’s womb. All the more horrifying is Max’s depiction of his mother’s reaction to the rape
that Slavitzki perpetrates against her son. Max’s wish for maternal protection, however, remains
unfulfilled. In a further grotesque twist, Minna Schulz casually looks on as the abuse takes place
and refuses to intervene:
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Meine Mutter stand neben dem Klappbett [...] stand dort und guckte, guckte verschlafen
mit gläsernem Blick, sah Slavitzki, sah den Friseursessel, sah meine Samthaut ... arisch,
schneeweiß, unschuldig ... leckte ihre Lippen, prüfte ihre Zähne, wollte beißen, überlegte
sich’s anders, suchte eine Zigarette, fand sie schließlich hinter dem rechten Ohr, nicht
hinter dem linken, steckte sie in den Mund, zwischen die starken weißen Zähne, fand
auch ein Streichholz, nicht hinter dem rechten Ohr, sondern hinter dem linken, hob das
magere Bein, das linke, rieb das Streichholz gegen die Pantoffelsohle, sah die Flamme,
zündete ihre Zigarette an, paffte, starrte auf den Mammutknochen des Friseurs Slavitzki,
grinste verlegen, kicherte, weil Slavitzki schwitzte ... und zuckte dann plötzlich
zusammen. (22-3)
In this complex passage, we notice how Max underscores his mother’s complicity in the act of
sexual abuse. She not only fails to intercede on her child’s behalf, but also appears to take a kind
of perverse pleasure in witnessing the scene, at least up until the moment when she winces. By
positioning his mother as on-looker who observes from the sidelines without complaint, the
narrator Max constructs a triangular constellation that mimics (and foreshadows) the triad of
identities that will emerge in post-Holocaust discussions regarding German wartime aggression
and postwar guilt: perpetrator, victim, and bystander (Täter, Opfer, and Mitläufer). His mother’s
role as bystander is further highlighted when we notice how the moment of abuse—of sexual
contact between Slavitzki and the baby Max—is focalized through Minna Schulz’s perspective.
The bite she contemplates, along with the smoldering cigarette dangling from her vulgar visage,
underscores her consumption of the scene that takes place before her. We observe her in the act
of observing the moment leading up to penetration and thus to the act of perpetration, as her gaze
wanders from Slavitzki’s mammoth member to the perspiration glinting off of the rest of his
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body. An ellipsis interrupts the flow of description, presumably as he proceeds to abuse the child.
The ellipsis—a literal gap in the narration—operates, I argue, as a stand-in for the sexual act
itself. This moment of disnarration and the cringe that appears on Minna Schulz’s face are the
only indicators that her perverse viewing pleasure is obscured by the exaggerated, taboo nature
of the crime committed.
Similar to the previous incident regarding the narrowly avoided circumcision, Max
depicts this scene of sexual abuse with an intensity of detail and level of sophistication to which
no baby has access. Humans cannot remember and therefore cannot narrate their own experience
as infants; nevertheless, Max depicts this incident of trauma as if he had direct, unhampered
access to the memory. He thus claims to be capable of accomplishing the impossible—yet
another signal of unreliable narration. His narration of this scene also fails to provide readers
with tools for understanding this scene of sexual abuse and its exaggerated character. He offers
no framework for his method of telling, he makes no mention of the fact that his narration—to be
plausible—would have to arise entirely out of imagination. While we might imagine that Max
bases this detailed representation on the memory of abusive incidents he suffers at a later point in
life, when he is old enough to be a conscious subject and therefore physically and
psychologically capable of having memory of said incidents, Max offers us no information to
corroborate a hypothesis such as this. It’s not the emotional content of the depiction of the primal
scene of sexual abuse that provides cause for doubt, but rather the veneer of verisimilitude to
which Max as narrator ostensibly clings. Instead of establishing an interpretive framework for his
audience or an explanation that his adult self is strategically contriving impossible childhood
memories through the act of telling, Max feigns recognition of his unreliability, interjecting: “Ich
weiß, was Sie sagen: ‘Max Schulz spinnt! Ein Alptraum! Nichts weiter!’” (23). But in admitting
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that he realizes that he appears psychologically untenable, he sidesteps the need for explanation
by introducing into his monologue a moment of “dialogue” with the reader. Reacting to his
audience’s likely disbelief, he sums up his terrifying depiction with a series of rhetorical
questions: “Aber warum behaupten Sie das? Hat der liebe Gott nicht die Urschuld erfunden,
damit sie zertreten wird ... hier auf Erden? Und werden die Schwachen und Wehrlosen nicht von
den Starken überrumpelt, niedergeknüppelt, vergewaltigt, verhöhnt, in den Arsch gefickt? [...] Ist
es nicht so? Und wenn es so ist ... warum behaupten Sie dann, daß Max Schulz spinnt?” (24). In
this passage, Max aggressively counters accusations of unreliability by underscoring his status as
victim, aligning himself with anonymous others who have also been unable to defend themselves
in the face of violence. But it is crucial to note here that he demands that we acknowledge the
veracity of the abuse he suffered as a child with his assertion that it is not unique in human
history. This acknowledgement, in turn, also entails absolving him of the charge of insanity—or
at least narratorial mendacity. When we look closely, however, we realize that this rhetorical turn
is a further ploy in Max’s deception. As readers, we don’t necessarily question that the abuse
occurred, we simply question Max’s method for depicting it. Max’s rhetorical gesture of
constructing a kind of artificial ‘conversation” between himself as narrator and the narratee
mimics dialogic exchange between discrete subjectivities. However, in playing both
conversational partners, Max calculatingly disregards the transformative potential of the
dialogic.17 He ends up reaffirming instead his monologic shaping of the narration.

17

With the transformative potential of the dialogic, I refer to narrators who address their audiences in the spirit of
productive debate and intellectual exchange. Both parties ideally stand to gain from dialogic interaction. Let us
consider for example the narratorial position taken up by Holocaust survivor and Germanist Ruth Klüger in her
memoir weiter leben, in which she urges her readers to engage with her in a critical manner: “Ihr müßt euch nicht
mit mir identifizieren, es ist mir sogar lieber, wenn ihr es nicht tut; und wenn ich euch ‘artfremd’ erscheine, so will
ich auch das hinnehmen (aber ungern) und, falls ich euch durch den Gebrauch dieses bösen Wortes geärgert habe,
mich dafür entschuldigen. Aber laßt euch mindestens reizen, verschanzt euch nicht, sagt nicht von vornherein, das
gehe euch nichts an . . . Werdet streitsüchtig, sucht die Auseinandersetzung” (142).
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Max’s self-positioning as child victim is further complicated by another instance of selfidentification as mass murderer. In relating his reaction to Slavitzki’s violence, he declares: “Ich,
Max Schulz, zukünftiger Massenmörder, zur Zeit noch unschuldig, stieß einen
markerschütternden Schrei aus [...]” (23). Here, Max once again refers to himself as mass
murderer as he did in the previous chapter, this time adding the adjective “zukünftig,” thus
implying that his victimized child self will one day grow up to become a future self that commits
murder on a mass scale. These references to his future criminal activity remind us that his
autobiographical account constitutes not only a memoir of childhood victimization but also one
of perpetration. In his study of actual (non-fictional) Nazi memoirs, Alan Rosen analyzes the
complex ethical dimension with which readers of these notorious autobiographical texts contend.
Rosen argues that as readers, aware of the memoirist’s criminal past, we automatically approach
such a text “with some hesitation [...] unsure whether the destruction of which the authors are
capable might find its way into the narratives they compose,” and are “apprehensive lest these
criminals convince [us] they are less evil than universally assumed” (553). As a result of this
hesitation, the dynamics of identification between the reader and the autobiographical text’s
narrating-I are complicated. The relationship between reader and Nazi memoir, according to
Rosen’s argument, is one marked by antipathy rather than empathy (554). As readers of Der Nazi
und der Friseur, we experience, I argue, a tension analogous to the one that Rosen describes.
Max’s deployment of autobiographical and associated confessional conventions invites us,
particularly in light of these early scenes depicting the abuse that he suffered as a child, to
empathize with him as victim and survivor of sexual abuse. On the other hand, Max’s
unreliability, willful manipulation of the narration, coupled with his self-identification as a future
perpetrator, provide us reason enough to begin cultivating doubt and recognizing an impulse
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against empathy and toward antipathy—which is also a form of identification, albeit a negative
one. As the reader encounters contradictory narrative cues—some which invite empathy, others
antipathy—the dynamics of identification take on a dialectical dimension.
Central to Rosen’s investigation of Nazi autobiographical texts is his incorporation of one
penned by Auschwitz commandant Rudolf Höss while in prison. In Höss’s text, Rosen identifies
a particularly insidious rhetorical strategy whereby Höss’s narrating-I manipulates the narration
of an event in order to cast himself as victim and downplay his actual, historical role as
perpetrator: “This pattern of reversal, in which victimizer becomes victim, surfaces regularly in
Höss’s memoir, most notably—and, for the reader, excruciatingly—when Höss, as commander
of Auschwitz, bemoans the terrible scenes he is compelled to witness” (556). Rosen’s analysis
provides helpful insight for my discussion of Hilsenrath’s text, for I assert that Max’s narratorial
manipulation involves a rhetorical strategy similar to Höss’s. While the reader of Höss’s memoir
approaches the text with prior knowledge regarding the nature of his crimes and thus knows
beforehand that he is a Holocaust perpetrator (despite his slippery attempts to claim the
contrary), Max introduces in the depiction of his childhood, even before he relates the crimes he
commits later in life as an adult, a similar “pattern of reversal,” according to which he switches
back and forth between what is often understood—usually for good reason—as diametrically
opposed subject positions. In one moment he refers to himself as a future perpetrator, and in the
next he goes to considerable lengths to demonstrate his victimization, perpetrated by his
insidious and lascivious stepfather and tacitly supported by his ethically reprehensible mother.
Keeping Rosen’s “pattern of reversal” in mind, let us imagine Max’s practice of selfidentification that we have seen thus far as a mechanism positioned on an axis that can be rotated
and then reversed at a moment’s notice or from one sentence to the next, allowing him to
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navigate the narrative without the need to explain the true nature of his intentions in constructing
this autobiographical account. And having established this pattern or mechanism at the beginning
of the novel within the greater context of narratorial unreliability, Max is able throughout the rest
of the text to sidestep the logical expectation on the part of the reader that his narrating-I
represents a fixed identity.
Max’s mechanism of self-identification as both victim and perpetrator gains additional
contours with the appearance of the trope of the loose screw. After the initial scene of sexual
abuse represented in the second chapter of the first book, Max depicts himself in the subsequent
chapter as a troubled child growing up in a household brimming with dysfunction and antiSemitic sentiment, as the child-rapist Slavitzki cultivates an envy-driven hatred toward his
neighbor and competitor, the German Jew Chaim Finkelstein, father of Itzig Finkelstein
(Hilsenrath 25-28). Against this maleficent backdrop, Max describes himself as a boy:
Als Junge schlug ich seltsame Purzelbäume. Ich konnte auch Radschlagen, verstand es,
meine Glieder zu verrenken, machte Handstand, Kopfstand, Spagat, konnte an meiner
großen Zehe lutschen, zog Grimassen, lachte oft ohne Grund, stotterte, warf Steinchen
auf kleine Mädchen, trat Jungens, die schwächer waren als ich, in den Hintern, schlug
Fensterscheiben ein, kletterte auf Dächer, pinkelte von Dächern auf die Straße und so
fort. (28)
Max provides a succinct overview of his childhood pastimes, starting with harmless activities
that depict a boy with a benign penchant for gymnastics. But as the list continues, Max’s favorite
pastimes become less innocuous and more violent. The boy Max exhibits the behavior of a bully
who enjoys terrorizing fellow children—early signs of potential sociopathic behavior. In addition
to delighting in harming others, he damages property and exposes himself by urinating from the
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roofs of buildings. While these proclivities are not necessarily conclusive indicators of future
wrongdoing, there is the sense that something is not quite right with the boy. He narrates a
conversation between his mother and stepfather, in which they speculate about the cause of the
boy’s deviance:
Einmal sagte mein Stiefvater zu meiner Mutter: “Weißt du, Minna, ich glaube, bei dem
Jungen ist ‘ne Schraube locker.” Meine Mutter sagte: “Weißt du, Anton. Beim ersten Mal
ist es passiert.”
“Wie meinst du das?” sagte mein Stiefvater.
“Dein Schwanz war ganz einfach zu groß,” sagte meine Mutter, “und zu lang. Der stieß
an seinen Hirnkasten an. Oder an sein Dach. Und was entstand: ein Dachschaden!”
“Ein Dachschaden,” sagte Slavitzki.
“Ja, Anton,” sagte meine Mutter ernst. “Ein Dachschaden.” (28-9)
Here, we encounter a moment in which someone other than Max questions his mental health.
Max the narrator positions his parents as the source of an amateur diagnosis, but he does not
explain how he acquired knowledge of this exchange. The conversation is depicted as if they are
observing from afar and commenting to one another regarding what they observe. Slavitzki
asserts that the boy Max has a “screw loose,” and Minna draws a causal connection between the
sexual abuse that Max has suffered at the hands of Slavitzki and the boy’s apparent odd
behavior. Referencing the first occurrence of rape and thus implying that Max has been subjected
to a routine pattern of sexual abuse at the hands of his stepfather, Minna offers her assessment
casually, without accusing her lover of any criminal behavior. In her explanation of what
Slavitzki did and how it affected the young Max, she combines a grotesque and fallacious
understanding of human anatomy (reminiscent of her superstition-riddled conception of Judaism)
86

with a common German euphemistic expression employed to describe someone who exhibits
odd or deviant behavior or who appears to have some kind of mental disorder. According to her
interpretation, Slavitzki’s gargantuan penis struck the baby’s developing brain from the inside
during the act of anal rape, and as a result the boy Max has a “Dachschaden,” i.e. a hole in his
roof, i.e. in his head. Max’s injury is the literal manifestation of a figure of speech—a joke in
itself. The “Dachschaden” also operates synechdochally here, representing the physical, mental
and emotional damage that Max has incurred not only as a result of the first instance of abuse,
but also as a result of subsequent abuse.
After this initial diagnosis of his childhood behavior, Max often refers to his
“Dachschaden,” establishing it as a trope that reminds the reader of the psychic damage he
incurred as a result of systematic sexual abuse perpetrated by his stepfather.18 Like a Homeric
epithet, Max employs the image of the loose screw within the larger context of his complex
methodology of self-narration. I argue that we must read Max’s construction of and elaboration
on the trope of the “loose screw” within the larger context of his manipulative and unreliable
narratorial practice. Let us return to McGlothlin’s analysis of Max’s narration. Borrowing and
expanding upon Andreas Graf’s terminology, she convincingly illustrates that Max’s
manipulation of narrative voice and his “markedly self-conscious unreliability” are features of a
18

Max refers to his loose screw on several occasions throughout the novel. In the fourth chapter of the first book of
the novel, Max, in discussing his experiences attending high school, states, “Die Jahre im Gymnasium drückten mir,
Max Schulz, Sohn einer Nutte, Stiefsohn eines Kinderschänders, Rattenquäler mit Dachschaden . . . einen neuen
Stempel auf” (35). This loose screw accompanies him through his school years and into early adulthood and is
present when he goes to hear Hitler give a speech from atop the “Mount of Olives” in 1932. The religious
association is not lost on Max, who depicts himself as a downtrodden supplicant in need of a savior. While
conversing with a former teacher whom he encounters in the crush of enthusiastic revelers clamoring to get a good
look at the Führer, Max rhetorically inquires: “Und haben Sie auch Kopfschmerzen, Herr von Salzstange? Ist das
von der Sonne? Die ist verdammt heiß. Und ich dürfte gar nicht hier rumstehen . . . in der Sonne, mein’ ich . . .
wegen meines Dachschadens . . .” (52). In keeping with the logic of his mother’s original euphemistic explanation of
his behavior, Max claims to worry for the health of his brain lest the sun beat down too intensely and heat up that
hot metal screw rattling around in his head. A day later Max joins the Nazi party, along with Slavitzki and his
mother (62), and he is inducted into the Schutzstaffel shortly thereafter (66). In addition to these references to his
loose screw in the first book of the novel, Max also employs the trope on several occasions in subsequent books. See
for example: 195-198, 240, 307, 316, 344, 407, 454, and 464.
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“pathological narration” (“Narrative Perspective” 164). Taking Graf and McGlothlin’s taxonomy
of pathology and disease as a point of departure, I propose the further expansion of the biomedical metaphor to discuss Max’s narration as an “injured” one. On account of his unreliability
and his penchant for describing grotesque, exaggerated human bodies that perform acts of
unspeakable violence, it comes as no surprise that his narrative practice—though not necessarily
his consciousness per se—lends itself to being understood in terms of medicine or hygiene, as
the product of a seemingly neurologically impaired brain. The term “injured” denotes both
Max’s portrayal of his subjectivity as wounded or damaged on account of his brutalization and
rape as a young child and his narration, since he manipulates narrative voice in order to present a
split subjectivity, often claiming to be two people at once: Max Schulz and Itzig Finkelstein.
Whether or not Max as the narrating figure or the “I” that shapes the text that we read actually
suffers from a medical condition or illness is less critical to my analysis than the fact that he
desires the reader to draw a connection between the extreme nature of the childhood trauma he
suffered and the “loose screw” that he illustrates as a permanent part of his psychological
makeup. Whenever he deploys the trope of the “Dachschaden,” he forces us to consider the
psychic link between this original injury and the later context in which it appears, whether it be
when he relates his experiences in school (34-37) or when inspired by Hitler’s speech on the
“Mount of Olives” and becoming a member of the National Socialist party (47-68). In the third
book of the novel, while assuming the identity of the dead Itzig Finkelstein and composing a
fatuous autobiographical summary under his newly developed alias, Max goes so far as to
transfer his loose screw from his previous Max-identity to his new Itzig-identity, claiming to
suffer from mild brain damage as a result of the traumatic events he experienced and witnessed
while he was supposedly interred in Auschwitz (193-202). While narrating a fabricated scene in
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which he stands before a DP-camp committee charged with the task of inspecting new internees
for the purpose of authenticating their Jewish identity, Max, speaking in the guise of Itzig, infers
his interlocutors’ thought process, “Die Herren starrten nur noch auf meine Auschwitznummer,
denn ich hatte meine Hose ja wieder zugeknöpft. Ich konnte ihre Gedanken lesen [...] Ich las sie
stumm, mit zusammengepreßtem Mund: Der war in Auschwitz! Der hat einen Dachschaden!
Kein Wunder!” (198). I assert that Max’s deployment of the trope of the loose screw invites the
reader to consider a causal relationship between it and his later behavior as an adult. When Max
describes himself as a mass murderer who participated in the killing of 20,000 Jewish prisoners
in the Nazi-run concentration camp Laubwalde (78-79) and who also happens to have a
“Dachschaden,” he models for us the logic that he wishes us to employ for interpreting his
behavior. Max wants us to believe, I argue, that his loose screw is a reason for his becoming a
perpetrator later in life. It is important to note that he does not explicitly make this claim; instead,
he employs rhetorical strategies available to him as narrator so that we might arrive at this
conclusion through the process of reading.
We have already seen how Max often leaves certain pieces of information out of his
storytelling, such as failing to explain how he can vividly describe episodes that occurred when
he was only an infant. Max seems to “suppress” certain crucial data, even while relating a scene
or an event that otherwise appears rich in detail. In her scholarship on causality, Emma
Kafalenos explains the process by which we mentally organize and digest information that we
receive while reading:
Missing information matters because we interpret and reinterpret events, from moment to
moment, on the basis of the information that is available to us at that moment. We
understand events, I shall argue, by viewing them as elements in chronological and causal
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chains of events. First we organize the events we know about in a chronological
sequence, and then we look for possible causal relations among the chronologically
ordered events. We consider whether there is an event or events in the sequence we have
constructed that could have caused subsequent events, or been caused by prior events.
When information that an event has occurred is deferred or suppressed, the event is
missing from the chronological sequence that perceivers construct. If the missing event is
crucial, the causal relations that seem to obtain among the known events are different
from the causal relations one would be able to perceive if information about the missing
event were available. (35)19
Because Max tells his life story more or less in chronological order, the reader of Der Nazi und
der Friseur spends less time determining when specific events occurred and more time
pondering why they took place and the “causal relations” that bind them together (Kafalenos
36).20 According to Kafalenos, the reader interprets occurrences in a text and negotiates gaps
retrospectively by way of “configurations” (38-41). She explains that when we read we construct
configurations, which entails mentally stringing together the pieces of information that we
perceive in the text, adding each new piece that we encounter to what we have already read.
When reading a discrete text, we assume that events are related to one another in some way. That
is to say, we are constantly attempting to extract meaning from the sequence of events that form
narrative. At any one point in a text, we seek to understand what we have read thus far, because
“to comprehend events as a configuration is to grasp a number of events as a single complex of
19

Kafalenos employs and expands upon narrative theorist Meir Sternberg’s categorization of narrators as
“suppressive” or “omnicommunicative.”
20
Citing the Russian Formalists, Kafalenos asserts that there are two separate sequences when consuming a text,
“sjuzhet (the representation) and fabula (the chronological sequence abstracted from the representation).” The reader
encounters the sjuzhet in the form of the text and then constructs the fabula through the process of reading. She
argues: “Positing sjuzhet and fabula as parallel sequences permits conceiving instances of deferred or suppressed
information as gaps in one or both sequences. Sjuzhet/fabula relations illuminate gaps” (36).
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relationships” (Kafalenos 39). We therefore rely upon the process of configuration as a
cornerstone for interpreting what we read.
Keeping the concept of the configuration in mind, let us return to Hilsenrath’s text. Max
tells us that he is sexually abused as a child, suffering permanent brain damage as a result. Later,
as young man, he becomes an ardent supporter of the Nazi regime and then rises in the ranks and
joined the SS. All the while this loose screw has been rattling around in his head. The
“configuration” that Max thus invites us to draw is a causal connection between his victimization
and his later perpetration. But if we consider the sequence of information more closely, we see
how Max strategically leaves critical gaps in the information that he presents. The “loose screw”
does not account for the murder he commits, nor does it explain his transformation from
enthusiastic acolyte of the National Socialist regime into Holocaust perpetrator. He does not
explain how he passes the rigorous standards for admission into the notorious SS, and he even
tells us that he will not explain how it all happened:
Mein ehemaliger Deutschlehrer Siegfried von Salzstange hatte einmal zu mir gesagt:
“Max Schulz, in der braunen SA findet jeder Platz, der richtig furzen kann. Aber nicht in
der SS!’—Denn die SS, das war der Verband der Schwarzen Puritaner, die Elite des
Neuen Deutschlands. Für Mäuschen wie den Max Schulz, die nicht wie Herrenmenschen
aussahen, sondern wie Untermenschen ... genau so und nicht anders ... eben so aussahen,
als ob sie die Ethik des Völkermords nicht kapieren würden ... gar nicht kapieren … für
die war der Eintritt in die SS alles andere als leicht.
Was hab ich gesagt? Nicht leicht? Das stimmt. Ich muß hier allerdings hinzufügen, daß
gute Beziehungen ... und zwar zu den richtigen Leuten ... im Leben oft eine
entscheidende Rolle spielen. (66)
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Here, the ellipses ironically speak louder than words. Max inserts his hesitation, his pauses to
consider carefully how he wishes to proceed, into the text. He gestures toward what he is leaving
out, hinting to us that there is more to the story but that he is unwilling to reveal all. We are
supposed to be satisfied with the explanation that his former teacher Herr von Salzstange had the
right connections and that he somehow passed “durch das meckrige Rassen- und
Bewährungssieb des Schwarzen Korps” (66-67). It is important to note here that Max endeavors
a few pages later to downplay the role he plays in the SS, even asserting that the SS victimized
and used him much like his stepfather had once done: “Die SS ließ mich nicht los. Die brauchte
mich genauso wie Slavitzki, der mich immer gebraucht hatte. Die brauchten meine Hände. Und
die brauchten auch meinen Hintern, damit er eines Tages herhalten sollte für den Rückschlag des
großen Glückrads, mit dem wir damals Geschichte machen wollten” (70). Max casts himself in
the role of the victim of history and of the machinations of his superiors rather than accepting his
portion of the responsibility and admitting to his complicity and to his willing involvement in
this history. For having a “Dachschaden” does not mitigate the fact he chose to participate in the
SS, and it also does not nullify his subsequent role in the Nazis’ “Final Solution.”
His loose screw also does not explain his motivations for willingly participating in killing
numerous Jewish victims as a member of an Einsatzgruppe, nor does it elucidate his thought
process when he serves as a guard in a Nazi concentration camp. Something is missing in this
regard in his account. His assumption that membership in the Nazi party directly correlates to
actual participation in the systematic murder of Jews and other targets of the Nazi genocide is the
product of false logic. Max implicitly explains (and perhaps attempts to justify) his
transformation into murderer and perpetrator by relying on the amorphous, unspecific concept of
the “Dachschaden,” instead of engaging in an explicit investigation of what he was actually
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thinking and experiencing when said transformation took place. The loose screw (ostensibly)
results from something that happened to him as a passive, helpless victim, but it cannot account
for the decisions that he actively makes as an independent, autonomous subject, however much
he attempts to convince the reader of its applicability.
The trope of the loose screw is therefore a red herring, rather than a reliable factor for
interpreting Max’s behavior in the diegetic world. It does, however, assist us in further
developing an understanding of his behavior as narrator and his injured narration. McGlothlin
convincingly argues that Max transgresses both in the diegesis and as a narrator on the
extradiegetic level for the purpose of evading criminal prosecution and deferring responsibility
for his crimes as mass murderer and Holocaust perpetrator (“Narrative Transgression” 220-39). I
view the trope of the loose screw within the context of this narratorial practice, because Max’s
subtle manipulation of a story regarding unspeakable sexual abuse perpetrated against him as a
child—the implied reason for why he later became a murderer—is nothing if not transgressive.
Max’s injured narration allows him to perform the role of mentally unstable criminal in the
diegesis and psychologically disturbed narrator in the extradiegesis—even if the narrating-I is, as
I suspect, not in fact “crazy” and is in fact extremely clever and conscious of the rhetorical
strategies he deploys for evading guilt and responsibility.
In the eleventh and final chapter of the novel’s first book, Max disingenuously informs
his audience: “Viel gibt es nicht mehr zu erzählen” (Hilsenrath 75), despite the fact that what
follows is his extremely brief narration of his involvement in the SS in Eastern Europe as a
member of Einsatzgruppe D, which was responsible for rounding up and executing Jews in
southern Ukraine and the Crimea. Citing his and what he assumes to be his audience’s lack of
patience with the topic, he tells his readers that he will keep this part of his story succinct: “Aber
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ich halte Sie unnötig auf. Stimmt’s? Sie wolllen doch wissen, wann ich zum Massenmörder
wurde? Also: Ich, Itzig Finkelstein, damals noch Max Schulz, werde versuchen, mich so kurz
wie möglich zu fassen. Sie haben keine Geduld mehr. Und ich auch nicht” (76). Max feigns
critical, discursive engagement with what is arguably the most fascinating and compelling aspect
of his autobiographical account, dangling the question before our eyes like a carrot. And yet at
this point in the text when he arrives at the moment in his life story when he must relate the
circumstances that will constitute his personal complicity in events associated with the
Holocaust, he fails to go into any substantive detail. In depicting the actions that he personally
committed as perpetrator, he offers us less than four pages’ worth of narration (76-79). Since the
beginning of the novel, he has claimed to be a mass murderer, but his description of the murders
he commits and his reasoning for perpetrating them remain vague: “Ich weiß das, da ich ja
damals sozusagen ‘mitbeteiligt’ war, obwohl ich mich heute nicht mehr genau erinnern kann,
wieviele Gefangene ich damals erschossen, erschlagen oder erhängt habe” (79). He explains that
as a guard at Laubwalde, he participated in killing 20 000 Jewish prisoners: “In Laubwalde
waren 20 000 Juden. Wir haben sie alle umgebracht. 20 000! Trotzdem war das ein kleines
Lager, denn die meisten Gefangenen wurden gleich nach ihrer Einlieferung kaltgemacht. Das
was praktisch. Denn auf diese Weise hatten wir nie zu viele von ihnen zu überwachen. Wie
gesagt: ein kleines Lager!” (79). Here, Max employs the pronoun “we” instead of “I,”
underscoring his role as member of a larger collective, i.e. the SS. He admits to participating in
this systematic killing, but he clearly leaves much out of this account. The insight into the
motives of the perpetrator that Max’s narration ostensibly offers leaves us in this instance
wanting more, for Max evades a longer, more detailed depiction by citing his impatience with
the topic. Compared with his elaborate depictions of the episodes from his childhood, his
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portrayal here of deeds in which he was a willing actor appears truncated. Moments in the
narration such as this one frustrate us rather than leaving us with any sense of greater
understanding of the thought process that Max employed when he committed murder. But Max’s
aim is to shed light neither on his motivations for killing nor on his true intentions with his
narration. Rather, his goal is to obscure the truth. The conclusion of the first book of the novel
coincides with the end of World War II: “Dort in Laubwalde tat ich Dienst, bis der Krieg zu
Ende war, das heißt: bis zu jenem denkwürdigen Tag, als der Krieg für mich, Max Schulz, später
Itzig Finkelstein, endgültig vorbei war” (79). Here, at the end of a brief explanation of his
participation in the Nazi Judeocide, the “narrating”-I reinforces the split identity, claiming two
names and two identities, one a Holocaust perpetrator and the other a Holocaust victim. At the
conclusion of the first book, we are left to wonder whether his childhood victimization and the
accompanying loose screw serve in some fashion as a psychological foundation for his
assumption of Itzig Finkelstein’s identity as Holocaust victim and survivor. But Max never
explains the connection; instead, he conflates two radically different experiences of victimization
and invites the reader to do the same. His injured narration thus often confuses us, throws us for
a loop. The end of the first book delineates a limnus, marking the conclusion of his criminal
actions as Holocaust perpetrator, but this does not, however, mean that his identity as perpetrator
comes to an end. His final rhetorical gesture in the first book of claiming two identities as both
victim and perpetrator reinforces a pattern with which we are already familiar—one that will
characterize the remainder of the narrative. Max never convinces us, unlike the characters whom
he encounters in the story world, that he is a Holocaust survivor. Instead, his assumption of
Itzig’s identity, along with the narrative tic of switching back and forth between subject
positions, reminds us of his criminal past and the fact that he goes unpunished for his crimes.
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Aboard the Exitus: Shaping a Dialogue Between Victim and Perpetrator
In the second book of Der Nazi und der Friseur, Max Schulz witnesses the German loss
of World War II, flees the advancing Red Army, takes refuge in the Polish forest, and travels
under cover to Berlin to start life anew. In this portion of the novel, first-person narration is
exchanged for a third-person narrator. Nevertheless, the unnamed heterodiegetic narrator features
the character Max narrating stories to other characters in the novel’s diegesis. Engaging with
Graf’s argument that “the narrative anomaly of the second book represents a variant, however
alienated, of Max’s function as a pathological narrator,” McGlothlin observes that “even when
Max is patently absent as the diegetic narrator in this part of the novel, he is recuperated as an
intradiegetic narrator and thus, in a more alienated fashion, still controls the text’s narration”
(“Narrative Perspective” 166).21 I concur with Graf and McGlothlin and propose that we also
consider the possibility that the narrating-I of the first book shifts narrative perspective to the
third person in the second book, meaning that Max pretends to distance himself from the
narration in the guise of an unidentified narratorial figure. Seen in this light, the second book
provides additional contours to Max’ s pathological narration: he disguises himself on the
diegetic level as Itzig Finkelstein and acts as ventriloquist on the extradiegetic level,
masquerading as an unnamed third-person narrator who ostensibly does not participate in the
events of the story world. Considering Max as the narrative authority responsible for all six
books, including Book Two, thus further underscores “his slippery vocal identity” (McGlothlin
“Narrative Perspective” 166). At the end of this book, Max narrates to his interlocutor Frau Holle
his decision to change his identity in the story world by taking on the name and biography of his
dead childhood friend, the German Jew Itzig Finkelstein.
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See also Graf’s discussion (143).
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In the third book, Max chronicles this transformation while he ekes out a living in Berlin
in the immediate postwar period. Using gold teeth that he purloined from the victims at
Laubwalde as a form of black market currency, he arranges for a corrupt doctor to perform a
circumcision and has an Auschwitz number tattooed on his forearm. Max marks his body in this
fashion in order to “pass” as a victim of the National Socialist regime that he had enthusiastically
supported. At the end of Book 3, Max makes his new identity in the story world a permanent
strategy for avoiding detection and judicial prosecution for his crimes by boarding a passenger
ship named Exitus and immigrating to Palestine, creating geographic distance between himself
and the site of his homicidal crimes in Eastern Europe and the judicial authorities who might
prosecute him, were he to be discovered. But Max’s transgressions, to employ McGlothlin’s term
again, do not end with the heinous deeds he commits in the novel’s story world as a Nazi agent
and as a war criminal on the lam. As she eloquently argues,
Max commits his violations not only physically, in the fabula, or story world, of the text;
he also transgresses on the level of the text’s discourse as the narrator of these events by
parading before the reader not only his iniquities and his uncanny ability to evade capture
and judgment, but also his astonishing lack of shame or guilt for the crimes he has
perpetrated (“Narrative Transgression” 233).
An additional aspect of Max’s extradiegetic transgression entails his treatment of the memory of
Itzig during the ocean journey. While on board the Exitus, Max shifts the focus of his narration
from an anonymous narratee to speaking directly to and naming Itzig as his interlocutor.22 I
argue that this shift in narratorial address in the fourth book operates as a crucial turning point in
his manipulation of narrative voice. A careful investigation of Max’s narration of his ship voyage
22

McGlothlin also fittingly describes Max’s transformation into Itzig as a hubristic act of identity theft (“Narrative
Transgression” 220-39).
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reveals how his switch of narratee from the reader to Itzig animates a dialogic between
perpetrator and victim that reveals further insight regarding the subjectivity that Max endeavors
to craft through his practice of narration. With cool, precise calculation, he manipulates the
novel’s narrative structure to reanimate the dynamics of perpetration. Max’s transgressions as
narrator certainly are not tantamount to the murder he committed as a Holocaust perpetrator;
however, the articulation of his post-perpetration subjectivity relies upon the vestiges of his past
self as a perpetrator. By murdering Itzig and stealing his identity, Max obliterates Itzig’s past,
present, and future. The real story of Itzig is lost as a result of Max’s use of his name and history.
In evading responsibility for his crimes in the postwar period by claiming status as Holocaust
victim and manipulating the narrative in such a way as to slip back and forth between his past
identity as Max Schulz and his present identity as Itzig Finkelstein, Max in effect perpetuates his
past criminal behavior and past self as Holocaust perpetrator. Max’s post-perpetration self thus
has his proverbial cake and eats it, too: he commits murder with impunity as a Nazi official
involved with the events of the “Final Solution” and subsequently evades prosecution for his war
crimes, benefitting from the camouflage provided by the name and biography of a once-intimate
Jewish friend whose identity he has coveted since childhood.
At the beginning of the fourth book, Max Schulz poses the question: who killed Itzig
Finkelstein—the “real” Itzig Finkelstein back in 1942? Max ponders this query and articulates a
response:
Das große Fragezeichen ... im Finstern ... über meinem Bett ... vor meinen Augen ...
nicht sichtbar ... und doch so greifbar nah ... schon hab ich’s eingefangen ... mit meinen
Blicken ... das Unsichtbare … die Vorstellung ... ich hab’s ... da hab ich’s ... könnte es

98

aufrollen ... will aber nicht ... könnte das fragende Häkchen umbiegen ... könnte das
Zeichen verwandeln in einen Strich. Ich will aber nicht! (243)
The answer he formulates here to his initial question allows him to ponder the epistemological
dilemma regarding the identity of Itzig’s murderer without offering a finite solution. This
fragment reveals crucial details for interpreting both this section of the novel and Max’s overall
practice of narratorial manipulation. His reference to a looming question mark hanging over his
head during the night might at first glance seem to belie the idea that Max the perpetrator
experiences feelings of guilt or some kind of moral compunction for the deeds he has committed.
But Max’s gesture here turns out to be, not surprisingly, disingenuous. He highlights his
manipulative nature by implying that he could unfurl and reshape the curlicued, interrogative
punctuation to reveal the answer this question, only to follow up this implication with the
declarative statement: “Ich will aber nicht!”
After asserting that he will allow this query to remain an unanswered, unresolved question
(“Ich aber sage: ‘Laß die Frage Frage sein!’” [243]), his form of address abruptly shifts.
Occupying the position of narrator, Max has the power to address—at least theoretically—
whomever he chooses. Up until the fourth book (not counting the second book), Max addresses a
generic readership. If we take into consideration the schematic of the communicative act of
narrative proposed by classical narratology, the text’s narratee is a figure that occupies the same
diegetic level as the narrator and serves as (imagined) auditor receiving the information related in
the narrator’s tale (Diengott 338). Were the narrator and narratee actual human beings, we might
imagine them sitting opposite one another while the narrator speaks and the narratee listens.
Throughout the first and third books of the novel, Max addresses an unidentified narratee with
the formal German pronoun Sie. We saw an example of this phenomenon in the first few pages
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of the novel when Max asserts to his narratee: “Ich nehme an, daß Sie wissen, was eine
Beschneidung ist [...]” (Hilsenrath 10). Max implies that he and his audience enjoy a shared
context, something perhaps approaching intimacy. At the beginning of the fourth book, Max
shifts the focus of his narration to another intimate relationship, this one from his past.
Immediately following the question regarding the identity of Itzig’s murderer in the passage
quoted above, Max evokes the figure of Itzig Finkelstein and addresses him directly. As if a
phantom version of the murdered Itzig stood before him in response to his question, Max states:
“Lieber Itzig. Du weißt nicht, wer dich erschossen hat. Damals in Laubwalde. Du hast ‘Ihn’ nicht
gesehen. Weil ‘Er’ dich überrascht hat. Weil ‘Er’ nicht wollte, daß du es siehst. Und weil ‘Er’
hinter dir stand. Zwei Schritte hinter dir” (243). Switching to the German informal pronoun “du”
and calling his interlocutor by name, Max signals a profound shift in narration. Max singles out
one of his many victims—his childhood friend—to function as his audience to his recollections
of the agent of his past deeds, to whom he refers in the third person (“Er”). Max reconfigures the
character of Itzig Finkelstein from the novel’s fabula and situates him in the role of narratee.
Disregarding the (ostensible) distinction between the realm of the narrator and that of the story
world and the fact that Itzig is dead, Max reorders the narrative’s ontology. Max plucks the
character of Itzig—or at least the memory of him—out of the story world that is under Max’s
narratorial control and reshapes him into a passive listener. According to the structuralist
narratological model, the narratee, unlike the narrator, exerts no direct control over the
mechanics of narration. By reviving his former childhood friend as a narrative function, Max
further underscores Itzig the deceased character’s lack of agency. McGlothlin argues for an
additional layer of complexity in this form of address, asserting that the “referent of the ‘you’ of
the address is ambiguous; at times ‘you’ designates Max’s former friend and his murder victim,
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with whom Max conducts an imagined, one-sided dialogue” (“Narrative Perspective” 166), such
as the “you” that appears in the passage quoted above. But “[a]t other times, however, the
narrator refers to himself in the second person” and “in those instances in which Max’s secondperson address is formulated as a self-dialogue, the ‘you’ to which it is directed is not his Maxself, but rather his newly figured Itzig-self” (166-7). Referencing Brian Richardson’s discussion
of second-person narration, McGlothlin argues that “[b]y virtue of its highly constructed,
artificial and mutable mode [...] second-person narration seems tailor-made for Max, a narrator
who is nothing if not polymorphic and synthetic. The ‘you’ of his narration in the fourth book is
as unstable and protean as the ‘I’ in the rest of the novel” (167). While I agree with her deft
assessment, my analysis focuses primarily on Max’s use of the pronoun “you” to invoke the
position of the deceased Itzig, a pivotal figure in Max’s formulation of a post-perpetration self.
After invoking Itzig’s name and taunting the figure of the murdered Itzig for not being
able to identify his killer, Max elaborates further:
Er hat auch deinen Vater erschossen. Den Chaim Finkelstein. Und auch deine Mutter.
Die Sara Finkelstein. Er hat euch alle umgebracht.
Kennst du ‘Ihn’? Weißt du, wer der Mörder ist? Dein Mörder? Und der Mörder deines
Vaters? Und der Mörder deiner Mutter? Soll ich dir das Geheimnis verraten? Ha? Ich laß
dich zappeln. Reiß ruhig deine toten Augen auf! Und spritze deine toten Ohren! Es wird
dir nichts nützen. Ich verrate das Geheimnis nicht. (243-4)
Max torments the figure of Itzig here, even though the “Itzig” evoked here is no longer living
and serves only as narrative conceit. Both Max and the reader are aware of his crimes, but the
actual Itzig, like other characters in the story world, could know of Max’s deeds. Max implies
that Itzig and his family members were not aware of their killer’s identity when they died
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because they were taken by surprise (“Weil ‘Er’ dich überrascht hat. Weil ‘Er’ nicht wollte, daß
du es siehst.” [243]). His game is an epistemological one, revolving around who has access to the
knowledge of what he has done and how he positions himself vis-à-vis his past crimes. Let us
also take notice of the pronoun “he” (“Er”). This switch in pronoun demonstrates an additional
grammatical split in Max’s psyche. Instead of employing the pronoun “I” to identify the agent
who surprised and shot Itzig and his family from behind, Max deploys the third-person pronoun
“he.” In doing so, Max further disavows, I argue, his own responsibility and culpability for the
murder not only of the Finkelsteins but also of all his other victims. Max foregoes a confession
of his crimes here by avoiding the “I” that would equate his identity with that of the killer.
Additionally, his use of the pronoun “he” further underscores McGlothlin’s assessment of Max
as “polymorphic” and “synthetic.”
Let us investigate more closely the disturbing interior “monologues” in which Max
addresses Itzig. As we have seen, Max speaks in the voice of Itzig, “inserting himself in the
position of Itzig’s I-narrator” (McGlothlin, “Narrative Transgression” 223). Max’s manipulation
of his victim’s memory goes beyond identity theft—he conjures up the dead Itzig and addresses
him within a rambling interior monologue that takes the form of a dialogue. In one of these
monologue-dialogues, Max discusses the topic of anti-Semitism:
Lieber Itzig. Es heißt, daß man haßt, was man verleugnen will. Ich, Itzig Finkelstein,
damals noch Max Schulz, habe immer wie ein Jude ausgesehen ... obwohl das nicht
stimmt. Aber man hat es gesagt. Ja, man hat es gesagt: Der sieht wie ein Jude aus! Denk
mal nach, Itzig. Schon aus diesem Grund hätt’ ich euch hassen müssen. Um zu
verleugnen, was ich gar nicht bin ... bloß, weil ich Angst hatte, ich könnte es sein. Oder:
weil sie glaubten, daß ich es bin, obwohl ich wußte, daß ich es nicht bin. Kapierst du das?
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Na also. Du kapierst das. Ich auch. Trotzdem hab ich euch nicht nicht gehaßt. Sonderbar
... wie? Das stimmt aber. Ich, Itzig Finkelstein, damals noch Max Schulz, habe die Juden
nie gehaßt. Warum ich euch nicht gehaßt habe? Ich weiß es nicht. Ich stelle nur fest: Ich,
Itzig Finkelstein, damals noch Max Schulz, habe die Juden nicht gehaßt. (244)
Here, Max stages what appears to be a question-and-answer session with “Itzig” (the imaginary
interlocutor rather than the character), inquiring as to whether “Itzig” comprehends his complex
relationship to his stereotypically “Jewish” appearance and the reasons for his active
participation as a Nazi perpetrator. Max’s utterances to a figure he addresses as Itzig might be
understood as a kind of dialogue, because Max appears to respond to himself as Itzig, as if he
imagines Itzig attentively listening and nodding at the appropriate moments. And on account of
Max’s invocation of Itzig’s name and his persistent use of the second-person pronoun “du,” this
monologue resembles, at least structurally, an extradiegetic dialogue between two speaking
partners. But because Max occupies the positions of both speaker and listener and thus produces
all aspects of the “conversation,” his monologue can mimic, but not constitute, dialogue between
two discrete subjective entities. Max’s digressions directed at “Itzig,” I argue, constitute a hybrid
form combining elements of both, a “monologic dialogue.” Max’s monologic dialogues
underscore the fact that he is in a constant state of flux, shifting repeatedly from one position to
another. He speaks as both Max and Itzig, and, though he may convince others in the story world
that he is a Holocaust survivor, he can never consolidate the two disparate identities of
perpetrator and victim. Instead of fully inhabiting his dead friend’s identity both physically and
mentally, Max’s narrating-I performs a split identity, occupying multiple identities at once.
McGlothlin asserts that “although Max has incorporated Itzig’s identity into his own, at the same
time, on the level of pronomial reference and in the act of narration, Itzig and Max remain
103

radically unintegrated, a condition made all the more evident by Max’s disingenuous secondperson address to the deceased Itzig whose identity he has hijacked” (“Narrative Perspective”
167). Max’s split identity, as it appears in the fourth book, is, I argue, another aspect of his
practice of injured narration that he established in the first book. Similar to the fallacious
connection that he endeavors to orchestrate earlier in the text between the childhood abuse he
suffered and the perpetration he later commits, Max invites us to assume a causal relationship
between his ostensible loose screw and the self that comes to the fore in these “monologic
dialogues” during this ocean voyage on the Exitus.
The reader may wonder why Hilsenrath constructs the narrative device of the “monologic
dialogue” in the first place. By employing this technique (and others), Hilsenrath constructs what
McGlothlin terms the “perpetrator’s subjectivity” (“Narrative Transgression” 235). The
communication that occurs between the two narrative positions “Max” and “Itzig” serves as a
constant reminder that Max remains throughout the novel the perpetrator who committed
horrible crimes as an officer in the SS, even after he assumes the outward signs of a Holocaust
survivor’s identity and enjoys a long, productive life, first in Palestine and subsequently in Israel.
Hilsenrath employs Max’s “monologic dialogues” with “Itzig” on the extradiegetic level as a
form of interaction between Max’s perpetrator identity and the crimes he committed on the
diegetic level. The two levels of the narrative structure mutually inform one another. But let us
take the argument a step farther. In the form of these monologic dialogues, the novel creates a
dialogue between two identities, between perpetrator and victim—a dialogical relationship
dictated by the figure of the perpetrator. What I propose here is an understanding of the dialogic
that is consonant with Mikhail Bakhtin’s concept.23 In discussing the term heteroglossia, Bakhtin
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McGlothlin also identifies a connection between Max’s deployment of narrative voice and Bakhtin’s
understanding of double-voiced discourse. She argues that Max’s malleable use of the pronoun “you” is a
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explains the concept of double-voiced discourse, in which we find “two voices, two meanings,
and two expressions that are dialogically interrelated [...]” (The Dialogic Imagination 324).
Though Bakhtin principally argues that double-voiced discourse involves the voice of the author
and that of the character, his discussion sheds light on the dialogical interplay between victim
and perpetrator in Der Nazi und der Friseur. What we encounter here is something appearing to
be diaphony but in fact only reflects one “real” voice—Max’s. The dialogic in the Bakhtinian
sense emerges between two identities orchestrated by the same character-narrator. The double
voices are evidence of Max’s narratorial transgression and serve to remind us further of the
performative quality of his narration. Max’s identity as perpetrator is reaffirmed on the level of
narration by way of this performance. Max’s narrating-I bounces back and forth between subject
positions, between a voice claiming to be the victim and another claiming to be the perpetrator.
But the consciousness in charge of the narrative invariably remains at its core the perpetrator
Max’s. I contend that he negotiates, within the interstitial space between these two subject
positions of perpetrator and victim, a new sense of self—a kind of dialectical sublation of thesis
and antithesis—that neither disavows the crimes of the past nor fully admits to them. The
dialogic between perpetrator and victim that we observe in the fourth book affords Max the
opportunity to articulate a post-perpetration self that is based on the vestiges of the past. Max is
careful to obscure his perpetrator past in the story world (at least until shortly before his death
after what he depicts as a glorious, nearly legendary, existence in Israel), but the narration and
manipulation of it provide him the means to reanimate the dynamics of perpetration, to transfer
patterns of transgression between diegesis and extradiegesis. Max’s extradiegetic interactions

“particularly pathological and almost literal version of Bakhtin’s notion of double-voiced discourse” (“Narrative
Perspective” 167). I agree with her assessment and employ here a Bakhtinian reading that arrives at a parallel take
on Max’s use of voice. For my part, I focus on the dialogical interaction between the Max-self and the Itzig-self in
Max the narrator’s double-voiced discourse.
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with the figure of “Itzig” are a narrative iteration of his dialectical positioning in the novel’s
diegesis: as a character, he never ceases to be Max Schulz, though he presents himself in the
story world as Holocaust survivor Itzig Finkelstein. Max never receives judicial punishment in
the story world for his crimes, and no other authority compels him to come to terms with his
criminal past after he arrives in postwar Palestine. Despite inhabiting the stolen identity of a
Holocaust survivor, he retains his subjectivity as perpetrator. Every time he falsely identifies
himself as Itzig Finkelstein, Max Schulz reminds himself and the reader of the reasons for this
shift in identity. Let us view Max’s post-perpetration self as the same as his perpetrator self who
pulled the trigger at Laubwalde. Though his manipulation of narrative is not tantamount to
murder or actual acts of perpetration, it nevertheless reflects a subjectivity that never ceases to
consider itself a perpetrator. In the postwar period, the consciousness that is Max Schulz
continues to occupy the subject position of perpetrator on the extradiegetic level, even while he
pretends to be a victim on the diegetic level. With each instance of Max identifying himself as
Max Schulz or Itzig Finkelstein (or both in the same sentence), his post-perpetration self recalls
the dynamics of perpetration that gave rise to this dual identity, thus simultaneously re-claiming
status as perpetrator.
Because the perpetrator/post-perpetrator Max is ultimately the figure that shapes the
narrative, we are afforded a glimpse into a grotesque24 world of Holocaust perpetration and the
psychological mechanisms of a perpetrator’s subjectivity. While reading Der Nazi und der
Friseur, we are forced to see through the eyes, literally and figuratively, of a Holocaust
perpetrator. The concern with such a narrative strategy might be, at first blush, that the reader
could be drawn into Max’s perspective without realizing the implications of identifying with the
24

For discussions of Hilsenrath’s use of the literary grotesque, see for example Peter Arnds, Dietrich Dopheide,
Hans Otto Horch, and Robert Lawson.
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protagonist. Max Schulz would like nothing better than to seduce the reader into seeing things
from his point of view, and the secondary scholarship bears out varying opinions regarding this
point. On the one hand, Astrid Klocke argues: “The reader becomes too personally engaged with
Schulz to allow any truly critical evaluation of his character [...] However outrageous Schulz’s
crimes may be, and however skeptical we may be regarding his reliability, we see his point of
view and wonder whether [...] he will manage to escape from Germany” (501). On the other
hand, a number of other narrative techniques are in place to make it possible for us to be
intrigued by Max’s story, but also to recognize his chicanery. Andreas Graf maintains: “Der
Leser bleibt nicht ein Aufnehmender, sondern wird von Anfang an zu einem aktiv
Teilnehmenden und Fragenden. Der sich treuherzig gebende Ton [...] könnte den Leser dieser
‘confessions monstreuse’ in einer trügerischen Sicherheit wegen, störten nicht sogleich die
eingebauten Widerhaken” (137). In her discussion of Max’s act of disguise, Anne Fuchs arrives
at a similar conclusion: “[T]he displacement of Schulz’s scandalous mimicry is of course
perceived by the reader as who cannot reconcile the rupture between Schulz’s past and his
disguise as Finkelstein in the present” (171). Taking a slightly different tack, Alexandra
Heberger discusses how Max’s exaggerated language also contributes to creating distance
between his mind and that of the readers (64-94). Several factors thus inhibit the reader from
identifying with Max, including his repeated references to the crimes he committed, his
monologic dialogues with the figure of Itzig, the grotesque and the abject, the inherent antipathy
generated by perpetrator memoirs that Rosen discusses, and the performative quality of
narration. Our engagement with Max constitutes an unsettling, though potentially instructive,
experience.
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With these interior monologue-dialogues between Max and Itzig, Hilsenrath constructs a
complex engagement with questions related to the Holocaust and Germany’s Nazi past. The
“dialogic form,” in conjunction with other devices, argues Wiebke Sievers, “serve[s] as a means
of Brechtian defamiliarization,” which “def[ies] the readers’ demand for identification with the
protagonists’ personal fates and thus enable[s] them to understand the political motives and the
ideological processes that lead to genocides” (290). The dialogic between victim and perpetrator
thus plays a critical role in Hilsenrath’s critique of postwar Germany and Israel. Exposure to and
revulsion in reaction to the perpetrator’s consciousness, within the framework of a satire,
provokes us to consider the social, historical, and political context that the text depicts.
McGlothlin argues that Max’s trickery (or attempted trickery) serves a larger purpose within
Hilsenrath’s critique:
In his public role as Itzig, the Holocaust survivor, Max speaks fluently the language of
sacred respect for those who experienced or perished in the Holocaust. At the same time,
he profoundly undermines this respectful rhetoric with his astonishingly easy and
unproblematic transformation from a self-admitted mass murderer into someone who is
universally recognized and accepted as a survivor. Max’s successful metamorphosis thus
points to the ways in which the postwar world, even as its discourse about the Holocaust
progressively has taken on the character of the sacred, has betrayed both the victims and
the survivors by allowing the perpetrators go unpunished for their crimes.
(“Narrative Transgression” 229)
By constructing a text in which a Nazi is able to don the identity of his murder victim, Hilsenrath
satirizes postwar German memory culture, laying bare contradictions and problems, such as the
“destructive splitting” that Gesine Schwan describes. We are reminded that the case of Max
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Schulz, while an extreme, exaggerated one, is rooted in historical reality. Similar to the real-life
Nazi perpetrators who provide the historical basis for Hilsenrath’s Holocaust perpetrator, Max
evades punishment and escapes detection, enjoying an outward appearance in the postwar period
that engages publicly with an anonymous, collective past without being forced to come clean
regarding the true nature of his complicity, i.e. the murders he committed, in the shaping of said
past.
Conclusion: Max’s Reaffirmation of the Monologic Dialogic at the End of His Life
At the end of the sixth and final book of Der Nazi und der Friseur, Max Schulz, after
leading a long, eventful life as Itzig Finkelstein since immigrating to the Yishuv after World War
II, is an old man. Toward the end of his life, he seems to want to reveal his secret, to tell
someone the truth and unveil his decades-long identity theft. During a game of cards, he attempts
to confess his true identity as Holocaust perpetrator to his long-time friend and former German
judge Wolfgang Richter. At the end of an alcohol-fueled conversation between the two men, one
of them an actual German-Jewish immigrant to the new state of Israel and the other a Holocaust
perpetrator masquerading as a German-Jewish Holocaust survivor’s identity, the judge,
exhausted from wine and Max’s rambling, is too enervated to deliver judgment. Max insists that
his comrade pass judgment on the case he has presented to him:
Der Richter überlegte. Er suchte nach einer Lösung. Ich sah es ihm an. Er konzentrierte
sich nicht auf die Karten. Nicht so wie sonst. Wir spielten noch zwei Runden. Dann
nickte der Richter ein.
Versuchen Sie, uns zu sehen! Zwei ratlose Männer. Sie haben ein Spiel gespielt. Sie sind
müde. Besonders der Richter. Er ist eingenickt. Und er wacht wieder auf. Er blickt mich
an. Er sagt: “Max Schulz. Es gibt keine Lösung. Das ist ein schäbiges Spiel.”
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Ich sage: “Ein Urteil muß gefällt werden!”
Und der Richter sagt: “Ich bin müde. Mir fällt jetzt nichts ein. Und das ist ein schäbiges
Spiel. Und ich bin ein alter Mann.”
Ich frage: “Soll ich das Urteil fällen?”
Und der Richter nickt, sagt: “Ich bin müde. Was ist das Urteil?”
Ich sage: “Freispruch!”
Und der müde alter Mann nickt . . . sagt: “Freispruch!” (457)
As Richter nods off, Max as Itzig whispers his ideal verdict: acquittal. Max exploits an inebriated
conversation partner in order to achieve a desired outcome. Even as a man of advanced age and
weakened by a heart condition, Max manipulates his confused interlocutor. The preference that
Max the narrator demonstrated in the fourth book for orchestrating conversations between two
ostensibly discrete conversation partners (in the “monologic dialogues”) finds an analogy at the
end of the novel in his purposeful guidance of this drunken conversation with the former judge.
Even when appearing to wish to confess to a lifetime of criminal activity and unethical behavior,
Max nonetheless remains a perpetrator (or post-perpetrator) impervious to reform and resistant to
any rhetorical move, either in the diegesis or in the extradiegesis, that might, once and for all,
precipitate an admission of full responsibility for his crimes. At the end of the novel, his postperpetration self endures.
In the eleventh and final chapter of the sixth book, Max suffers an apparent heart attack
and as a result is on the cusp between life and death. As he slips in and out of consciousness and
his awareness of his surroundings begins to break down, Max narrates the experiences of a
confused consciousness that seems to defer the inevitable caesura in narration that will
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accompany his demise. Invoking once again the trope of the loose screw, Max describes his
experience attempting to make visual sense of what is happening to his physical form:
Ich sehe, wie meine Gedanken aus der Dachschadenecke herausschlüpfen, sich befreien,
um die Augäpfel herumschleichen, aus den Froschaugen quellen, hervorquellen, zu
schweben anfangen, im Raum herumschweben, an der Zimmerdecke hocken, mich
anstarren, mir etwas zuflüstern. (464)
In his reverie, Max’s thoughts attempt to free themselves from the confines of his brain, from the
prison of his physical form. He describes how they slip out of the dark corner of his mind, no
longer held in place by the loose screw. The hole in the head, the ostensible telos of Max’s
lifelong pattern of perpetration, serves at his moment of death as a point of egress for his
thoughts—for the consciousness that has manipulated the narration from the beginning. With his
consciousness liberated from the confines of his physical form, Max narrates an attempt at
circumventing mortality. According to his unreliable depiction, his thoughts possess the ability to
exist beyond his death. His success in this endeavor remains a question of interpretation. But just
as we know that he cannot remember his infancy, we suspect that this phenomenon cannot
happen either.
In the novel’s final lines, Max invokes the practice of memorialization associated with
the “Forest of the Six Million,” referring to the six million Jews who perished as a result of the
Nazi Judeocide. As Max draws his final breaths, he imagines a wind that wafts through his room,
a wind that brings with it the essence of memory:
Und es kommt mir vor, als käme der Wind aus dem Wald der 6 Millionen. Der Wind!
Und der Wind packt die weißen Gardinen vor meinem Fenster. Und schüttelt sie. Und
allmählich werden sie dunkler. Die Gardinen am Fenster. Werden dunkler und dunkler,
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haken sich los, werden zu Flügeln, schwarzen Flügeln, fangen zu flattern an, lassen sie
tragen vom Wind, vom Wind, der aus dem Walde kam, dem Wald der 6 Millionen. Und
die Flügel packen mich, krallen sich fest an meinen ausgestreckten Armen. Und der Wind
erhebt sich, trägt meine Flügel, und auch mich. Irgendwohin. Dorthin! (465)
Here, Max claims that this wind, originating somewhere in this forest planted to honor the
memory of those who perished in the Holocaust, carries his winged form to some undesignated
destination. While this destination does not necessarily entail salvation, it also does not clearly
signify a site of punishment and retribution. Max implies that the memory of those whom he
killed, the energy propelling the wind, transports him to an unspecified place where his
ambiguous identity does not dissolve but continues to exist in some shape or form. With these
final utterances, Max’s reference, to both the millions of Jews who died in the Holocaust and the
imperative associated with the forest planted to memorialize them subverts the practice of
memorialization. At the end of his life and in the liminal moment adjoining death, he is
apparently subject to no final judgment; there is no recourse for the perpetrator who claims the
identity of one of his victims so the he might self-servingly avoid detection and evade
punishment for his crimes. With his final words, Max’s post-perpetration self defers
responsibility indefinitely, if not infinitely. In the wake of his practice of injured narration, the
reader is left to contemplate Max’s motivations as perpetrator and to consider the actual nature of
his loose screw.
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Chapter Three:
Memorializing Lost Voices, Mediating Memory: Yiddish and Dialogicity in Fred Wander’s
Der siebente Brunnen
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Introduction
Holocaust survivor and Austrian Jewish author Fred Wander’s 1971 novel Der siebente
Brunnen experiments with voice—in the form of both speech and narrative perspective—as a
method for depicting what was lost in the Nazi Judeocide.25 The text operates as both elegy and
eulogy, simultaneously mourning the collective loss of millions of European Jews as a result of
genocidal violence and celebrating the memory of individual victims who appear as characters.
Wander’s unnamed narrator assembles the novel’s discrete, vignette-like chapters, positioning
himself as a kind of teichoscopic witness to the Holocaust, who often downplays his own
presence in the diegesis in favor of highlighting the experiences and speech of friends and fellow
prisoners in the camps. Featuring both fictional and non-fictional elements, Der siebente
Brunnen might be best read as an autobiographical novel. Erin McGlothlin argues that a
“referentielle Beziehung” connects the narrator’s experiences “im ‘l’univers concentrationnaire’”
with “Wanders eigener Geschichte in Auschwitz, Buchenwald und anderen Lagern” (97). The
reader must, she argues, take this “overlapping” between autobiography and fiction into account,
because the novel clearly situates itself as a fictionalized representation of actual historical
events associated with the Holocaust (97).26 Establishing an historical referent, the link between
the narrator’s life story and Wander’s autobiography lends veracity, perhaps a degree of
authenticity, to the horrors depicted in the novel.
Walter Grünzweig describes Wander’s impetus with this novel: “Er wollte den im Lager
gestorbenen Freunden ein Denkmal setzen” (307). He seeks to construct, with the figure of the
narrator, a record, however incomplete, of these fallen comrades. Wander’s novel functions both
as mnemonic tool and means for memorialization; the narrative serves as the medium for the
25

Der siebente Brunnen was originally published in 1971 by the East German Aufbau Verlag.
McGlothlin also argues that the narrator’s search for an identity as storyteller operates as analogue to the search
for self that often appears in autobiographical texts penned by Holocaust survivors (103-7).
114
26

narrator’s recollections and providing the reader concrete examples of individual lives and
narratives lost on account of the violence of the Holocaust. In much the same way that Orpheus
sought refuge in the lyrical representation of the past as a method for engaging with the memory
of his perished lover Eurydice, Wander’s narrator shapes the narrative to memorialize his dead
friends and compatriots and provide a mode for representing their lost voices and individual
stories.27 Wander’s narrator struggles with the burden of the memory of millions of perished
Jewish victims of the Holocaust. Though this burden cannot ultimately be shouldered by one
survivor’s testimony or one single narrative, Wander’s novel thematizes this psychological and
intellectual conundrum both thematically and structurally. The narrator gestures toward the
innumerable lost lives in the Holocaust with his focus on memorializing individuals with whom
he was once personally acquainted—individuals who did not survive to tell their own stories in
their own words. While these perished companions cannot be revived or brought back from the
dead, the narrator endeavors to depict them as he remembers them in life, representing their
words through the vehicle of his own. Wander’s gesture here is to return to the characters in this
novel their “almost” lost stories. The novel self-reflexively thematizes this tension between the
enormity of what was lost and the struggle to retain something of what little remains. While the
text cannot recuperate these characters’ lives, it can strive to recuperate their memory. The
“almost lost story” balances on the razor’s edge of the conditional mood, hovering between
27

Thomas Schmidt asserts that Wander engages the question of Holocaust “Repräsentierbarkeit” through the act of
narration itself, particularly by establishing an overt connection between his novel and Jewish culture. He argues,
“Erst im Kontext der jüdischen Kultur offenbart sich die Selbstthematisierung des Erzählens dann auch in ihrer
ganzen Komplexität. Über den Zweck hinaus reflektiert die Erzählung nämlich ebenso die Mittel, mit Hilfe derer sie
ihren Gegenstand zur Sprache bringt. Dabei steht allerdings die Frage nach der Repräsentierbarkeit des Holocaust
nicht im Mittelpunkt, den Wander versteht Sprache nicht allein in ihren abbildenden Möglichkeiten, sondern
exponiert, wie erläutert, ihre humanisierende Qualität: als mühsame Suche nach dem ‘richtigen’ Wort, das der
Mensch um seiner selbst Willen sprechen oder hören muß” (97). The narrator’s search for the “right words” leads
him to seek instruction in narration from the consummate storyteller Mendel Teichmann. The text depicts the
process itself of coming to terms with, though perhaps not entirely solving, the problem of employing language as
medium for depicting trauma and loss.
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memory and oblivion, between the indicative and the subjunctive: had these stories not become a
part of Wander’s novel, had the narrator not preserved the memory of these individual characters
and folded them into the narrative, their names and the details of their lives and deaths may have
otherwise left no trace.
To depict these “almost lost stories” that would otherwise be lost on account of traumatic
and violent events, the novel relies, I argue, on the implementation of voice, i.e. narrative
perspective, and the interactions among various actual voices. The narrative representation of
voice, in the form of direct speech and indirect discourse, operates as a rhetorical strategy for
memorializing individual personalities, fellow camp internees, with whom Wander’s narrator
was acquainted. Each chapter of the novel highlights a particular story or sequence of events
articulated from narrator’s personal experience, and each chapter focuses on a particular
character or series of characters. Over the course of the novel, the reader encounters these
characters and hears them speak their own words or what the narrator imagines to be their own
words, as each individual struggles to survive in a series of Nazi-run concentration camps. In her
afterword to the 2005 edition of the novel, Ruth Klüger describes Wander’s literary approach:
“Fred Wander nennt sein KZ-Buch einen Roman, man könnte es auch mehrere, ineinander
verwobene Erzählungen nennen, mit verschiedenen Helden. Er selber ist nicht einer dieser
Protagonisten, er ist die Kamera, die wahrnimmt” (154). Klüger’s comparison is apt insomuch as
the narrator, mimicking the camera’s synthetic eye, often temporarily recedes into the
background so that particular character can be brought to the fore and made the focus of the
narration. But because voices, rather than photographic or video-recorded images, are what the
narrator reproduces, at least from memory and cast in his own words, we might be better served
by comparing Wander’s narrator to an audio recorder that has the capacity for preserving speech
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and replaying it at a later moment. The narrator not only reproduces their words, but also
gestures toward the acoustic quality of their voices, endeavoring to capture their cadence,
idiosyncrasies, and linguistic particularity. Even after the characters have died, their voices
persist in the narrator’s memory. The narrative provides means for playing back memory, for
replaying and preserving for posterity these voices that would otherwise remain lost and
forgotten.
In the following chapter, I discuss various rhetorical strategies that Wander’s narrator
deploys for staging multivocality. I employ the term multivocality to refer to the chorus of voices
belonging to various characters that speak their own words or tell their own stories over the
course of the novel. Wander’s novel emphasizes storytelling, with each chapter operating as a
discrete story or series of stories. These stories arise out of dialogue staged between the narrator
and these other characters. Hans Höller insightfully argues that Wander’s work privileges the
interaction between two speaking partners, which he terms “eine Form der dialogischen
Anerkennung des Gegenübers” (“Bruchstücke” 68). I build on Höller’s argument by exploring
how Wander’s novel is fundamentally underpinned by dialogical interaction—interaction that
creates multiple sites in the text for the cultivation of memory and the expression of mourning.
My analysis focuses on narration and the narrator’s portrayal of other characters who narrate
either in their own words or through the words the narrator recalls or imagines them uttering. In
the following chapter, I analyze three characters and the narrative instances or configurations that
allow the narrator to explore various strategies for mediating the voices of others. My
investigation includes the Yiddish storytellers Mendel Teichmann and Meir Bernstein, as well as
the young Talmud prodigy Tadeusz Moll.28 I argue that these figures form the crux of the
28

Wander’s novel portrays numerous characters whose depiction warrants careful exploration, but for the purposes
of my analysis I will concentrate of these three figures.
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narrator’s engagement with narration. With Mendel, we encounter a character narrator who
narrates in his own words within the novel’s diegesis. Meir speaks in his own words, but not at
the time of narration. The narrator reconstructs from memory a story that Meir once told. The
narrator stages a dialogical interaction in which Meir’s words are reproduced for the reader in the
narrator’s voice, a re-telling of a story made possible by a specific deployment of narrative
perspective. In the case of Tadeusz Moll, Wander’s narrator constructs a narrative strand out of
what he imagines the boy might be thinking and feeling in the final moments of the boy’s life.
An analysis of each of these configurations reveals how Wander’s novel assembles both
structurally and thematically multivocal discourse. I investigate the narrator’s dialogical
interactions with Eastern European Jewish storytellers, the narrative’s deployment of Yiddish
language and Yiddish literary techniques, and the narrator’s development of a type of “midrash”
that allows for the empathetic interpretation of the suffering of others. My exploration of these
features of Wander’s narrative is nurtured by the Buberian theoretical model of the “I-Thou”
relationship, Bakhtin’s notion of the dialogic, and narrative theorist Lisa Zunshine’s scholarship
on theory of mind and the representation of fictional characters’ mental states. I demonstrate how
the Holocaust survivor narrator in Der siebente Brunnen repeatedly eschews purely monological
narration in favor of animating dialogical interaction that recuperates the memory of the dead.
Wander’s Narrator and Mendel Teichmann: Dialogue Between East and West
In Der siebente Brunnen, the narrator foregrounds at the beginning an overt
preoccupation with the construction of narrative, or with the narrativity of the text he produces
through his narration of events that take place in the concentration camp story world and
pertaining to the thoughts he entertains in reaction to what he witnesses. “Narrativity,” as Gerald
Prince defines it, operates as (but is not solely limited to) a “function of the disnarrated and the
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richness and diversity of so-called virtual embedded narratives, story-like constructs produced in
a character’s mind” (387). We see something similar to what Prince describes here at work in
Wander’s text. Wander’s narrator inserts into the diegetic world of the concentrationary universe
a series of embedded narratives, often in the form of stories told by fellow camp internees.
Narrativity in Wander’s novel involves a subtle negotiation of narrative voice and perspective, as
the narrator endeavors to portray and underscore the experience of other characters that populate
the diegetic world, to represent their voices and mediate what would otherwise remain
disnarrated or lost as a result of historical violence. As I will illustrate in this chapter, Wander’s
narrator develops a structurally complex text involving multiple diegetic layers, all of which
result from a central crisis regarding the representation of historical trauma and the
memorialization of the dead.
Wander’s novel is self-conscious about narration. To a significant degree, Wander’s
narrator offers the reader insight into his meditations on and anxiety concerning the act of
narration. In the novel’s first chapter, Wie man eine Geschichte erzählt, the narrator portrays
interactions he has with a man named Mendel Teichmann. The backdrop against which these
conversations are set is the brutal reality of the novel’s story world—a reality whose conditions
emerge detail by detail over the course of the first few paragraphs. I offer here a close reading of
the narrator’s introduction of the figure of Mendel—an introduction that sets the stage for the
narrator’s practice of representing various characters and their voices. Careful attention to how
the narrator portrays Mendel and fills in certain gaps to complete his portrayal and understanding
of the character’s experience sheds light on the novel’s narrativity and provides a point of
departure for unpacking the intricate narrative complexities of Wander’s text.
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The novel begins in medias res. Before the reader learns of the novel’s setting, the
narrator, employing the first-person and switching between German imperfect past and future
tenses from one clause to the next in a single sentence, situates himself as a witness to the events
that take place in the story world, informing his interlocutor that he will relate the details of a
conversation that he once had with Mendel. The narrator underscores the urgency and necessity
of his portrayal of this dialogue, informing the reader in the first line of the novel: “Drei Wochen
nach dem Gespräch, von dem ich nun berichten werde, sollte Mendel sterben” (7). The reader
immediately learns that Mendel will perish and will therefore not live to tell his own tale, and we
are left in these initial moments wondering what the circumstances of his death will be. But his
death is not the narrator’s focus. Instead, we are told of Mendel’s verbal virtuosity:
Aber noch immer hatte er seine äußerste Konzentration auf das Betrachten menschlichen
Verhaltens gelenkt, überschüttete er uns, auf dem Holzplatz, beim Abladen von
Baumstämmen oder auf dem Marsch, mit glühenden Schmähungen, Flüchen,
Verherrlichungen der Schönheit, mit seinen zu Versen geschmiedeten düsteren
Prophezeihungen, Wortergüssen, mit seinem Stolz. (7)
Here, the narrator underscores Mendel’s charismatic prowess at speaking and capturing his
audience’s attention. His medium is the spoken word, and his speech consists of curses, taunts,
rants, and poetically structured prophecies. Before he quotes Mendel directly and in great detail,
the narrator tells us about Mendel’s words and the quality of his speech. He depicts the
storyteller from his perspective as fellow camp inmate, and we are afforded a glimpse into what
the narrator witnesses and the details he finds significant. What emerges from the outset is the
characterization of Mendel as a figure for whom the spoken word is an integral and unassailable

120

component of existence, an essential tool for engaging with and creating meaning out of the
world around him.
Several scholars discuss the significance of dialogue and speech for Wander’s overall
project. Hans Höller asserts that Der siebente Brunnen and Wander’s other texts “beziehen ihre
sprachliche Kraft vor allem aus der erzählerischen Vergegenwärtigung der mündlichen Rede, aus
der Evokation der vielsprachigen, vielstimmigen Welt des Judentums. Schreibend erschafft
Wander jenen Raum des gesprochenen Worts [...]” (“Bruchstücke” 67). The narrator’s depiction
of Mendel underscores Höller’s observation here. Höller identifies here a crucial component of
Wander’s text: the interaction between two discrete entities—between speaker and interlocutor,
between subject and counterpart. The narrator’s characterization of Mendel in the first few pages
of the novel foregrounds the importance of the spoken word and the role that dialogue plays in
providing a point of contact for these two entities.
Christa Wolf also points to Wander’s preoccupation with representing in narrative form
the act of interpersonal communication. She argues, “Vom ersten Kapitel an [...] denkt er über
die Voraussetzungen menschlicher Sprache, des einander Zu-Sprechens and Miteinanderredens
nach, gerade dann, wenn sie—aus gutem Grund, vom Standpunkt der Bewacher aus—als
schweres Verbrechen geahndet werden” (18). Here, Wolf’s argument points to the complexities
inherent to the novel’s representation of voice.29 I employ the term voice here to refer not only to
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Ulrike Schneider argues that a crucial element of Wander’s text is the portrayal of a diverse array of Jewish
victims of the Holocaust and their voices (the first of which is Mendel). She argues, “Mit dieser Erzählung stellte der
Schriftsteller Fred Wander seine Perspektive auf die nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung und –vernichtung dar,
verfasst aus der Position des jüdischen Überlebenden der Vernichtungs- und Konzentrationslager. Diese Erfahrung
bildet ein wesentliches Moment der literarischen Darstellung, in deren Mittelpunkt die vielfältigen Stimmen von
jüdischen Verfolgten aus unterschiedlichen europäischen Ländern stehen (149). According to Schneider, Wander
endeavors to represent something of the spectrum of European Jews who were deported to Nazi concentration and
death camps. Wander’s portrayal highlights the fact that Jews from various geographic and linguistic backgrounds
co-existed—even if only temporarily—in the camps. Wander’s narrator stages an encounter with this multilinguistic, diverse environment, highlighting discrete Jewish personalities such as Mendel Teichmann. Though my
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a character’s quoted speech but also to narrative voice, i.e. narrative perspective. Considering
how speech is portrayed and how we are afforded access to this speech are principal concerns of
the narrative that the narrator signposts for us from the outset. The narrator’s depiction of the
spoken word is also closely related to his portrayal of the act of storytelling, which is also
foregrounded in his characterization of Mendel.
The narrator informs us that Mendel composes images and details culled from his acute
power of observation and attention to detail. The narrator contextualizes Mendel’s speech with
references to the setting of the concentration camp that makes up the diegesis: imprisonment,
forced labor and torture. With every sentence, the reader encounters additional details that
underscore the fact that the novel’s story world is a Nazi-run concentration camp. The narrator
and fellow characters are internees, and Mendel’s talent for speaking extemporaneously provides
the prisoners with a modicum of distraction from the camp’s grueling conditions. With his
depiction of Mendel, Wander’s narrator provides additional indicators regarding the novel’s
setting and additional details regarding the context in which Mendel narrates:
Einmal, als ihn einer unserer Wächter mit einem Kubel Wasser übergoß, weil er stehend
eingenickt war, beim Schichten von Holz, vor Müdigkeit und Schwäche, und die
Gestiefelten schallend lachten (es fror an diesem Tag, die Posten waren in Schafpelze
gekleidet, hatten von Sattheit und Wärme rote Wangen), da streckte sich Mendel, sein
nasses graues Haar klebte in der Stirn, die Augen lugten scharf darunter hervor, nicht
hassend oder klagend, sondern gespannt. Was tut dieser Mensch, fragten die Augen. (7)
In this intricate description of Mendel’s appearance and his potential mental response to being
doused with icy water, we observe the narrator’s attention to detail and skill at characterization,
analysis concentrates specifically on the Eastern European Jewish cultural elements in the novel, Wander’s text also
depicts several characters from Western European countries.
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even as he underscores his friend’s verbal abilities in this chapter. The narrator effectively
employs his own prowess with words to provide an analogue to Mendel’s oratorical faculty.
Wander’s narrator juxtaposes Mendel’s talent for the spoken word and cool reserve in the face of
adversity with the faceless, nameless camp guards (the “booted ones”) who mete out harsh,
senseless punishment for the slightest “infraction” against camp rules. The narrator positions
himself as eyewitness to Mendel’s humiliation at the hands of the guards. He attempts to
interpret Mendel’s thoughts and emotions as a result of cues provided by posture and facial
expressions. The narrator concludes that Mendel, rather than hating his captors for subjecting
him to torturous cold, questions their behavior, analyzing them in search of clues that might
allow him to construct meaning out of meaningless cruelty. Mendel’s ability to concentrate on
the vicissitudes of the actions of the people around him includes that of both fellow camp
internees and the guards responsible for their suffering. Mendel’s keen sense of observation thus
takes into account both fellow victim and perpetrator.
Mendel responds to the particular social logic of the concentration camp by rallying a
sense of community with other prisoners in the camp. Mendel’s speech constitutes more than an
outpouring of aesthetically formulated, though seemingly disconnected, utterances. The
narrator’s previous description of Mendel’s taunts and rants becomes more contoured as we learn
that Mendel is also a master storyteller. Wander’s narrator explains that Mendel regularly
provides fellow prisoners with distraction in the form of narrative,
An jedem zweiten Sonntagnachmittag (wir hatten nur zwei Ruhetage im Monat) pflegte
Mendel Geschichten zu erzählen. In der Essensbaracke versammelten sie sich. Juden aus
Warschau, Sosnowiec und Krakau, fasziniert vom Wort. Das Wort hatte magische Kräfte,
es zauberte eine reichgedeckte Sabbattafel herbei, die Lieblichkeit eines jüdischen
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Mädchens, Duft von süßem Palästinawein und Rosinenkuchen, verlorene schöne Welt.
(8)
In this passage, Wander’s narrator constructs with the figure of Mendel the image of an Eastern
European Jewish storyteller who possesses the ability to tap into the “magical” power of the
spoken word for the purpose of evoking a “lost, beautiful world.” The lost world to which the
narrator refers in this passage is the world of Eastern European Jewry prior to the Holocaust. The
Polish cities to which he refers—Warsaw, Sosnowiec, and Krakow—stand in metonymically, I
argue, for any and all cities, towns, settlements and shtetlekh once inhabited by Eastern European
Jews. Evoking a kind of communal nostalgia, Mendel’s stories remind his interlocutors of their
past lives prior to the Nazi persecution and the sweetness they once knew. Mendel eulogizes here
the world of Eastern European Jewry that the Holocaust eradicates. His audience no doubt
consists of Jews from diverse walks of life, including, but not limited to, devout Hasidic Jews
from close-knit Jewish communities in rural Galicia and working class Jews from urban centers
in Eastern Europe. With references to a richly appointed Sabbath table, sweet kosher wine, and
the pulchritude of young Jewish women, Mendel translates into narrative form topoi commonly
associated with central and Eastern European Jewish life and religious practice. His audience
members recognize and share a mutual cultural understanding of these references. Mendel’s
narration evokes a communal sense of yidishkayt, or Ashkenazic Jewishness. Mendel’s narration
is powerful, as he is able to captivate his listeners, even if his enchantment provides only a
temporary respite from the daily horrors to which the prisoners are subjected. The sense of
yidishkayt that Mendel conjures up also has linguistic implications: his original words, addressed
to a Jewish audience whose constituents hail from various locations in Eastern Europe, most
likely take place in Yiddish. In relating this scene, Wander’s narrator positions himself as a
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member of Mendel’s audience during one of his Sunday afternoon storytelling sessions—a
witness to Mendel’s talent and therefore also capable of understanding, and perhaps also of
speaking, Yiddish. The narrator in turn mediates in the postwar period his memories of Mendel’s
Yiddish storytelling in German. I will demonstrate how Wander’s novel is not monolingual (at
least not entirely), gesturing instead toward multilingualism, as the narrator shapes the Germanlanguage text to convey Yiddish in a variety of ways. The aforementioned passage and its
reference to the “lost beautiful world” hint at the novel’s complex portrayal of Yiddish—a
portrayal that I examine over the course of this chapter.
In this scene, in which he portrays himself as audience member and interlocutor,
Wander’s narrator models his method for downplaying his own experiences, thoughts, and
feelings in favor of underscoring the words of others. Because Mendel Teichmann and the other
characters are already dead at the time the narrating-I relates the events of the novel, the narrator
has no choice but to employ his own voice as the means of representation. Nonetheless, the
narrator endeavors to portray what would otherwise be lost to oblivion. Wander’s narrator
attempts to obscure his own presence even as he deploys his own words to capture the voice of
another. By way of the narrator’s voice, we are afforded access to Mendel’s words and stories.
By downplaying his own presence and participation in the action he depicts in this moment in the
text, the narrator allows Mendel’s voice to come to the fore. The narrator’s technique of
eschewing quotation marks in his depiction of the quoted speech of others, so that the boundaries
between direct and indirect (and free indirect) speech are often blurred, underscores the novel’s
multivocal quality. The narrator’s voice thus blends seamlessly into the voices of the people
whom he portrays, as he mediates multiple voices and experiences of Jewish victims who did not
survive to tell their own stories. The comparison of Wander’s narrator to an audio recorder gains
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purchase here. Wander’s narrator de-emphasizes himself with the goal of memorializing others
who cannot speak for themselves. By highlighting the figure of Mendel, the narrator gestures
both toward the individual with whom he was once personally acquainted and the innumerable
Jews like Mendel whose voices cannot be heard and whose untold stories constitute a body of
disnarrated testimony—an anti-history reminiscent of the one we encountered in Hilsenrath’s
Jossel Wassermanns Heimkehr.
As the first chapter unfolds, Wander’s narrator further highlights Mendel’s function as
Jewish rhapsode in the concentration camp. Mendel’s drive to narrate does not abate in light of
adverse circumstances, a fact that further underscores both the tenacity of Mendel’s talent and
the role that storytelling plays as an act of defiance and a strategy for survival. The narrator
follows up his depiction of Mendel’s narration of the Sabbath table and the kosher wine by
relating the crowd’s affective response to what they hear. Mendel’s storytelling prowess elicits a
range of emotions communicated by a variety of physical symptoms: “Das Wort, kaum daß es
erklang, machte die Männer erbleichen, es verwandelte sie, kehrte ihre Blicke nach innen, ließ
sie Tränen vergießen and lachen, geißelte sie, erstickte sie, ließ sie ächzen und sogar schwitzen”
(8). By highlighting the complex emotional reaction that Mendel’s words evoke, the narrator
implies that he, along with the rest of the men, sat in awe of Mendel’s abilities. The narrator
metaphorically doffs his hat to Mendel, as an apprentice might do to honor the abilities of a
master craftsman. The narrator sees in Mendel a potential mentor. He retrospectively
reconstructs a past moment when he expressed the desire to learn how to construct the kind of
story that Mendel can, requesting his tutelage, “Zitternd, mit belegter Stimme, hatte ich
angedeutet, dass auch ich versuche, das Handwerk des Erzählens zu lernen” (8). There is more
indicated here than simple curiosity and the wish for what might amount to honing one’s social
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skills. As a Holocaust survivor, the narrator has, by the time he narrates the text, experienced and
witnessed atrocities, and in the postwar period subsequently wrestles with finding ways of
relating these (traumatic) experiences after the fact. The title of the chapter, “Wie man eine
Geschichte erzählt,” gestures toward an intellectual, ethical struggle regarding representation.
The reader is invited to participate in the narrator’s ruminations regarding how to do justice to
the stories of those who did not survive to tell their tale. A possible solution, or at the very least a
point of departure, lies at the intersection between experience and story: the narrator’s
conversation with Mendel provides a literal starting point for fashioning a narrative that can give
expression to what unfolds over the course of the novel. After asking for lessons in storytelling,
the narrator is taken aback at Mendel’s response, “Erst schien er mir nicht zuzuhören, dann
überraschte er mich mit einem Wortschall, dessen Bedeutung ich erst viel später erkannte. Doch
wie soll ich es wiedergeben—verglichen mit dem Glanz and der Kraft seiner Rede, kann mein
Bericht nur Gestammel sein” (8). Here, the narrator employs litotes, or understatement, as a
rhetorical strategy that further deemphasizes his own voice in favor of Mendel’s. Despite the
narrator’s emphasis on Mendel’s superior narratorial acumen, we see in his description of
Mendel in the first chapter evidence of his own skill at storytelling. We recognize that the
narrator, whose self-representation focuses on his lack of talent for crafting narrative, has
literally found his voice by the time he narrates his recollections. The implication is that
Wander’s narrator will have learned the lessons that Mendel offers him at some point between
the time of the events that are narrated, i.e. the diegetic world of the camps, and the time of
narration, i.e. the narrator’s act of relating what he experienced in the camps after his survival.
McGlothlin argues that Wander’s narrator gains facility as a storyteller as the novel
progresses, articulating his own voice through the voices of others (109-117). His search for
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narrative voice operates in tandem to his search for self. I wish to expand on her argument. The
novel affords the reader, I argue, two images of the narrator. We observe both his development
as storyteller throughout the novel and his burgeoning sense of self-awareness and a finished
product that underscores the narrator’s abilities from the novel’s inception. The point bears
repeating: on the one hand, Wander’s narrator stages his development as one of the text’s central
themes, but on the other, we are aware all along that his quest to learn how to tell a story will be
fulfilled on account of the skillful narration and textual complexity apparent from the beginning.
The mature narrating-I at times presents himself as the naïve narrated-I. The narrator
occasionally splits narrating-I and narrated-I into two discrete entities for effect. The naïve,
awestruck narrated-I, enthralled by Mendel’s ability to weave a story, belies the degree of
narratorial sophistication that Wander’s narrator achieves in his portrayal of Mendel and other
characters. This gentle wielding of narrative voice—a far cry from Max Schulz’ insidious
manipulation of voice in Der Nazi und der Friseur—further serves to downplay the narrator’s
experiences in favor of underscoring the words and experiences of others.
The narrator’s description of his conversation with Mendel reveals another constellation
that I contend is crucial for Wander’s project, namely the evocation of Yiddish storytelling and
literature. Wander’s formulation of a character narrator named Mendel as master storyteller is far
from arbitrary. The name Mendel, or its diminutive form “Mendele,” is more than just a common
Yiddish name. With the articulation of the character Mendel Teichmann, Wander’s novel
establishes, I argue, a metaliterary link to Yiddish literature, in particular to texts penned by the
“grandfather” of modern Yiddish literature, Sholem Yankev Abramovitsh.30 Abramovitsh, “the

30

Several scholars and commentators, such as Brand, Lauckner, Lewis, and Renoldner have discussed, to varying
degrees, the role that Yiddish plays in Wander’s text or the author’s relationship to the language. Lauckner argues
that “Wander relieves the stark realism of his work and provides a more universal context by using techniques
typical of the Yiddish tradition. Thus, he uses Biblical quotations, letting the words of Jeremiah and Ezekiel about
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first writer to produce Yiddish novels on a par with nineteenth-century fiction in other European
languages,” first garnered significant popularity with Yiddish readers on account of his novellas
The Little Man and Fishke the Lame, which I discussed in Chapter 1 (Frieden ix-x). In both
works, the reader encounters Abramovitsh’s lively narrator, Mendele the Book Peddler (this
moniker also served as the author’s pen name). Dovid Katz explains that “Mendele is a traveling
salesman of books and religious articles who gets to ride all around the Pale [of Settlement] with
his horse and wagon and observe Jewish life up close” (205). Mendele depicts his adventures as
he journeys from one shtetl community to the next. He tells his own stories and also reproduces
the tales that other characters relate to him. He is simultaneously salesman, storyteller, and
interlocutor. On the surface, he appears to be a “Jewish Everyman” (Miron 181) who speaks a
“folksy Yiddish” (Schachter 32). Dan Miron argues that “Mendele himself often encourages his
readers to regard him as [...] a universal Jewish commoner” (180). The figure of Mendele,
however, is more sophisticated than he lets on and constitutes far more than a cultural type or
“folkstip” (Miron 169-202).31 Mendele is not only the narrator of these novellas, but also
Abramovitsh’s “demonic double,” the mischievous literary persona whose name appeared on
publication title pages and who afforded the real-life author the freedom of anonymity to mock
the aspects of Yiddish and Eastern European Jewish cultural and religious life that “he
considered worth parodying” (Roskies 65).
ancient persecutions symbolize this one as well, and he also places the holocaust [sic] in the context of other
persecutions by quoting the wisdom of later Jewish sages” (144-45). While I agree with Lauckner’s assessment that
Wander’s text evinces a strong relationship to Yiddish language and literature, she fails to explain what the
characteristics of this “Yiddish tradition” are beyond her vague reference to Bible quotations. Lauckner’s analysis
does not take into consideration the sophisticated nature of Yiddish literature and Wander’s equally sophisticated
deployment of aspects drawn from it.
31
Dan Miron’s excellent analysis underscores how complex and rich Abramovitsh’s Mendele is. He explains that on
the one hand Mendele is “an ordinary Jewish bookpeddler of the old school. The familiarity implied in the
diminutive form of his name as well as in its commonness (Mendel) suggest the ordinary Eastern European Jew in
his most workaday, unceremonious aspects” (131). But on the other, Mendele is “a conférencier or a one-man
chorus” (173) that “performs” multiple roles for both the characters whom he introduces in the diegesis (and who in
turn tell their own stories that form embedded narratives) and the readers (175).
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Abramovitsh’s “demonic double” plays many roles at once. A homodiegetic narrator,
Mendele addresses an audience of readers and participates as a character in the diegetic world,
interacting with and collecting stories from fellow characters. For example, in Fishke the Lame,
Mendele’s rambling conversation with Reb Alter provides the impetus for Alter to tell the story
of Fishke, which forms a metadiegetic level within the framework of the diegetic world that
Mendele and Alter inhabit. As the narrative figure in charge of constructing the text, Mendele is
a master of metalepsis, organizing and orchestrating multiple metadiegetic levels with their
embedded narratives. The “spoken Yiddish” that Abramovitsh “conjure[s] in [his] prose” serves
as medium for the copious storytelling that occurs within his novellas (Katz 220). But we need to
take care not to identify Abramovitsh’s text simplistically as a string of Yiddish folk tales. The
stories that Mendele and other characters relate operate as elements of a complex narrative that
self-reflexively employs said stories in the service of a literary project. Abramovitsh’s Yiddish
narratives are often purposefully cloaked in ostensibly folksy Yiddish stories that may at first
glance belie the text’s sophisticated diegetic structure. His Yiddish-language texts, and those by
other Yiddish writers such as Sholem Aleichem, position themselves as literature about
storytellers and storytelling. As a component of what Allison Schachter terms his “self-conscious
narrative style,” Abramovitsh employs a narratorial figure that takes on the guise of the
traditional Yiddish storyteller as a literary device that references traditional Yiddish culture while
simultaneously serving as a narrative tool that not only highlights sweeping social and cultural
changes affecting entire swathes of Eastern European Jewry over the course of the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, but also serves to signpost the transformation of Yiddish into a
modern literary language (32-37). The Yiddish storytelling that Mendele the Book Peddler
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enacts is called upon in the service of articulating modern Yiddish literature. Mendele is thus
traditional Yiddish storyteller and modern narrator all at once.
Mendele Moykher Sforim is Mendel Teichmann’s literary antecedent. I argue that
Wander’s text evokes Mendele the Book Peddler and his practice of Yiddish storytelling for the
purpose of situating itself as beneficiary of Yiddish literary culture. Mendel Teichmann
embodies the role of Yiddish storyteller and serves as the pivotal figure that instructs Wander’s
narrator in crafting not just stories in general, but specifically Yiddish stories. The narrator’s
depiction of Mendel evoking the “lost beautiful world” of Eastern European Jewry provides an
introduction into Mendel’s storytelling art and his practice of narration. In a manner that
resembles the narratorial position that Mendele Moykher Sforim occupies in Abramovitsh’s
texts, Mendel Teichmann models for Wander’s narrator over the course of their conversation the
deployment of seemingly “folksy” stories as a tool for constructing an intricate narrative.
Let us return to the narrator’s depiction of this dialogue with Mendel. Wander’s narrator
feels a drive to narrate, but he is at a loss as how to construct a story. Mendel Teichmann
responds to the narrator’s query with a question, “Wie man eine Geschichte erzählt, möchtest du
also wissen? Nun, sagte er, das hat man oder hat es nicht” (8). The narrator approaches Mendel
much like a Jew seeking the answer to a religious question might entreat a rabbi. Mendel
responds to the request by demonstrating his art for his interlocutor. Instructing by way of
example, Mendel constructs a tale out of thin air, rich in detail, about a young man of ill repute
from a working class, predominantly Jewish neighborhood in either Łódź or Warsaw (9-12).
Mendel’s metadiegetic story begins with a conversation similar to the one Mendel has with the
narrator. Mendel recalls that another young man had also once asked him to reveal the secret of
storytelling, entreating the raconteur to initiate him in the poetic arts (9). Mendel responds by
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engaging in dialogue with the young man, asking him about his origins, family life, and other
biographical details. The young man (anonymous up to this point in the story) responds by
explaining that he grew up “[i]n einem alten Haus [...] in einer übelriechenden Straße, am Rande
der Stadt [...] Ein Haus voll von beschränkten, widerlichen Leuten” (9). This few meager pieces
of information are sufficient for Mendel to evoke in his own words the scene that the young man
describes. Mendel is capable of constructing an entire narrative starting with these details, for he
declares, “und das genügt mir, ich kann es sehen, riechen kann ich das Haus” (9). This young
man recedes into the background as Mendel the storyteller imaginatively inserts himself into his
story’s diegesis. The storyteller enters the building that he imagines to be the young man’s
childhood home and encounters a long-time resident who remembers the young man and his
destructive, anti-social behavior as an abused child and delinquent teenager. Mendel describes
how this old man, eager to converse with him, a stranger, provides a detailed account of the
boy’s past. Similar to Abramovitsh’s Mendele, Mendel Teichmann introduces into his narrative a
character narrator who narrates his own story that forms a metadiegetic level embedded within
the context of the larger diegetic world.
In response to Mendel, the older man recalls that the young man’s name was Mottl
Leiser, “Ein Bursche, ohne Vater aufgewachsen, die Mutter schwach und krank, schlägt ihn, er
schlägt zurück, brüllt, zertrümmert Tisch und Bänke und Fenster, stiehlt, räubert, belästigt
Frauen, was wollen Sie noch hören, sagt der Alte, ein Ganef ist Mottl, ein Strolch, klein wie ein
Zwerg, aber stark und finster wie die Nacht!” (10). Here, the deployment of vocabulary
borrowed from Yiddish, such as the term “ganef” for thief, as well as the Yiddish names Mendel
and Mottl, signal to the reader the story’s mediated nature. “Ganef” serves as an example of the
interaction that the text stages between the Yiddish and German: German Jews, even those who
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spoke little to no Yiddish, would have understood and used the word “ganef” (the German word
“Ganove” is called to mind). The deployment of this word is a nod to the complex history
between Yiddish and German, between German Jews and Eastern European Jews who spoke
Yiddish. Here, the word “ganef” serves as a point of contact between Yiddish and German, as a
moment of linguistic overlap between the two languages, and by implication, between the two
speakers, Mendel and Wander’s narrator.
Let us return once again to Mendel’s narrative. Mendel relates how the old man in the
apartment building tells his story about Mottl, but quickly changes the topic to discuss himself.
What follows is Mendel’s depiction of a man who craves conversation, yearns for a chance to
tell the many stories he has bottled up inside. Mendel explains to Wander’s narrator,
Du merkst natürlich an der umständlichen verschlagenen Art des Alten, er sucht ein
Gespräch, sonst nichts. Mit allen Mitteln will er dich in eine Debatte verwickeln, als
ginge es um Leben und Tod, so wichtig ist es für ihn. Nun ja, ein fremder Mensch!
Endlich einer, verstehst du, dem er alles noch nicht erzählt hat, der das noch nicht kennt.
Wann hat man schon das Glück, ein neues Gesicht zu sehen. Er kommt nicht mehr weit,
der Alte, die Knochen sind kaputt. Und nun hat er dich eingefangen, holt dich in die
Stube hinein, hat dir eine Zigarette entlockt, eine von den ausländischen guten, die er sich
längst nicht mehr lesiten kann, schlurft erregt hin und her, senkt die Stimme and weiht
dich ein: Denn er kennt das Haus! Von Mottl Leiser schwenkt er direkt auf sich selbst.
(10)
Here, an ordinary old man who otherwise possesses little has the capacity to waylay a storyteller
as skilled as Mendel Teichmann. The old man’s ranting about Mottl, in turn, serves as the stuff
of Mendel’s narration. As Wander depicts it, storytelling, arising out of conversation, plays a
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vital role in Eastern European Jewish culture. Here, Wander’s narrator depicts a conversation
within a story told within a conversation—very much like Abramovitsh’s Fishke, which has
numerous embedded narratives. Wander links storytelling to dialogue, to dialogic exchange.
Monologue is downplayed in favor of diaphony. I assert that the narrator depicts Mendel
presenting him not only an introduction to storytelling in general, but also an entrée into a
particular type of narrative, born out of dialogue, associated here with Yiddish-language
storytelling. As we have seen with the narrator’s initial gesture toward the complex world of
Eastern European Jewry encapsulated in the phrase “lost, beautiful world,” Wander’s narrator
seems keen to capture through storytelling something of what was lost as a result of the
Holocaust, in this case Eastern European Jewish literary culture and the Yiddish language.
Mendel’s narrative also removes us temporarily from the diegesis of the concentration
camp, replacing it with a scene depicting an example of Eastern European Jewish life prior to
World War II. Directly prior to the conversation between the narrator and Mendel and the story
about Mottl, the narrator depicts himself and Mendel changing physical location as they traverse
the concentration camp Hirschberg, anticipating the shift to a narrative space outside of the
camp, all of which is made possible by Mendel’s embedded story. Wander’s narrator explains,
“Als er mich zur Seite nahm, um mit mir zu reden (sie feierten damals das Pessachfest, versteckt
in der Waschbaracke, aber er, der Hochpriester ihrer Träume, glaubte nicht an Gott), gingen wir
schnellen Schrittes, um bei der Wache nicht aufzufallen, die Baracken entlang, die vielleicht
zwanzig Baracken des Lagers Hirschberg im Riesengebirge” (8). Here, the narrator highlights
the presence of both devout and apostate Jews in the camp. While one group of Jewish prisoners
attempts to cobble together a makeshift, clandestine Passover celebration, Mendel and the
narrator sneak off to engage in a different kind of Jewish activity, namely dialoguing in the form
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of storytelling and recounting memories of Eastern European Jewish life prior to the Holocaust.
Mendel’s narration serves as a parallel in the novel’s diegesis to the narrator’s narration on the
extradiegetic level. The interplay between diegetic levels is, I argue, a rhetorical strategy that
further underscores an emphasis on the dialogic. Similar to the interplay between diegetic levels
in the train car that I discussed in my analysis of Hilsenrath’s Jossel Wassermanns Heimkehr, the
various diegetic levels conjured by the various narrators and the interaction among, here
Wander’s narrator, Mendel, and the old man in Mendel’s story, arise directly out of dialogue, out
of the act of characters and character narrators speaking to one another within the text. The
dialogical exchange preserves, at least to some degree, structural and thematic elements that are
linked in Der siebente Brunnen to the practice of storytelling in Yiddish-speaking Eastern
European Jewish culture.
In contrast to Mendel Teichmann, Wander’s narrator might be best viewed as a Western
European, German-speaking Jew. Though Wander’s narrator reveals few clues about his past and
remains an anonymous figure in the text, we can nonetheless infer certain details regarding his
identity. If we take into account the autobiographical overlap between author and narrator,
Wander’s narrator is likely an Austrian Jew whose native language is German but who also
understands and speaks Yiddish.32 We might best view the narrator in Der siebente Brunnen as a
mouthpiece, a representative of particular aspects of Wander’s traumatic past as Holocaust
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As a result of his upbringing as the son of Galician immigrants in a working class Jewish neighborhood in Vienna,
Wander understood and spoke some Yiddish. Wander’s autobiographical writing provides evidence for this fact. In
his 1996 memoir Das gute Leben, Wander recalls his maternal grandfather’s habit of reading stories aloud to him in
Yiddish. Wander relates this experience: “Als mir Großvater Isaac Hoffmann die Märchen aus Tausendeiner Nacht
erzählte, auf jiddisch, in dieser kraftvollen, grotesken Sprache, die in ihrer lapidären Kürze und Farbigkeit äußerst
poetisch wirkt. Die Geschichten von ‘Aladin und der Wunderlampe’ oder ‘Alibaba und den vierzig Räubern’ mußte
er mir Jahre hindurch immer wieder erzählen. Er war ein kleiner Schneider und kannte nur die hebräische Schrift.
Woher hatte er diese Märchen? (34). Wander’s description here underscores a fascination with Yiddish as a vehicle
for stories. It is important to note, however, that the texts he mentions his grandfather reading aloud are translations
of classics of world literature into Yiddish and not originally works of Yiddish literature.
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survivor and his search for an authorial identity. Wander views himself as a writer whose
aesthetic influences include Eastern European Jewish storytelling and literary culture. In a 1994
questionnaire that appeared in the Austrian literary magazine Literatur und Kritik, he explained,
“Ich sehe mich als Erzähler. Ich sehe mich durchaus in der Tradition der jüdischen
Geschichtenerzähler, die als Handwerker, als Schnorrer oder Heiratsvermittler durch die Dörfer
und Ghettos des Ostens zogen und sich Ansehen verschafften, indem sie den Leuten Nachrichten
aus der übrigen Welt überbrachten, Anekdoten und Schnurren aus dem schweren Leben der
Menschen” (“Nicht jeder braucht eine Heimat” 41). Here, Wander refers to itinerant Eastern
European Yiddish-language storytellers who once traveled from one Jewish community to the
next, carving out a living in their respective trades, telling stories and engaging customers both
as sources of income and interlocutors. These Yiddish storytellers, in Wander’s view, employ
narrative as method for constructing meaning in a world that was often harsh, marked by poverty
and unpredictable outbreaks of anti-Jewish violence. Wander’s characterization here bears
striking resemblance to both his novel’s narrator and Yiddish literary figures such as Mendele
the Book Peddler.
The interactions between Mendel and Wander’s narrator constitute, I argue, the
confluence of two narratorial voices, each of which represents a particular incarnation of the
European Jewish life and culture. I contend that the result of the conversation between Mendel
and Wander’s narrator is a dialogue between East and West—between two languages and
literary traditions, Yiddish and German. Wander’s narrator stages here in the text a dialogical
interaction between two linguistic entities that emerges as the reader interacts with the text’s
multiple layers of narration. The German-speaking narrator stages a crucial step in his aesthetic
education, which is dependent on his interaction with Mendel, the Eastern European Jew who, as
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a metaliterary reference to Mendele the Book Peddler, models Yiddish storytelling and
simultaneously gestures toward the multifaceted role that storytelling plays in the development
of modern Yiddish literature. Wander’s narrator situates the act of storytelling, as well as
discussion regarding the importance of telling stories effectively, within the framework of the
novel. The dialogue between Mendel Teichmann and the narrator, as well as the Yiddish literary
forebear that Mendel evokes, sheds new light on Wander’s autobiographical statement quoted
above. The conversation between Mendel and Wander’s narrator becomes emblematic for the
dialogue that Wander’s text endeavors to establish with Yiddish literature. This metaliterary link
to a modern Yiddish literary idiom and the storytelling that plays a crucial role in the formation
of it are in turn additional components of the memorialization and mourning that the novel
enacts. In doing so, Wander’s text eulogizes not only the “lost beautiful world” but also the
world of Yiddish literature and Yiddish speakers and readers.
Adjacent to dialogue, the dialogic, I assert, plays a crucial role in Wander’s novel and
provides a point of departure for situating Wander’s work within the larger context of GermanJewish thought. In her analysis of Der siebente Brunnen, Andrea Reiter argues that Wander’s
novel is influenced by Hasidic stories.33 Within the context of her argument, she draws a
connection between Wander and Austrian-Jewish philosopher Martin Buber (74-76) and
contends that Buber’s work on Hasidism provides a link both to Eastern European Jewish
storytelling and Bakhtin’s notion of the dialogic. In the following section of this chapter, I
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Reiter argues, “Die Erzählform Wanders wurzelt in der Tradition des Chassidismus, einer volkstümlichen
Bewegung im Judentum des 18. Jahrhunderts” (74). She also asserts that Wander’s narrator positions Mendel
Teichmann in the role of a “Zaddik,” the figure in Hasidic tales that serves as spiritual leader, wise man, and
sometimes faith healer (76). While I agree that Mendel performs in Wander’s novel some of the functions that the
tzaddik does in Hasidic literature, Reiter’s focus in her analysis on Hasidic tales myopically obscures the complex
intertextual relationship that the novel constructs to Yiddish literature, particularly modern Yiddish writers such as
Abramovitsh and Sholem Aleichem. Reiter’s analysis is, in my view, indicative of German scholarly reception,
which is largely ignorant about Yiddish and Yiddish literature.
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explore a triangulation among Wander, Buber, and Bakhtin to highlight the dialogical aspects of
Wander’s text—an aspect that underpins the theoretical work of both Buber and Bakhtin.
In Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue, Maurice Friedman argues that significant
consonance exists between Buber’s concept of dialogue, as foregrounded in his seminal 1922
study Ich und Du (translated into English as I and Thou), and Mikhail Bakhtin’s notion of
dialogue and the dialogic. Friedman explains that Buber’s thinking revolves around the
distinction between two types of configurations: “the ‘I-Thou’ relationship, which is direct,
mutual, present, and open, and the ‘I-It,’ or subject-object, relation, in which one relates to the
other only indirectly and nonmutually, knowing and using the other. The essential element is not
what goes on within the minds of the partners in a relationship but what happens between them”
(354). In other words, Buber’s “I-Thou” constellation constitutes dialogue between two discrete
entities, while the “I-It” relationship, which is essentially one-sided, exists in the form of
monologue. According Buber’s philosophy, the human subject requires both types of interactions
for a genuinely productive existence. According to Friedman, the dialogue so crucial to Buber’s
thinking finds a kindred spirit in Bakhtin’s concept of the dialogic. Quoting Bakhtin, Friedman
argues,
[T]he achievement of self-consciousness and the most important human acts arise out of
the relation to a “Thou.” “Life is dialogical by its very nature. To live means to engage in
dialogue, to question, to listen, to answer, to agree.” In exact parallel to Buber’s contrast
between I-Thou and I-It, dialogue and monologue, Bakhtin defines “monologism” as the
denial of the existence outside oneself of “another I with equal rights (thou).” Authentic
human life can only be verbally expressed in “open-ended dialogue” in which one
participates wholly and throughout one’s whole life. Entering into dialogue with an
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integral voice, the person “participates in it not only with his thoughts, but with his fate
and with his entire individuality.” (356)
What can constitute a “Thou,” the reciprocal dialogical partner of the “I,” remains open-ended: a
“Thou” with which the “I” dialogues can be another human being, nature, a text, or the self. On
account of the close connection between dialogue and language, an understanding of the “IThou” relationship often sees a link between dialogical interaction and the spoken word (and, by
extension, the written word). Steven Kepnes asserts that the Austrian-Jewish philosopher
develops, as a result of his thinking in Ich und Du and his evolving understanding of Hasidic
literary culture, a “dialogical hermeneutic method” (18). According to Kepnes, Buber
“developed a notion of interpretation as a dialogic relationship between the reader and the text”
(19). Buber’s understanding of the relationship between reader and text is inspired by and
analogous to the primacy of dialogical exchange in Hasidic stories, primarily between the figure
of the tzaddik and other characters that pose questions and seek answers from him (19-20). For
Buber, the back-and-forth that these stories often instantiate illustrates the mutually reciprocal
relationship between tzaddik and interlocutor associated with an “I-Thou” relationship.
Interpreting Hasidic texts, in turn, thus requires that the reader pay close attention not only to
what the tzaddik expresses and but also to how he delivers his message and the ways in which his
message is received within the context of an individual story’s diegesis.
In the forward to Die Erzählungen der Chassidim, one of the volumes of Hasidic tales
that he translated from Yiddish into German, Buber emphasizes the importance of and analyzes
the function of dialogue and dialogical exchange characteristic of many of these stories. Buber
explains that these tales position the tzaddik not only as a literary character, but also as a speaker
whose interpersonal communication or dialogue with his listeners the text preserves: “Aber der
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Zaddik soll nicht bloß in Handlungen gezeigt werden, die dazu zeigen, in Sprüche überzugehen,
sondern auch in seinem lehrenden Sprechen selber, das wesentlich zu seinem Handeln gehört”
(10-11). Here, Buber identifies as a crucial element of these stories the conversational back-andforth between the figure of the teacher and his audience. The dialogical interaction, in the form
of human conversation articulated within the narrative, is elevated to an “I-Thou” relationship,
because the content of the exchange between teacher and follower takes on mystical significance
as an expression of “the truth about ‘Being’ to which the Hasidic text points” (20). Buber
explains the mechanics of this technique in many Hasidic tales, explaining, “Der Lehrer, der
Zaddik wird gefragt, nach der Bedeutung eines Schriftverses, nach dem Sinn eines Brauchs, er
gibt Auskunft, und indem er sie gibt, lehrt er mehr als der Fragende zu lernen hoffte” (10-11).
This description is reminiscent of the ways in which Wander’s narrator beseeches Mendel
to instruct him in the ways of storytelling. The dialogical interaction between the narrator and
Mendel Teichmann represents the communing of two subjectivities within the context of the
extreme conditions of the concentration camp. This relationship, I argue, assumes contours of a
Buberian “I-Thou” relationship. Mendel teaches by way of example, answering the narrator’s
question with question, a gesture that provides the impetus for the evocative story about Mottl
that serves as example of how one effectively channels observation and imagination into a
successful story—one that will capture the attention of one’s listeners. The narrator not only
learns the craft of storytelling from Mendel, but his interactions with the master raconteur also
catalyze in the narrator a transformation of self. This transformation recalls Buber’s explanation
of how the subjectivity of the “I” composes itself within the space of the reciprocal relationship
generated between said “I” and “Thou”: “Der Mensch wird am Du zum Ich. Gegenüber kommt
und entschwindet, Beziehungsereignisse verdichten sich und zerstieben, und im Wechsel klärt
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sich, von Mal zu Mal wachsend, das Bewußtsein des gleichbleibenden Partners, das
Ichbewußtsein” (20). The narrator’s subjectivity as a narratorial authority achieves consciousness
in the interaction with Mendel, the “Du” or “Gegenüber” whom he addresses. In keeping with
the tradition of Hasidic tales, the narrator encounters in an everyday occurrence something
approaching mystical significance, such as experiencing the evocation of the “lost, beautiful
world” of Ashkenaz when listening to Mendel narrate. We also observe how the “I-Thou”
relationship between Wander’s narrator and Mendel is mediated by the interplay among diegetic
and metadiegetic levels. Mendel embeds a story within a story within the framework of the larger
text produced by the narrator. Wander’s version of the “I-Thou” dialogical interaction takes
place both in the speech acts between the narrator and Mendel and on the level of narrative
structure, in the layers of metadiegesis that are inserted into the diegetic world when Mendel
constructs his story about Mottl. Eastern European Jewish storytelling, articulated by Mendel, is
built into the German-language text. But similar to Mendele the Book Peddler, Mendel
Teichmann negotiates his role as narrator while simultaneously staging the storytelling of
another character narrator. Mendel is both tzaddik and modern narrator. Buber’s work on Hasidic
tales thus provides a framework for understanding the significance of the dialogical exchange
between Mendel and the narrator and further underscores how the narrator’s portrayal of Mendel
situates the novel within the larger history of Yiddish literature that includes both Hasidic tales
and modern Yiddish writing by authors such as Abramovitsh.
In addition to employing Buber’s notion of the “I-Thou” relationship, we also find in
Wander’s novel a particular iteration of Mikhail Bakhtin’s concept of the dialogic. Similar to my
analysis of the dialogic in Hilsenrath’s Jossel Wassermanns Heimkehr and Der Nazi und der
Friseur, my reading of Der siebente Brunnen finds inspiration in Bakhtin’s theoretical work on
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novelistic discourse. For Bakhtin, the modern novel possesses a choral quality, an aggregate of
multiple voices that speak from multiple positions. Bakhtin explains the idea of double-voiced
discourse, in which we find “two voices, two meanings, and two expressions that are dialogically
interrelated [...]” (324). Though Bakhtin principally argues that double-voiced discourse involves
the voice of the author and that of the character, his discussion sheds light on the dialogical
interplay between Wander’s narrator and those whose voices he represents, such as Mendel. I
argue that the narrator in Der siebente Brunnen endeavors to mimic diaphony when he represents
interactions between himself and individual characters. The Bakhtinian dialogic emerges in the
congress between discrete identities. These multiple groupings of narrator and character in the
story world culminate in a structure that privileges multivocality over monologue. Wander’s text
brings voices into conversation with one another in several ways. We have observed the
emphasis on the representation of dialogue, particularly between Wander’s narrator and various
characters, including the consummate storyteller Mendel. We have also observed the dialogical
interaction that Wander stages between German and Yiddish literature. In the following section,
I discuss how the text stages this dialogical interaction on a semantic level, between German and
Yiddish languages in its portrayal of another master Yiddish storyteller, Meir Bernstein.
Yiddish and German Entwined: Wander’s Narrator and Yiddish Storyteller Meir
Bernstein
Mendel Teichmann’s storytelling in the first chapter serves as an introduction to a
dialogue between East and West—between Yiddish and German—that has multiple
permutations throughout the text. The novel’s preoccupation with Yiddish is also evident in the
fifth chapter, “Der siebente Brunnen,” in which Wander’s narrator overtly sutures a Yiddishlanguage tale (or “mayse” [majsse as the word is rendered in the text in German orthography]),
into the larger context of his depiction of a storyteller named Meir Bernstein, whose talent, the
142

narrator claims, rivals that of Mendel (47). Framed within his depiction of Meir Bernstein and
his storytelling habits, Wander’s narrator further explores the portrayal of experiences related to
the Holocaust through the lens of Eastern European Jewish storytelling.
This chapter of the novel opens with the narrator and a group of inmates imprisoned in a
train car that has departed from the concentration camp Hirschberg, a satellite camp of GroßRosen, and is destined for Buchenwald.34 The narrator describes how the men locked in the car,
their meager food rations depleted, approach mental breakdown as their physical and
psychological energy dissipates. Trapped in these horrific circumstances, they begin to speak
“mit sich selbst, im Fieber, in der Agonie” (44). The movement of the train provides the sole
acoustic respite from the sounds of the prisoners’ moans and gasps (“Wenn der Zug fährt, wird
das Geraune und Todesröcheln vom Rattern der Räder übertönt” [44]). Among the many sights
and noises filling the train car, the narrator perceives Meir Bernstein, previously a passionate,
energetic storyteller, lying in silence, drained of energy and on the cusp of death. Because he
wears a decent pair of shoes and a warm jacket, two men patiently await his death, so that they
may inherit the only earthly possessions he will leave behind.
Wander’s narrator recalls the Meir who once was and the stories he told about his family
and the plenitude of the holiday feasts he once celebrated with them. The narrator imagines what
Meir ponders as he approaches his final moments, assuming that his friend and storyteller, along
with the other Jews on the train, are filled with fantasies and memories even in this moment in
which they are too enervated to speak (“Alle Ostjuden erzählten gerne von den Festen. Jetzt
reden sie nicht. Sie phantasieren” [45]). Ignoring his personal suffering, the narrator endeavors to
inhabit Meir’s perspective. He empathetically projects what he thinks Meir experiences, basing
34

Wander’s narrator does not explicitly state at this point in the text from whence the train has departed and whither
it is destined. This information is revealed in subsequent chapters.
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his depiction on his acquaintance with him and the stories he has told in the past. Wander’s
narrator explains his thought process:
Ich kenne die Geschichten der Toten, die dort auf der vorderen Plattform des Wagens
liegen. Ich kenne die Geschichten von Meir Bernstein, oft hat er sie erzählt. Seine Lippen
bewegen sich, was flüstert er. Vielleicht ein Dankgebet? Ich danke dir, Ewiger, wispert er
in die kalte Luft, ich danke dir, daß du mich noch einmal meine Chanah und die Kinder
hast sehen lassen, ich danke dir, ribonje-schel-ojlem. Da stört ihn das Holpern über
Weichen, reißt ihn aus seiner Vision. (45)
Here, Wander’s narrator translates his knowledge of Meir and his storytelling habits into
narrative. The narrator represents a man in his final moments of life, engaged in the act of prayer.
Though the narrator cannot be certain that he interprets Meir’s facial expression and demeanor
correctly, he constructs an imaginary dialogue with Meir’s thoughts, as an act of memorialization
that commences prior to the man’s death in the diegesis. The narrator’s voice shifts seamlessly
into Meir’s voice, without quotations marks. The narrator’s inquiry (“Vielleicht ein
Dankgebet?”) is followed by an utterance in Meir’s voice (“Ich danke dir, Ewiger, wispert er in
die kalte Luft, ich danke dir, daß [...]”), and then the narrator resumes the depiction from his own
perspective (“Da stört ihn das Holpern [...]”). We observe how the narrator’s words are
punctuated by speech attributed to Meir. The narratorial gesture in this passage emphasizes
diaphony in place of monologue, in that the narrator shapes narrative voice to stage an
intermingling of two distinct voices that arises out of the narrator’s switching between his own
perspective and the perspective that he imagines Meir occupies.
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As the train journey progresses, Wander’s narrator reproduces a specific story that Meir
used to tell. He relates Meir’s tale about an experience the loquacious farmer once had on the
Sabbath:
Und Meir erzählt mit kunstvollen Ausschmückungen, beinahe so gut wie Mendel
Teichmann und andere, die seit Jahrhunderten verfolgt sind und daher im Worte leben.
Hert mich ojss, pflegt Meir Bernstein zu beginnen, well ich aich dazejln a majsse ... will
ich euch eine Geschichte erzählen: Ist gewesen Schabbes und haben alle gewußt, daß
Schabbes im Haus des Meir Bernstein ist ein Jom-tew, ein heiliges Fest. Zwar ist Meir
Bernstein nicht gewesen einer von den Jiden, die erfüllt haben die Gebote des Talmud
buchstabengetreu. Gottgläubig ja, aber nicht buchstabengetreu! Weil Gott lebt in mir und
in dir und in jedem Strauch, und ist größer als der Buchstabe, und auch ich bin also
größer als der Buchstabe. Aber Schabbes ist Schabbes. Wird kein Licht angezündet von
eigener Hand, Wagen und Pferd bleiben im Stall. Kommt doch Freitag abend ein Bauer
vorbei, ein Christ. Kein schlechter Mensch, aber hat schon getrunken und will mir
beweisen—ich soll sein ein Meschumed und gar kein Jid! (47)
Before the narrator commences with his depiction of Meir’s narrating his tale in action, he
emphasizes the historical continuity of Jewish storytelling by reminding the reader that both
Meir and Mendel are preceded by a long chain of raconteurs who also “lived in the word” as a
result of an existence often fraught with religious persecution and other dangers. Wander’s
narrator, too, must live in the word, as his project of memorializing fellow Jewish victims who
do not survive the Holocaust (and depicting his own experiences in the concentration camps) can
only take place in language.
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The narrator then transitions to the content of Meir’s tale, signaling the introduction of
Meir’s voice with a linguistic shift to Yiddish (“Hert mich ojss”). The narrator cites the original
story rather than paraphrasing, reproducing, at least at the tale’s beginning, Meir’s native
Yiddish. The narrator constructs here a moment in the text in which German and Yiddish
intermingle. He creates a hybrid that is composed of elements of what are usually two discrete
languages, and he provides the (German) reader with the information necessary for decoding it.
The narrator effectively translates the original Yiddish twice: first, by shifting the orthography
from the Hebrew letters in which Yiddish is written into the Latin alphabet; and second, by
placing a German rendition of the story’s introductory words side by side with the Yiddish
(“[...] well ich aich dazejln a majsse . . . will ich euch eine Geschichte erzählen”). The phrase
“well ich aich dazejln a majsse” also highlights both the Germanic and the Hebrew components
that contribute to the Yiddish language. The narrator’s deployment of Yiddish further acts as a
mimetic gesture, an attempt to capture something of the spoken quality of Meir’s storytelling.
Wander’s use of the term majsse further underscores the linguistic and historical authenticity of
Meir’s tale. The German narrative gently mediates the Yiddish story.
The remainder of Meir’s tale, a nocturnal adventure with the non-Jewish farmer, entails a
less than kosher journey to a local Polish tavern and Meir’s clever management of
Jewish/Christian relations. Aware of the Jewish prohibition on work and travel on the Sabbath,
an anonymous Pole mischievously insists that Meir offer him a ride into the village, an action
that involves the laborious hitching of horse to wagon. Because Meir’s non-Jewish servant lies in
the barn intoxicated and incapacitated, Meir fulfills the task without complaint and ferries the
non-Jew into town. Upon arriving at the tavern, it becomes clear that Meir’s neighbors have
collectively conspired against him in a drunken prank. Thinking that they have hoodwinked the
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Jew and tricked him into tergiversation, they celebrate their apparent victory and jokingly offer
him a round of “Pflaumenschnaps und trejfetiges Fleisch” (48). Meir, however, emerges as victor
when he discursively defends himself by claiming that the night in question was not, in fact, the
Sabbath. In an attempt to prove him wrong and assert their dominance, they inquire of both the
sober innkeeper, to whom Meir once generously loaned money, and the respectable Catholic
priest regarding the day of the week. Both side with Meir. Meir relates how the priest employs a
trick of logic to vindicate the Jew: “Da schüttelt er den Kopf: Wenn Meir Bernstein hat das
Kummet angefaßt und am Wehr gedreht, kann nicht sein Sabbat, Meir hat recht!” (48). In his
tale, Meir emphasizes Jewish agency, humor, and linguistic finesse, which in his selfaggrandizing narrative triumph over non-Jewish boorishness and inebriation. As far as his
adversaries are concerned, Meir avoids transgressing Jewish law because of the high regard in
which the community generally holds him. He does not lose face and is not seen as apostate
(Meschumed). Meir obeys the spirit, if not the letter, of the law. He says of himself, he is devout
but not “buchstabengetreu.”
Meir’s storytelling is reminiscent of Mendele the Book Peddler’s narratorial habits. His
ingenious deployment of language as a mechanism for evading the mischievous intentions of his
non-Jewish neighbors could just as easily come from the mouth of Mendele, as he spins a yarn
about his adventures for a fellow traveler and storyteller such as Reb Alter in Fishke the Lame.
Wander’s narrator also mimics Abramovitsh’s narrator. His embedding of Meir’s story into the
larger frame narrative of the “concentrationary universe” of the camps and train car also reminds
us of Mendele’s practice of situating metadiegetic stories that others tell him within the context
of the diegetic world that he narrates. In this way, Wander’s narrator evokes also in his depiction
of Meir and his majsse Abramovitsh’s narrative style.
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The humor and good cheer that mark Meir’s Yiddish tale are framed by the narrator’s
depiction of the train car destined for Buchenwald, the depleted prisoners, and the two men who
anticipate their relative gain with Meir’s last breath. After nodding off during the journey, the
narrator is asleep when Meir dies. Upon waking, he witnesses Meir’s ignoble end: “Auf der
vorderen Plattform des Wagens lagen die Toten aufgehäuft, wie auf einem heidnischen Altar,
einer über dem andern, obenauf Meir Bernstein. Lang hingestreckt und ausgeglüht lag er da, das
knochige Gesicht fast schwarz, Mund und Augen geschlossen” (52-53). In contrast to the
injustice of what would otherwise be an anonymous death, Meir’s narratorial abilities are
recuperated, even if only partially, by the story Wander’s narrator tells. The presence of Meir and
his story in the text serve both to mourn and memorialize. In lieu of official documentation and
Meir’s family members (who have also been killed), the narrator’s depiction of Meir must serve
the function of both obituary and kaddish, the Jewish prayer for the dead, traditionally recited
every year by a close family member, often a son, on the anniversary of the deceased person’s
death. Here, the narrator eulogizes both his perished friend and the language that he spoke and
deployed to tell his stories. The depiction of Meir’s tale and the overture made to include
Yiddish in the German-language text remind the reader that Meir’s death, as well as the demise
of millions like him, entails the near-destruction of Yiddish culture and Eastern European Jewry.
The kaddish that the narrator in effect articulates for Meir Bernstein serves as a metonymical
reference to the millions of Holocaust victims whose memory the text cannot preserve.
The portrayal of Meir’s “mayse” is, I argue, emblematic of the integral role Yiddish
language and literature play in Wander’s German-language novel. The narrator weaves the two
languages together at this point in the text, mapping out a point of dialogical exchange between
the two. In addition to recreating Yiddish speech of the past, as recalled by the narrator, and
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building it into the linguistic structure of the novel, the narrator thematizes the act of dialogue
and the dialogic interaction of storytelling. In much the same way that the text enacts a dialogue
between German and Yiddish in the conversation between Mendel and the narrator, we observe
here a dialogical interaction between Meir’s Yiddish story and Wander’s German text. In the
case of Meir’s story, we see German and Yiddish woven together on the semantic level. This
intermingling of the two languages also operates as a version of Bakhtinian double-voiced
discourse, signaled by the overlapping of two voices, the narrator’s and Meir’s. The reader
witnesses, I argue, the preservation of the Yiddish in black and white, on the literal page of the
book. Through the act of reading (and re-reading), we participate in this process of the
preservation of the words and memory of Meir Bernstein. Similar to Mendele the Book Peddler,
who elevates the “folksy” Yiddish tale by making it the subject of a literary text, Wander’s
narrator aestheticizes Meir’s Yiddish tale by situating it within the framework of novelistic
discourse.
With the blending of Yiddish and German in Meir’s story, Wander’s text also gestures
toward the history of European Jewish culture and literature as multilingual rather than
monolingual. Monolingualism, as a cultural construct with a specific historical trajectory that is
connected to Western European nation-building and hegemonic language politics often
associated with nationalism, has recently received considerable scholarly attention. In Beyond
the Mother Tongue: The Postmonolingual Condition, Yasemin Yildiz discusses, in the context of
German-language literature, writing practices that critique or disrupt the monolingual paradigm.
She identifies a variety of multilingual practices that demonstrate—and arguably often contribute
to—a shift toward toward postmonolingualism. In contrast to monolingual literature, Yildiz
examines authors whose works demonstrate varying degrees of engagement with more than one
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language, what she terms “diverse forms of multilingualism” (15). There is no one single method
for a writer to engage in multilingualism: some authors are bilingual and write in two languages
at once, while others compose in a language different than their native tongue (15). I argue that
Wander’s text, in the case of the reproduction of Meir’s Yiddish story, participates most closely
in what Yildiz refers to as the “mixing different languages in one text” (15). She cites as
examples of authors who mix different languages together James Joyce and Gloria Anzaldúa:
Joyce, in Finnegans Wake for example, creates a polyglot text from vocabulary drawn from
English, French, German, Irish, Italian, etc., and Anzaldúa employs a combination of English
and Spanish, i.e. “Spanglish,” in her writing. I contend that we may add Fred Wander to this list
if we take Der siebente Brunnen into consideration. In its formulation of dialogical interaction
between German and Yiddish and its quotation of Yiddish speech and storytelling, Wander’s
novel formulates a constellation of rhetorical and narrative strategies that gesture toward both the
multilingual, Babel-like environment of the Nazi concentration camps and the complex cultural
and political history that links German-speaking Jews in Germany and Austria and Yiddishspeaking Ostjuden. Wander’s construction of a metaliterary bridge to modern Yiddish literature
also provides an example of a post-Holocaust literary interchange between German and Yiddish.
I argue that Der siebente Brunnen is an experiment in postwar German-Jewish literature that
seeks to galvanize the German language as a medium for the representation of traumatic memory
and loss through the enrichment of Yiddish language and literature.
Imagining Tadeusz Moll: Theory of Mind and Midrash on Suffering
Thus far, we have encountered two examples of narratorial figures that, through the
intervention of Wander’s narrator, are portrayed in the act of uttering their own words. Mendel
narrates by way of conversation with Wander’s narrator. In the case of Meir Bernstein, the
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narrator introduces Meir’s storytelling as a recollection, reproducing the man’s words in his own
voice. The emphasis on the representation of the spoken word of other characters underscores the
novel’s implementation of a kind of multivocal model of novelistic discourse. Instead of
privileging the narrator’s personal experience first and foremost, the text reveals a particular
concern for other victims (who do not survive like the narrator does) and the understanding that
their voices have been otherwise silenced. The stories that Wander’s narrator is in a position to
represent are nonetheless contoured by the innumerable lives and testimonies lost due to the
Shoah. The narrator negotiates the delicate line between gesturing toward the historical absence
of the millions of stories that can never be told, i.e. the disnarrated body of testimony, and the
desire for a moment of resistance to an otherwise infinite ellipsis. The narrator’s sense of
responsibility toward his perished comrades and their memory fuels the novel’s engine. This
sense of obligation takes a different form when violent events in the story world foreclose the
narrator’s access to a particular character’s interiority, which would otherwise be available, as in
the case of Mendel and Meir, by virtue of the stories he tells or the words he utters.
In the novel’s tenth chapter, “Woran erinnert dich Wald?” the narrator relates how he is
drawn to a young man named Tadeusz Moll. We learn that Tadeusz has survived Auschwitz after
being assigned a work detail with a Sonderkommando and is subsequently deported to another
camp. The narrator is in awe of the youth’s apparent innocence and light-heartedness in the face
of what he experienced at Auschwitz. Wander’s narrator empathizes with what he has learned
regarding Tadeusz’ personal experience of Nazi persecution and imagines the spiritual and
psychological resources that exist in the boy’s mind: “Ich frage mich, welche unerschöpflichen
Seelenkräfte in diesem jungen Menschen wohnen. Wie konnte ein Sechzehnjähriger die
Gaskammer überstehen, ohne Schaden zu nehmen?” (110). At the beginning of the chapter, the
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narrator alternates between describing Tadeusz and depicting his speech, allowing the boy to tell
details of his own story as the narrative rapidly switches back and forth between indirect and
direct discourse. The boy reveals himself to be a tzaddik who appears to live and breathe the
teachings of the Baal Shem Tov, the founder of the Hasidic movement in Eastern Europe (111).
He also demonstrates himself to be a sophisticated scholar of Jewish learning, capable of quoting
from memory entire swathes of the Talmud. He even corrects a fellow inmate who disputes his
mnemonic accuracy (114-115). The narrator underscores the significance of the boy’s faculties
by depicting Tadeusz in the act reciting from memory a passage related to Enoch: “mit
geschlossenen Augen leierte seine Sprüche Tadeusz Moll: Gott nahm mich aus der Mitte des
Geschlechtes der Sintflut hinweg und trug mich auf Windesflügeln zum obersten Himmel” (114).
In addition to employing reported speech, the narrator signals that he is quoting Tadeusz by
rendering the recited words in italics. The narrator’s depiction of Tadeusz also underscores the
boy’s ability to employ his extensive learning as a framework for locating meaning in the world
around him. An expert at midrash or Jewish biblical exegesis, Tadeusz applies his spiritual
understanding and scholarly expertise to the bleak situation in the concentration camp. The
narrator relates how the youth blinks at him and offers encouragement, “Tadeusz Moll blinzelt
mir zu: Der Körper leidet, die Seele halte heraus. Tröste sie, gib ihr ein gutes Wort. Wenn der
Körper leidet, die Seele soll lachen. Das hat uns Baal-Schem gelehrt” (111). Inspired by the
wunderkind’s interpretative abilities, the narrator employs, I argue, a technique that resembles
midrash when he imagines and explicates Tadeusz’ final moments.
The narrator’s reflection on Tadeusz’ ability to withstand psychologically the inhumane
conditions of the camp and his seemingly unassailable spirit is interrupted when the boy is
singled out by the camp commander for torture and execution. After this moment, the narrator
152

can no longer speak to the boy or hear what he has to say. After Tadeusz mistakenly misses a roll
call, the camp guards seize him and lead him away for execution (“Bei der Zählung nicht
dazusein, bedeutete für die SS einfach Flucht. Auf Flucht stand die Todesstrafe” [121]). Along
with a handful of men also sentenced to death for transgressing camp rules, Tadeusz is tied to a
post on a platform in the middle of the camp and tortured prior to being hanged. Jörg Thunecke
argues that “Wander himself—as he stressed in more than one interview—constantly seems to
have been especially interested in those cases where an inmate’s will is shown to break, his
reflexes become paralyzed, and the fight for survival ceases, as happened with Tadeusz Moll”
(252). Wander’s narrator describes how Tadeusz visibly suffers as his physical and mental
strength is depleted by the strain of being forced to stand lashed to the merciless wooden stake
for hours on end. The narrator is deeply affected by Tadeusz’ fate. He observes the boy’s
suffering and seeks to find a modicum of meaning in what is otherwise a meaningless incident of
violence (123-124).
The narrator, who at this point can no longer relate Tadeusz’ actual words or allow him to
express his own thoughts and experiences (“Keiner, der unter jenem Galgen gestanden hat,
konnte eine Nachricht hinterlassen oder auch nur ein Wort” [124]), instead imagines what the
young man might be thinking as he is tortured. The narrator spins out various possibilities and
scenarios; in one moment Tadeusz begs for forgiveness and sees in Christ on the cross a forebear
to his suffering. In another version, “[er liebte] niemanden mehr, nichts mehr. Was übrigblieb,
was Kühle, Klarheit, Erkenntnis von der Sinnlosigkeit ales Seins oder vom NICHTS, aus dem
wir kommen und in das wir sinken” (128). Though the narrator can never be certain regarding
the veracity of his projections, his rambling thoughts represent an attempt to provide a voice
where no voice could be heard. The narrator expresses his desire to find some kind of meaning in
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his companion’s suffering as he witnesses the boy’s physical form endure torture. Like some
kind of angelic figure, similar to Enoch in the passage Tadeusz quotes, that can witness and
record but never intercede, the narrator remarks, “Der Kopf lag jetzt in der Schlinge, der goldene
Kopf. Ich kann es drehen und wenden, wie ich will, mein Freund, es kommt immer wieder auf
eines heraus: Wenn der Mensch sterben soll, entdeckt er den Zauber des Daseins” (130). In lieu
of a physical intervention that could save Tadeusz’ life, the narrator resorts to the only thing that
can preserve the boy in any form. The narrator “rescues” the story of a boy who survives
Auschwitz only to be killed in another camp on account of a comparatively minor infraction of
camp regulation. The mind reading that Wander’s narrator attempts serves as homage to
Tadeusz’ talent for midrash. The narrator develops his own version of midrash, which engenders
a meditation on suffering. In lieu of speaking directly with the dying boy, the narrator conjures a
dialogical exchange between what he can subjectively observe and what he imagines Tadeusz to
think and feel in his final moments.
The episode depicting Tadeusz Moll further underscores the narrator’s practice of
empathetically inferring and imagining what another character thinks and feels in moments when
said characters are unable to speak for themselves. We are reminded of the narrator’s description
of Meir Bernstein as he lies dying in the train car, too enervated to speak. The narrator observes
Meir’s suffering and infers, based on episodes from the past and their acquaintance, what the
dying man might be thinking and feeling in that moment. In similar fashion, Wander’s narrator
witnesses Tadeusz in his final hours prior to being executed and imagines what the boy’s thought
process might be in reaction to what he suffers. In an empathetic manner, the narrator endeavors
to “read the minds” of other characters, so to speak, to construct meaning out of the facial and
other physical signals that he perceives. In his representation of Tadeusz’ final moments, the
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narrator energizes a dialogical dynamic, reminiscent of the Buberian “I-Thou” relationship that
he stages in his portrayal of Mendel and Meir, between his own subjectivity and the version of
Tadeusz that he conjures in his imagination.
The narrator’s pattern of interpretation is an isolated incident neither in other literary
texts nor in the broader scheme of human existence. Narrative theorists such as Lisa Zunshine
have adapted the concept of “theory of mind,” which has roots in the field of cognitive science,
to the study of narrative and often employ it as a fundamental cognitive principle for
understanding how humans interact with others humans and, by extension, how readers engage
with fictional characters. As Zunshine understands it, “theory of mind” is a form of mind-reading
that “has nothing to do with plain old telepathy” and instead refers to “our ability to explain
people’s behavior in terms of their thoughts, feelings, beliefs, and desires” (6). Zunshine explains
how most humans apply theory of mind unconsciously as a matter of course as they interact with
others and attribute to them particular states of mind (6-10). In Why We Read Fiction, Zunshine
takes as her point of departure the concept of theory of mind as a near-universal human cognitive
faculty and explores how fictional texts such as novels depict the mental states of fictional
characters and how readers subsequently interpret these representations by employing the same
faculty of theory of mind that they use every day when interacting with their co-workers,
neighbors, friends, family, etc. While Zunshine is concerned first and foremost with how real life
human readers engage with literary characters, her understanding of theory of mind also entails
how fictional characters often endeavor to interpret the psychological states of fellow characters.
To cite one example of fictional characters employing theory of mind with each other, she
discusses Elizabeth Bennet’s (sometimes incorrect) attempts to interpret Mr. Darcy’s state of
mind on the basis of his behavior in Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice (61-65).
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Though she plucks the majority of her textual examples from the realm of Englishlanguage literature, Zunshine argues that her insights, because they are based on a cognitive
apparatus belonging to (nearly) all humans across all cultures, potentially have universal
application for readers of fiction in any language. Her work enriches my analysis of Der siebente
Brunnen. I argue that Wander’s narrator often makes use of theory of mind, and his practice of
inferring the states of minds of others culminates in the episode with Tadeusz. Analyzing the
narrator’s habit of “reading” the minds of others in terms of theory of mind situates it within the
broader framework of cognitive behavior; he performs through the act of narration a universal
psychological function. In this way, Wander’s narrator demonstrates a mental similarity to other
fictional characters and to real life humans. Viewed in this light, the narrator as a semiautobiographical figure exhibits behavior characteristic both of human subjects in the real world
and of characters that populate a fictional text. Understanding the narrator as a practitioner of
theory of mind helps us to envision him as a combination of fact and fiction, as a narratorial
figure whose cognitive abilities model how readers might engage with fictional characters in
narratives about the Holocaust. In imagining the thoughts and feelings of characters and fellow
camp internees such as Tadeusz, Wander’s narrator provides an example of how to approach the
literary representation of a character that suffers. The narrator demonstrates empathetic concern
for Tadeusz while recognizing that witnessing the boy occurs at an epistemological remove. This
is not to say that identification with a fictional Holocaust victim is entirely foreclosed, but the
dynamics of reader identification might be tempered by the knowledge that the reader, much like
the narrator, perceives aspects of but cannot ever fully know what Tadeusz experiences while
suffering. In his description of how he attempts to interpret Tadeusz’ thoughts and feelings,
Wander’s narrator, I argue, invites the reader to approach the episode, and by extension the other
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traumatic events that take place in the text, with an understanding of the mediated nature of what
is represented. In this way, Der siebente Brunnen gestures toward the ethical implications of the
mechanics of literary identification for post-Holocaust readers.
Conclusion: Wander’s “Almost Lost Stories”
As we have seen in this chapter, Wander’s narrator employs narrative as a means for
memorializing individuals with whom he was personally acquainted and who did not survive to
provide their own testimony. To investigate the novel’s mechanics of memorialization, I have
analyzed the narrative configurations of Mendel Teichmann, Meir Bernstein, and Tadeusz Moll,
whose memory and stories survive, at least partially, due to the narrative intervention of
Wander’s narrator. The narrative strives to recuperate the memory of these individuals, to
salvage their “almost lost stories.” Though these “almost lost stories” succeed in preserving the
names of a handful of characters, the narrative’s depiction of them also reminds us of the
millions of Jews whose stories and testimony—and not to mention their lives—are
unrecoverable. Sketching out what she identifies as Wander’s “poetological concept,” Schneider
identifies a link between Wander’s narrativity and Jewish historiography. She argues, “Der
Rekurs auf die jüdische Erzähltradition erlaubt Wander, die Erfahrung des Exils und der
Konzentrations- und Vernichtungslager zu verarbeiten und sie auf die jüdische
Geschichtsschreibung zu beziehen” (334). The “Jewish narrative tradition” to which Schneider
refers appears, I have argued, in the form of Wander’s specific deployment of Yiddish language
and literary tropes. Wander explores in Der siebente Brunnen the possibilities—and
limitations—of narrative with respect to Holocaust memory and the practice of memorialization
with the help of narrative strategies drawn from Yiddish and Eastern European Jewish culture.
More specifically, Wander’s evocation of Yiddish serves as a reflection on the role that Yiddish
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literature might play in post-Holocaust German-Jewish writing.
To conclude my analysis of Der siebente Brunnen, I return to the narrator’s depiction of
Mendel Teichmann. After the conversation with Mendel that Wander’s narrator depicts in the
first chapter, the master storyteller appears or is mentioned frequently throughout the remaining
chapters. In the sixth chapter, “Karel,” the narrator evokes Chelm, an imaginary shtetl from
Eastern European Jewish folklore that often appears as a literary trope in Yiddish-language texts,
such as Isaac Bashevis Singer’s The Fools of Chelm and Their History and Aaron Zeitlin’s The
Wise Men of Chelm. Wander’s reference to Chelm35 provides another example of the novel’s
construction of a metaliterary bridge to Yiddish literature. While relating the story of the Jew
named Karel, the narrator depicts a nocturnal scene in the camp barracks. Interspersed among the
sounds of sleeping arises a chorus of lamenting voices: “Nachts hörte man verhaltene
Klagegesänge, Ächzen und Stöhnen in den Baracken” (65). As the men lie in their bunks at
night, voices emerge from the darkness, giving expression to mourning and suffering. During
one particular night, a kind of conversation forms as various voices, guided by Mendel, settle on
the topic of Chelm. The narrator provides a sketch of the exchange:
Denn die Welt ist schön, hörte ich Mendel Teichmann leise und mit zärtlicher Stimme
rezitieren, und der Tau netzt deine müden Augen, die nicht aufhören zu staunen über
deine Schönheit. O Morgenröte, lächle über unseren bösen Träumen ... Aber wenn ich
zurückkomme nach Chelm, lispelte im Fieber ein galizischer Jude, was soll ich sagen?
Wie werde ich dastehn, allein. Die Fenster werden nicht mehr leuchten, Schabbes, von
Lichtern und von den Augensternen der Kinder. Wenn ich zurückkomme nach Chelm ...

35

“Chelm” is also the name of a real life community in the Lublin district of Poland. Wander’s reference in this
chapter of the novel, however, is to the Chelm of Eastern European Jewish folklore.
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Niemand wird zurückkommen nach Chelm, sagte ein anderer galizischer Jude, weil
Chelm liegt nicht mehr auf dieser Welt. (66)36
Here, the voice of one Galician Jew transitions seamlessly to the next. Narrative perspective
appears to glide effortlessly from one character to the next, another instance of the novel’s
emphasis on multivocality. We also observe additional aspects of the “lost beautiful world” of
Eastern European Jewry that Mendel evokes with his storytelling in the first chapter. In this
passage, the shared nostalgia that the characters experience in “Wie man eine Geschichte
erzählt” when recalling a richly appointed Sabbath dinner table is replaced by a communal
longing for a mythic home of Chelm, the shtetl that they call by name and recognize as a group.
In Wander’s depiction, Chelm becomes a site of collective fantasy, a metonym that represents
their individual homes to which they will never again return. The evocation of Chelm in the
passage (and the meaning ascribed to it) is predicated upon the sort of dialogical interaction and
the intermingling of voices and minds that appear throughout the novel in various constellations:
from the narrator’s depiction of his conversation with Mendel and his explanation of how to tell
a story, to the multilingual representation of Meir’s Yiddish tale, to the mind reading that the
narrator employs for the purpose of attributing meaning to the dying Tadeusz. Wander’s narrator
is ultimately a dexterous figure that deploys a variety of rhetorical strategies that serve a single
goal: the preservation of and memorialization of the dead in the form of narrative. The narrator is
the “I” who downplays his own story in favor of recuperating, however temporarily, the “almost
36

In his otherwise excellent 2008 translation of Wander’s novel, Michael Hofmann mistakenly translates “Chelm”
as “Chelmno” (66), confusing the shtetl for the Nazi extermination camp. Given the context in which this name
appears—in this conversation among Jewish prisoners expressing yearning for a time and a place far away from
their current site of torture and imprisonment—a reference to “Chelmno” makes little sense. On the one hand, this
infelicity in the translation reveals a lacuna in the translator’s knowledge of Yiddish literary culture, but on the other
hand, it underscores the apparent linguistic overlap between the two names. It is bitterly ironic that the literary
Chelm, in contrast to Chelmno (the site of innumerable murders that contributed to the near-annihilation of Eastern
European Jewry and Yiddish culture), is routinely populated by “schlemihls and schlimazls,” who “[comically
misrepresent reality]” as they humorously bungle their way from one problem to the next (Pinsker 10). I am
indebted to Erin McGlothlin for bringing this wrinkle in Hofmann’s translation to my attention.
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lost stories” of others. He acts as audio recorder in his depiction of the speech of his perished
comrades, as empathetic interlocutor who seeks to find speech for his conversation partners even
after they are no longer able to speaker for themselves.
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Chapter Four:
An Elegy for Ashkenaz: Yiddish, Radio, and the Dialogic in Jurek Becker’s Jakob der Lügner
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Introduction
The information presented on the back cover of a 2008 biography on East German
novelist, screenwriter, and essayist Jurek Becker, penned by Olaf Kutzmutz and published in the
BasisBiographien series by the Suhrkamp publishing house, underscores both Becker’s traumatic
past and memory, and the lacunae in the latter, as primary epistemological tools for engaging his
literary output. This blurb, which appears in form of a quotation by Becker followed by a brief
interpretation by the biographer, is intended to distill some quintessential aspect of Becker’s life
story and literary career:
“Ich wurde am, in, als einziges. Mein Vater war, meine Mutter. Bei Kriegsausbruch kam
ich, wo ich bis zum. Nach Ende des blieb mein Vater mit mir, was ich bis heute nicht. Er
hätte doch auch. Jedenfalls ging ich zur und wurde ein halbwegs normales. Das änderte
sich, als ich den Beruf eines. Wenn ich auf mein bisheriges zurückblicke, dann muß ich
leider sagen.”
Lauter Leerstellen bestimmen das Leben Jurek Beckers. Sein Werk füllt diese Lücken mit
Weltliteratur—von Miniaturen auf Postkarten bis hin zu Jakob der Lügner.37
Here, the paratext underscores the significance of absence when considering Becker’s life and
work. In his introduction, Kutzmutz explains the source of the chosen quotation, “Diese
Leerstellenerfahrung verdichtet Becker auf einer seiner letzten Postkarten zur poetischen
Miniatur” (8). The “Leerstelle” is an absence that punctuates the written word—a site of
emptiness gesturing toward what is lost to oblivion. The “Leerstellen” or ellipses that this
paratext performs on the semantic level refer to the fragmented nature of the early years of
Becker’s childhood in Łódź, Poland, which was interrupted by Nazi violence. The author’s early

37

Olaf Kutzmutz, Jurek Becker, Suhrkamp BasisBiographie 32, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2008, back cover.
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years were characterized by traumatic loss—loss of home as a result of being imprisoned in the
Łódź ghetto, loss of his mother after subsequent deportation to the concentration camps—and the
“Leerstellen” associated with this loss. This blurb underscores how Becker’s identity, framed by
events associated with the Shoah, comes to the fore in the manner in which publishers and
editors present him as an author.
Jurek Becker’s life story, in particular his Jewish heritage and status as a child survivor of
the Holocaust, also serves many critics and scholars38 as a lynchpin in an interpretive framework
for analyzing the author’s life in general and, more specifically, his 1969 novel Jakob der
Lügner. Though perhaps over-determined, the paratextual blurb on the back cover of this
biography nevertheless highlights a decisive element: absence. While Kutzmutz’s biography
demonstrates “Leerstellen” or absence to be a key factor in the larger matrix of Becker’s life
story and oeuvre, it is particularly applicable in discussing his novel Jakob der Lügner. We
should think of the novel, I argue, as a dialogue about absence, signposted from the outset, both
thematically and structurally. Firstly, absence refers to the novel’s characters, who, with the
exception of the narrator, have all perished in the Holocaust by the time of narration. Secondly,
absence occurs in the realm of language. The multilingual complexities of Eastern European
Jewish life and culture are rendered in the novel in an almost entirely monolingual paradigm.
38

A cursory perusal of the secondary literature on Jurek Becker reveals the central role that the author’s
biography—particularly the Jewish aspects of his life story—plays in the analysis of texts penned by him. See
Jürgen Egyptien (“Die Riten des Erzählens und das Stigma der Identität”), Sidra DeKoven Erzahi (“After Such
Knowledge, What Laughter?”), Manfred Karnick (“Die Geschichte von Jakob und Jakobs Geschichten”), Sander
Gilman (Jurek Becker: A Life in Five Worlds), Grant Henley (“Confronting Kulturpolitik”), and David Rock (A Jew
Who Became A German?). Andrea Stoll, for example, opens her essay “Das Lebensthema Jurek Beckers” with the
statement, “Im Erzählwerk Jurek Beckers gibt es einen Schwerpunkt: das autobigraphisch erfahrene Trauma der
jüdischen Vernichtung durch die Nationalsozialisten” (332). Stoll argues that Becker’s narrators, including the
unnamed narrator in Jakob der Lügner, act as mediators or mouthpieces not primarily for their own stories, but for
stories about the Holocaust that in turn become entwined with and inseparable from their personal histories. This
entwining foregrounds the dialogical quality that underpins post-Holocaust literary texts such as Jakob der Lügner
and Der siebente Brunnen, in which a single narrator tells multiple strands of various stories belonging to an array of
characters who do not survive the Holocaust to tell their own stories in their own words. Narrators who depict
themselves bearing this responsibility negotiate monological discourse for the purpose of constructing (or gesturing
toward) a mode of storytelling that can assume the contours of dialogical or multi-voiced discourse.
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The narrator does not build into his narration any overt evidence of the rubbing together of
various languages (such as the kind of linguistic blending and interplay that we see for example
in Wander’s novel), particularly for the Jews under German occupation in the diegetic world. All
characters, including the Germans and the Jews, regardless of origin, are shown to speak the
same language. The novel relies instead upon a smattering of Yiddish vocabulary to gesture
toward the larger multilingual configurations of Eastern European Jewish life that remain
otherwise disnarrated. Absence speaks volumes, as it were. Becker’s text engages with absence
as a method for constructing an elegiac contemplation of the lost world of Ashkenaz.
The epistemological problems related to absence are linked intrinsically to the specific
place depicted in the novel. The setting of Jakob der Lügner is an unnamed ghetto under German
military occupation during the Second World War.39 Similar to Wander’s novel Der siebente
Brunnen discussed in the previous chapter, Jakob der Lügner features an unnamed narrator and
Holocaust survivor who narrates in the first person and relates the experiences of friends and
fellow prisoners in the ghetto who do not survive. In contrast to Wander’s narrator, however,
who situates himself principally within the diegetic world of the concentration camps even as he

39

Though the ghetto in the novel is never explicitly named, many readers assume a connection between the text’s
diegesis and Becker’s biography. Sidra Ezrahi explains, “The mise-en-scène has been identified by readers as the
Lodz ghetto, where Jurek Becker himself was incarcerated as a child. But like the other ghettos and camps in the
fictions under consideration [in this article], the ghetto is never named, and takes on a generic quality” (293). Sara
Horowitz maps Becker’s status as real-life survivor of the ghetto in Łódź onto the novel as a way of delineating the
ontological and epistemological divide between author and reader, who occupy the realm of the living, and the
fictional Jewish characters who, with the exception of the narrator, perish either in the ghetto or at some point
following deportation. She argues, “The novel ends with the ghetto’s liquidation. The narrator—sole survivor of
Jacob’s transport—learns what the author, a Lodz Ghetto survivor, and the reader have known all along: that
fabricated broadcasts prove no match for history. The confabulated narrative of hope that Jacob produced in the
ghetto masked but could not ultimately displace the narrative of destruction” (68). In contrast to the general trend of
which Ezrahi and Horowitz speak, Rachel Halverson asserts that Becker’s narrator relates “life in the Warsaw
Ghetto during World War II” (454). Halverson does not specifically substantiate this claim. The specific history of
the Warsaw ghetto, including the 1943 Warsaw Ghetto Uprising (an event without parallel or reference in the text),
cannot logically serve as a model for the story world of Jakob der Lügner. Among the ghettos in Poland, only the
Łódź ghetto was still in existence in 1944 by the time Russian forces reach the area of Bezanika, the place name
mentioned in conjunction with the advancing Red Army during the German radio broadcast that Jakob overhears in
the precinct.
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narrates from a position of after, Becker’s narrator, though also eyewitness to the (often horrific)
events that he relates, underscores the temporal and spatial boundary separating the diegesis of
the ghetto and the extradiegetic realm of postwar Germany. Becker’s narrator, while presenting
the reader with a number of characters, organizes his story around a particular individual, a
Polish Jew named Jakob Heym, who has perished as a victim of Nazi aggression by the time of
narration. Positioning himself as eyewitness to the events that he relates and as a personal
acquaintance of the subject of his narration, the narrator endeavors to mediate to a postHolocaust (East German) audience a two-fold story: one of Holocaust survival, i.e. his own, and
one of Holocaust destruction, i.e. the murder of a population of Jewish internees imprisoned
within the ghetto. Like the other characters that appear in the story world, Jakob does not survive
to tell his own story, to provide testimony regarding what he experienced. The narrator must
provide this otherwise lost testimony by proxy. Slipping metaleptically between diegesis and
extradiegesis in his mediation of the past in the present tense of the time of his narration,
Becker’s narrator constructs a dialogical exchange with the memory of those who have perished.
Throughout Jakob der Lügner, Becker’s narrator displays a preoccupation with narration,
particularly as it is related for him to the process of communicating with others. The narrator’s
desire to tell the story of Jakob and his radio, as it appears in the form of the narration of the
novel, is prompted by an anxiety involving the transmission of memory and the complexities of
conveying traumatic experience through the medium of language. The choice of language and
the manner in which it is deployed is paramount for the narrative project of Jakob der Lügner, a
text about the Holocaust written in German. I examine the language in which the narrator relates
his story and analyze specific episodes that reveal a fundamental linguistic tension in the novel.
The narration remains overwhelmingly monolingual, employing few gestures toward the
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polylinguality that existed historically among the Jewish inmates of Nazi-run ghettos. The Jews
imprisoned in the ghetto in Łódź, for example, communicated chiefly in an amalgamation of
Yiddish, Polish, and German—a reflection of the primary languages spoken in the Polish city
prior to German occupation and the construction of the Jewish ghetto (Rosen 2). Under Nazi
occupation, German became the language of power in which all official discourse took place.
Nevertheless, Polish Jews continued to speak their native Yiddish, Polish, or some combination
of the two, in addition to the German they were forced to speak with German authority figures.
Alan Rosen explains that “[i]n the ghettos of Eastern Europe, Jews continued to be enmeshed in
family and community life that, while subject to unprecedented deprivation and danger, still bore
resemblance to what had preceded it, as was true of languages as well” (4). What is missing is
the recognition on the part of the text that Jakob actively speaks and thinks in Yiddish or Polish
(or both). The names of other languages do not appear in the text; there are no extradiegetic
explanations provided by the narrator to indicate that the characters speak anything other than
German. The novel also does not gesture toward linguistic difference by explaining how
characters such a Jakob contend with having to speak German with figures of authority or
navigate a multilingual environment. While Jakob may have had some familiarity with German
prior to thew Nazi occupation, there is no explanation of how he acquired it. In this respect,
Becker’s novel is monolingual, or linguistically monotonal. And the absence of gestures toward
linguistic difference is striking: literary texts about the Holocaust often overtly thematize the
radical confrontation with language, specifically with the plurality of languages in the ghettos
and camps. To name but one example among many, one thinks of Primo Levi’s discussions of
language in his memoir Survival in Auschwitz, including his portrayal of his encounter with the
cacophony of languages in the concentration camp.
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However, the novel develops an alternative to directly depicting this kind of direct
linguistic confrontation. Becker’s narrator, I argue, makes use of German as a proxy for a larger
constellation of languages as they overlapped in a site like the ghetto depicted in the novel. And
it is not just any German, but an “impure” German. One of the clues for unpuzzling Becker’s
German as a language of experience in the Holocaust is his occasional use of Yiddish. The only
linguistic interruptions in an otherwise monolingual text appear in the form of a smattering of
Yiddish vocabulary. “Yiddish words and intonations,” David Roskies argues, “are all that
survive in a German echo chamber whose sole inhabitant is a young German-speaking Jew,
formerly from Lodz” (“Laughing off the Trauma of History” 70). I read Jakob der Lügner within
a theoretical framework informed by Yasemin Yildiz’s 2012 study on the monolingual condition,
which speaks, I argue, to German Jewish post-Holocaust texts such as Becker’s novel that tackle
critical questions regarding representation and language. I demonstrate how Becker’s narrator
constructs in the telling of his story about Jakob and his non-existent radio discursive strategies
for engaging the problem of employing specifically the German language to convey a narrative
about Jewish victimization and the virtual annihilation of Eastern European Jewry.
In conjunction with the deployment of German punctuated with Yiddish, Jakob der
Lügner emphasizes the narrator’s struggle over representation and communication in its
preoccupation with radio. Jakob Heym’s clandestine, yet non-existent, radio serves as both a
literary trope that operates to advance the plot and as a metaphor for the novel’s overarching
structuring principle. As a result of technological specificities, radio practice involves a constant
interplay or tension between monologue and dialogue. Radio is a medium that mimics or
reconstructs through the transmission and reception of electromagnetic pulses the patterns of
human communicative interactions: “On the radio, as in life, monologue and dialogue are the
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two primary modes of speech” (Barnard 180). Analogous to narrative, radio is monological in
the sense that an often authoritative, narratorial voice operates as mediator in the broadcasting of
information to the recipient. Human voices are transmitted over airwaves and the listener’s
relationship to the disembodied voices is predominantly one of passive reception.40 But radio,
similar to a narrator who creates (or re-creates) the voices of various characters or focalizes
them, can nevertheless approximate dialogical interaction, particularly when we consider how
the medium often entails not just a single announcer or speaker but a multiplicity of voices
engaged in conversation or theatrical performance. In its deployment of radio, Jakob der Lügner
mimics this tension between monologue and dialogue. In a critical scene in which the novel’s
protagonist performs a series of radio programs for the orphaned child Lina, the technological
boundaries of radio become malleable and weigh in favor of the dialogic, as Jakob provides his
audience of one with a fantasy of how radio can operate. Jakob blurs the lines between the
medium of radio and his own performative abilities as he engages with Lina in a conversation in
which he not only explains the features of radio to a novice but also allows her to make specific
requests as an audience member, eradicating the fourth wall separating the active performer and
the passive listener. A key Yiddish word also appears in this scene, establishing a link between
the fantasy of radio and the linguistic strategies at work in the rest of the novel. In offering Lina
and readers such a fantasy of radio as a dialogical interaction in which audience members can
actively engage in determining and producing radio content, the novel, I argue, articulates by
way of radio an elegy for the loss the true dialogical exchange. In depicting this scene with Jakob
and Lina, Becker’s narrator gestures toward an alternative version of technology and history in
40

Let us consider situations in which the radio listener appears to interact dialogically with the radio announcer,
such as during phone-in programs. Upon closer inspection, these ostensible formats for conversational interplay with
the medium of radio nonetheless retain the patterns of monologic discourse. Stephen Barnard explains, “Phone-in
programmes offer an opportunity for the public to converse with a presenter or guest over a chosen topic, but again
the conversation is weighted in favour [sic] of the presenter, who can cut a caller off at the touch of a button” (181).
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which dialogical reciprocity exists and the subjugated have the agency to alter the course of their
fate in the face of genocidal violence. But like the novel’s articulation of an alternative—yet
imaginary—ending, fantasy cannot undo history. In this manner, the radio also serves as voice
box, allowing the narrator an outlet to mourn the loss of characters like Jakob and Lina, who
ultimately perish either in the ghetto or following deportation in cattle cars.
In this chapter I examine the staging of language, particularly at moments in the text in
which linguistic difference is installed on the semantic level. In my discussion of Der Nazi und
der Friseur, I argue that the unreliable narrator Max Schulz constructs what I term monologic
dialogue, cloaked in the veneer of dialogical exchange with an interlocutor that nevertheless
remains contained firmly within the grip of his monologic control. Max’s ostensible
conversations with Itzig Finkelstein resemble a cat-and-mouse game in which the victim is
perpetually trapped under the perpetrator’s discursive control. In distinct contrast to Max Schulz,
Becker’s narrator, often in ways parallel to Wander’s narrator, struggles to find a way for the
experiences of others to come to the fore. While Becker’s narrator appears cognizant that his
perished friends and fellow ghetto internees can neither speak for themselves nor tell their stories
in their own words (or voices), he nevertheless endeavors to find a narrative structure that can
speak with multiple voices at once: his own and those of the characters whom he portrays. As a
first-person narrator, he shapes monologue. But as someone eager to represent the words of dead
comrades and thus also the memory of them, Becker’s narrator seems to yearn for the
conversational interplay between two discrete subjectivities. He seeks a form and structure in his
narration that can approximate a dialogic monologue, or a blending of voices and perspectives.
Echoing the complex interplay between monologue and dialogue in the medium of radio,
Becker’s narrator develops narratorial strategies that gesture toward the generosity often implied
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in the dialogic, with respect to both the subjects of his narration and his audience. Similar to the
mutually respectful kinship that Martin Buber envisions within the relationship between his
concepts of “I” and “Thou” (Ich und Du), Becker’s narrator is eager to develop with the narrative
tools at his disposal a double-voiced practice of narration, something along the lines of an
interview between two parties broadcast over the radio—two independent, yet mutually
cooperative, voices channeled to the interlocutor from a single source. By investigating how
voices communicate with one another in the text and the language in which this communication
occurs, I demonstrate how Becker’s novel probes the tension between fact and fiction, between
the necessity of acknowledging history and the desire to re-write it or at least append it. Jakob
der Lügner contends with the real horrors of the Nazi Judeocide, while simultaneously imagining
alternatives—no matter how fictive and illusory—to the murder of the Jews in the ghetto, and by
extension, the almost total annihilation of Eastern European Jewry. The product of this tension
between recognizing the past and a desire to alter aspects of it is an act of mourning, an elegy for
Ashkenaz.
Yiddish as Fremdwort and Metonymy
The preoccupation with finding the appropriate words—the “right” language—for
representing violence and historical trauma is foregrounded in the opening pages of the novel.
Becker’s narrator, through a series of metalepses between diegesis and extradiegesis, oscillates
between the time of the narrated events and the time of narration. From one paragraph to the
next, the narrator situates himself within the walls of the ghetto and then outside them. Grant
Henley gestures toward the text’s concern regarding the act of narration: “On several occasions
in the text and often through means of an open narrative excursus that addresses the reader,
Becker’s primary narrator comments on the nature of the story itself and on his source, Jakob
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Heym, the hero protagonist” (26). Henley highlights the discursiveness of Becker’s narrator,
whose digressions (“excursus”) in his one-sided conversation with his audience function as a
vehicle for staging his anxiety regarding his function as narrator. Becker’s narrator, I argue,
performs this anxiety as a rhetorical strategy that both underscores his personal relationship with
respect to the story’s subject matter and foregrounds the novel’s overall dialogical quality. At the
outset, the narrator demonstrates a yearning for dialogue, both with receptive interlocutors and,
more poignantly, with the subjects of his narration—his perished companions, such as Jakob
Heym, who do not survive the Holocaust. Upon establishing his position as an eyewitness and
fellow prisoner who was also imprisoned in the ghetto and subject to Nazi abuse and violence
(“Ihr seid Juden, ihr seid weniger als ein Dreck” [Becker 9]), the narrator remarks that his
attempts at narrating the story in the postwar period have often been undermined. He mournfully
explains, “Ich habe schon tausendmal versucht, diese verfluchte Geschichte loszuwerden, immer
vergebens. Entweder es waren nicht die richtigen Leute, denen ich erzählen wollte, oder ich habe
irgendwelche Fehler gemacht. Ich habe vieles durcheinandergebracht [...]” (9). Here, the narrator
claims that his difficulties with narration are rooted in both language and audience: in the act of
narration itself and in locating receptive interlocutors (two not entirely unrelated problems). For
Becker’s narrator, the act of relating the story he wishes to tell involves searching for a kind of
narrative logic or form that can approximate or provide linguistic contours to traumatic
experience that appears, as he describes it, to resist transmission—at least in the form of
conversation at a bar. With a subtle metaleptic shift, the narrator reflects on past difficulties
finding people willing to listen and respond to him in an ethical, emphatic fashion, while in the
act of addressing an alternative recipient, i.e. the reader. There is hope that we as readers might
become the narrator’s ideal audience, as he engages in a fictive dialogue (or dialogic monologue)
171

with us, rather than with those who in the past have proven incapable of receiving his story. But
we are also implicitly problematized as potentially disappointing narratees.
But the narrator’s concern with representation hinges not only on what to say and when
to say it, but also on the choice of linguistic form. The narrator searches for a language that will
be accessible to his audience. The mistakes (“Fehler”) to which Becker’s narrator refers may
have something to do with the transfer and translation of memories from one historical and
linguistic context to another. Though the narrator’s linguistic background is never made explicit
in the text, we infer that he is a fluent speaker of German. David Rock identifies Becker’s
narrator as a German-speaking European Jew who strives to communicate with a non-Jewish
German audience. He argues that “in the person of the narrator and the other Jewish figures in
Jakob der Lügner, Becker articulates the speaking Jew for his German readers through its
narrative tone and language and through the oral narrative form of the novel,41 through repeated
interaction between the narrator and his assumed listeners which partially reconstructs the
discourse of the East European Jew” (70). Rock’s argument here underscores the role of the
narrator as mediator between a postwar German audience and a story that thematizes Jewish
victims of the Nazi Judeocide.42 The East European Jewish discourse to which Rock refers is
multilingual, for “European Jews have had a long history of multilingualism” (Rosen 2). The
narrator translates this discourse so that it takes on the veneer of monolingual discourse—in this
41

It is not clear what Rock means here by “oral narrative form of the novel.” Perhaps he references the kind of
folksy storytelling that often appears as a sophisticated narrative device in modern Yiddish literary texts, such as in
tales written by Abramovitsh and Sholem Aleichem. At any rate, Becker’s narrator has readers, not listeners. There
is no evidence that he is speaking this story at the time of narration, even though he seems to have done so in the
past.
42
In discussing Becker’s novel within a constellation of other post-Holocaust texts that “resurrect a cultural Jewish
attitude,” Ezrahi argues that “[w]riting a ‘Yiddish’ story in post-war East Germany is, as David Roskies claimed,
like writing in an echo chamber” (294-5). She highlights the complex role that readerships in particular cultural and
political contexts play in the configuration and reception of works such as Jakob der Lügner. Becker’s novel, written
in German (at least initially) for a German-speaking audience, has often been called upon by critics and scholars to
communicate the multitudinous voices of pre-war European Jewish discourse interrupted and displaced by Nazi
censorship and violence.
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case a German-language discourse aimed at a non-Jewish German audience. Sander Gilman
discusses Becker’s narrator in multilingual and transcultural terms, asserting that the narrator
speaks German with an identifiable Eastern European Jewish inflection. He contends that the
narrator’s language has a “pseudo-Yiddish tone” that does not entail “mauscheln” per se but
rather “the intonation of the Yiddish speaker” (“Jewish Writers and German Letters” 132).
Though Gilman does not specifically demonstrate what constitutes the narrator’s “pseudoYiddish tone” (he offers, for example, no close reading of a passage from Jakob der Lügner to
illustrate his observation), his argument provides a point of departure for considering the text’s
particular deployment of the German language.
Both Gilman and Rock understand the narrator’s deployment of German as a linguistic
mode that bears traits associated with central and East European Jewish language and oral
culture. But I wish to push their arguments further on this point. The German that Becker’s
narrator employs for narrating the text and in turn places into the mouths of his characters
represents a deviation of sorts from the monolingual norm. Though the text is written almost
entirely in German, the narration evinces moments of linguistic tension and rupture. Taking
Yildiz’s argument here as a point of departure, I propose that we interpret Becker’s novel as a
German-language text “in which German ceases to be a unified language with impermeable
boundaries” (57). Furthermore, the narrator is self-reflexively aware, I aver, of this internal
tension or lack of cohesion and gestures toward it as a piece of the puzzle in his overall struggle
regarding representing the past and memorializing his perished comrades.
We see evidence of this linguistic dynamic in the narrator’s past attempts to engage an
audience and free himself of the burden of telling this story (“diese Geschichte loszuwerden”).
He makes reference to German interlocutors who listen to his story only in anticipation of the
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moment when they can interject to provide proof (“beweisen” [25]) of their lack of guilt. The
implication here is that the narrator’s audience often consists of Germans seeking to absolve their
guilty conscience in an act of projection onto a Jewish Holocaust survivor in the midst of telling
his (and others’) story of suffering and victimization. Becker’s narrator subtly relates previous
interlocutors’ insistence on their blameless involvement in World War II, making claims such as,
“Aber als der Krieg zu Ende war, war ich gerade erst …” 25). Here, the ellipsis functions not
only to signify absence, i.e. the words that the narrator chooses not to provide, but also to gesture
toward an excess of presence, i.e. the many excuses and deferrals of guilt to which the narrator
has been submitted on any number of previous occasions when he attempted to relate the story
he now tells.
This moment in the text constitutes, I contend, a rupture in the communicative model
between speaker and listener, implying a pattern of tension and lack of resolution that the
narrator has experienced during previous endeavors in which he sought dialogue with an
audience. This tension, which appears to have its source in an aborted conversation between the
Jewish Holocaust survivor-narrator living in postwar Germany and the non-Jewish German
reader with an unspecified wartime affiliation, is closely associated with a related linguistic
tension that underpins the entire novel. Becker’s narrator channels the German language in
specific ways that echo pre-war and pre-Holocaust debates and questions regarding the status of
Jews as speakers of German. In his particular employment of the German language, the narrator
gestures, I contend, toward the historical anxiety of Jewish Germans and Austrians regarding
linguistic dispossession and dislocation (Yildiz 36-43). If we concur with Gilman’s and Rock’s
assertions that Becker’s narrator communicates in a discourse identifiable as possessing a Jewish
particularity, then we must also take into account not only the multilingual aspects of European
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Jewish culture but also the intricate history of European Jews engaging in German and AustroHungarian languages, cultures, and politics (Yildiz 36-43). I argue that the narrator makes use of
this linguistic tension—or constellation of tensions and dislocations—as a rhetorical strategy, so
that “what looks like a monolingual text may, in fact, suggest the contours of a multilingual
paradigm” (35). I identify here a parallel between the use of German we encounter in Jakob der
Lügner and the “uncanny” quality characteristic of Kafka’s writing practice, which, as Yildiz
demonstrates, interrogates the “boundaries, coherence, and identity” of the German language
“from within” (Yildiz 56-7). Though the text is monolingual in that it is written almost
exclusively in German and in its overall lack of gestures toward linguistic difference among the
Jews in the ghetto, it nevertheless contains moments in which the German language is unsettled.
We observe the tension and signs of dislocation within the German language not only in
the narrator’s extradiegetic reflections on previous attempts at engaging an audience and telling
his story, but also in the first description he offers of his protagonist, Jakob Heym. As Jakob
rushes through the streets of the ghetto at twilight to return home, he encounters a German guard
who insists, perhaps jokingly, that he has been caught in violation of curfew. The guard sends
Jakob to the nearby precinct (“Revier”) with orders to request from the German officials
stationed there a suitable punishment (“eine gerechte Bestrafung”). As Jakob walks toward the
precinct and is illuminated by a spotlight, the guard interrupts his journey and demands that the
prisoner state for a second time the nature of his errand (11-12). The soldier appears to tease
Jakob, treating him as if he were a child who must be reminded to complete a chore. The narrator
emphasizes Jakob’s struggle to maintain the appearance of calm in what must be a terrifying
moment and to access the vocal and linguistic qualities critical for a Jew speaking with German
authorities:
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Er schreit nicht, nur unbeherrschte oder respektlose Menschen schreien, er sagt es aber
auch nicht zu leise, damit ihn der Mann in dem Licht deutlich über die Entfernung hin
verstehen kann, er gibt sich die Mühe, genau den richtigen Ton zu treffen. Man muß
merken, daß er weiß, worum er bitten soll, man muß ihn nur fragen. (12)
Here, Jakob strives to telegraph to his German interlocutor rational, cool-headed behavior in
response to threatening interrogatives. As though attempting to communicate in an ostensibly
foreign language and not being entirely certain about stress and intonation, Jakob speaks in this
scene after careful deliberation. Fully aware that his life potentially hangs in the balance when
interacting with these guards, he is anxious to demonstrate his full assimilation into the Germanrun system of the ghetto. This striving for assimilation is coded here in terms of language. Jakob
must speak “their” language—the language of subjugation. But the reader also notes that the
narrator makes no explicit reference to the specific shifts between languages that Jakob might
need to make for the purpose of communicating with the occupying forces. The text does not
register any possible feelings of terror on Jakob’s part in being forced to speak German. This
lack of anxiety about speaking German, specifically with a German guard in a moment of
extreme danger, is striking. One imagines that even a Polish Jew with a high level of familiarity
or facility with German would experience some kind of trepidation regarding specifically the
language itself, particularly when being forced to speak with a figure of authority. Instead, the
image of Jakob the reader encounters is something more like an actor playing a part for an
audience whose members he must convince. In this case, Jakob’s relationship to the German
language appears to revolve around performance or the manner in which he responds to the
guard, rather than around linguistic alterity. According to the description, we might well read
Jakob’s effort to achieve the correct “tone” as a psychological issue, born out of anxiety, rather
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than a linguistic one. In this scene, the narrator does not specifically elude to any difficulties that
Jakob might have in speaking German in a particular way because it might constitute a foreign or
non-native tongue for the Polish Jew. Nevertheless, as the depiction of his journey into the
precinct progresses, the emphasis on Jakob and language persists.
The precinct is a notoriously perilous site in the ghetto, which no Jewish entrant ever
survives to describe (11). The escalating dramatic tension of the scene as Jakob makes his way
from the street outside into the precinct overlaps with anxiety regarding language, made evident
when he must speak with the guard commander on duty inside the precinct. When the
commander, interrupted while taking a nap, cordially inquires as to the reason for the unexpected
visit, Jakob again evinces, in the narrator’s depiction of him, difficulty in finding the proper
mode in which to communicate. After he hesitates too long, the commander inquires again.
Because the scene is focalized through Jakob rather than through the commander, the reader is
privy to both the conversation and Jakob’s thoughts as he scrambles to utter an acceptable
response:
Jakob rechnet zu lange, der Wachhabende wird ungeduldig, das ist nicht klug, auf seiner
Stirn bilden sich Falten. “Redest du nicht mit Deutschen?” Selbstverständlich redet Jakob
mit Deutschen, wie wird er nicht mit Deutschen reden, dieser Eindruck soll um Himmels
willen nicht aufkommen, wir sind doch alle vernünftige Menschen, da kann man doch
miteinander reden. (18-19)
Here, the protagonist struggles to speak with the commander according to the discursive
expectations of the ghetto. Because the scene is related by way of Jakob’s perspective, the
questions regarding language take on particular valence. The commander’s question, “Redest du
nicht mit Deutschen?” bears a double meaning and telegraphs the insidious threat of violence.
177

The subtext of the guard’s question is a derisive, mocking inquiry, posed to find out whether
Jakob, as a “lowly” Jewish prisoner, “deigns” to communicate with Germans. Anything other
than a humble answer in the affirmative or the equivalent from Jakob might pique the
commander’s ire and serve as justification for immediate and harsh punishment.
But the commander’s question also bears another meaning. He seeks to assess Jakob’s
linguistic skills in an attempt to discover whether the disenfranchised Jew speaks the language
well enough to converse with the occupying forces and can adhere to the logic of the power
dynamic enforced under German rule. It is as if the commander poses two questions at once,
“Redest du nicht mit Deutschen?” and “Redest du nicht Deutsch?,” but utters only the former,
even though the latter would be more logical, given the circumstances. Jakob responds in time to
appease his interlocutor with a well-formulated statement (“Die Antwort [...] klingt gehorsam,
hinreißend ehrlich” 19), and he even procures the officer’s misplaced cigarette lighter from its
hiding place under the office couch—an additional gesture of deference, servility and
acquiescence intended to pacify the menacing authority figure. The commander spares Jakob’s
life and sends him home without further ado. In this scene, Jakob demonstrates to both the
commander and the reader that he has become attuned to the linguistic codes necessary for
navigating the vicissitudes of Nazi rule and the absurd logic of the prohibitions in place in the
ghetto. But the commander’s inquiry regarding Jakob’s linguistic competence displaces the
question of language onto the speakers of that language.
Nevertheless, the commander’s direct inquiry regarding Jakob’s ability or willingness to
speak with the German occupiers opens up the question of Jakob’s language faculties. The
narrator positions the commander’s interrogative “Redest du nicht mit Deutschen?” in such a
way that we wonder what languages Jakob speaks and how he has gotten to the point that he can
178

perform the role of the obedient prisoner in the German language. Because we are privy to
Jakob’s thoughts and emotions during the sequence in the precinct, the reader also encounters his
recollection of the building when it served a different purpose in the days prior to Nazi
occupation. As a resident of the city prior to the creation of the ghetto, Jakob has already seen the
inside of this municipal building. Sidra Ezrahi explains that, while the ghetto depicted in the
novel “takes on a generic quality,” we nevertheless comprehend “that it is the former hometown
of the Jews who have become its inmates. The ‘baseline,’ therefore, is the space where life was
conducted: a community of barbers and pancake-makers, of trees and tax collectors” (293).
Jakob’s normal life and the architectural space that once constituted it, therefore, still exists in
his and his many of his compatriots’ memories. The city, once fulfilling the definition of home,
has become the opposite: a prison, a site of torture and death. Ezrahi explains further, “Every
place, every edict, is a measure of deviation from that norm, from that place where Jakob Heym
is truly at home” (293). The ghetto reverses the logic of home; its rules and restrictions deny the
possibility of sustaining life and guaranteeing the hope for futurity.
The linguistic delicacy and tact that Jakob demonstrates in his interactions with the
German soldiers does not, however, shift when, immediately after he enters the precinct, he
recounts a memory of entering the same door in an entirely different context. Before the Nazis
had converted the building into the central administration office for the ghetto, it had been the
tax office in Łódź. Jakob remembers how the building’s fixtures used to be arranged and how the
Polish bureaucrats engaged with the local citizenry:
Er war schon oft hier, früher hat gleich links neben der Tür ein kleiner Tisch gestanden,
dahinter hat ein kleiner Beamter gesessen, seit Jakob sich erinnern kann, immer Herr
Kominek, und hat alle eintretenden Besucher gefragt: “Womit können wir dienen?” –“Ich
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möchte meine Steuern für das Halbjahr bezahlen, Herr Kominek,” hat Jakob gesagt. Aber
Kominek hat so getan, als ob er Jakob noch nie gesehen hätte, obwohl er von Oktober bis
Ende April fast jede Woche in Jakobs Diele gewesen ist und dort Kartoffelpuffer
gegessen hat. (12)
Here, we encounter an element of the uncanny in the manner in which Becker’s narrator relates
this scene. What at first appears to be an analogy constructed between Jakob’s experience at the
tax office and his experience interacting with Nazi soldiers—the alienation and anxiety he
experiences in both contexts ostensibly links the two moments together—becomes complicated
when we consider the question of language. The entire reminiscence occurs in German, even
though Jakob’s memories must logically have been in Yiddish or some combination of Yiddish
and Polish. The fact that Jakob is shown to think in German is congruous with the linguistic logic
that the novel employs. The German language presumably serves as the artificial interface for the
Yiddish and/or Polish in which he thinks and other Polish Jewish characters likely speak and
think in the novel. What is striking in this scene is that Jakob exhibits no difficulty speaking
German flawlessly with the Nazis. After all, Jakob is a Polish Jew, not a German Jew or an
Eastern European Jew with an educational background that would substantiate the level of
German proficiency that Jakob appears to have obtained. What complicates the issue of language
further still is the apparent lack of linguistic distinction between the exterior world of the ghetto,
with the enforcement of German from the outside, and the inside of Jakob’s mind. While he
appears to speak German well enough to satisfy the Nazis in charge, his private thoughts would
likely take place in the language (or languages) in which he feels most comfortable. Becker’s
text remains monotonal with respect to the multilingual reality of Łódź’s Jewish population.
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Though the commander’s question is positioned in such a way that we ponder the humble
Polish Jewish shopkeeper’s linguistic background, the narrator offers no explicit clues regarding
the mental gymnastics that would be necessary for code-switching between the language of the
occupying force, nor does he gesture toward the historical reality regarding how Polish Jews
dealt with the issue of language while under German military occupation. While we are privy to
Jakob’s reflections on the previous history of the precinct building as the tax office during the
previous (i.e. pre-ghetto) period of interwar Poland, we receive no explicit information here
regarding the role discrete languages most likely play in Jakob’s thought process. An explanation
of Jakob’s ability to speak or think in Yiddish and Polish is absent from this sequence of events.
On the surface at least, the narrator renders this overlapping of two separate temporalities
mapped onto the site of the precinct building in monolingual discourse. The point bears
repeating. When encountering this richly layered scene, one could imagine a scenario in which
the narrator comments, even in German, on Jakob’s negotiation of the linguistic slippage
between past and present—between, on the one hand, his former life conducted in Polish and
Yiddish, and on the other, his current subjugation under Nazi rule and the enforced usage of the
language of the hostile enemy. But instead of calling direct attention to the language politics at
play by way of an overt description of the protagonist’s linguistic abilities, Becker’s narrator
gestures toward this issue by way of implication. The German commander’s question to Jakob
regarding his capacity for communicating with Germans signals linguistic tension. The issue of
linguistic difference—with Jakob’s ostensible need for contending with the German language—
is displaced onto a more general question of communication: “Redest du nicht mit Deutschen?”
This subtle gesture invites us to pose our own questions about Jakob’s relationship to language,
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and we are left to undertake the interpretive work of untangling the linguistic labyrinth that his
journey to the precinct should evoke, but in fact does not.
Following this initial sequence, which provides the catalyst for the action of the novel
and Jakob’s decision to start the rumor regarding the radio, the text provides signals that imply
the particularities of language among the Jewish prisoners in the ghetto. The linguistic tension
and dislocation that surround the depiction of Jakob and his deployment of German with the
Nazi officials take on greater contours when the narrator deploys a series of Yiddish words in the
text during a scene that follows the depiction of Jakob’s anxiety-ridden journey into the precinct.
This vocabulary is implemented in conjunction with a character’s intense emotional reaction to
the news regarding the protagonist’s radio. When Jakob confides in his fellow prisoner Mischa
and tells him the news that he in fact overheard being transmitted over the radio in the precinct
office (rather than from a secret radio that he claims to possess), the narrator inserts Yiddish
vocabulary into his description of Mischa’s response to the news: “Sie sitzen noch ein bißchen,
Mischa lächelt glücklich mit seinen Augen wie ein Goj, so hat ihn Jakob zugerichtet” (32). Here,
Yiddish is employed to underscore the intensity of Mischa’s positive emotional response to the
potentially uplifting news that the Russians might be approaching. Mischa’s emotional response
is portrayed in his physical response, as his eyes appear to laugh with mirth and hope. The
crucial initial response that Jakob witnesses upon presenting a fellow prisoner with potentially
life-affirming news is presented in a combination of German and Yiddish. In addition to this
word, we also encounter two other words that remind us that the conversation between Jakob and
Mischa takes place between two Eastern European Jews who share a common cultural and
linguistic context. Becker’s narrator provides details from Mischa’s background, and we learn
that prior to being imprisoned in the ghetto, Mischa had been a mildly successful athlete as a
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“Hakoah” (Jewish sports club) boxer (28). This detail serves to explain why Mischa possesses, at
least for the time being, more strength and endurance while hauling the heavy burdens in the
arduous work details assigned to the prisoners than the relatively physically weaker and clumsier
Jakob.
The narrator also mentions that Jakob talks endlessly about food, as he attempts to keep
Mischa wrapped up in conversation while they labor. In describing how Jakob prattles away, the
narrator underscores the privation of the ghetto by listing typical Central and East European food
to which the Jewish prisoners no longer have access: “eingelegte Heringe [...] gebratene Gänse
[…] Millionen Töpfe voll Tscholent” (29). By mentioning cholent, the narrator refers to a typical
Ashkenazic dish consumed as the primary Sabbath meal, thus further situating Jakob’s
loquaciousness within the context of East European Jewish culture. Cholent, a staple recipe of
Jewish kitchens throughout Galicia and the Pale of Settlement, serves to evoke nostalgia,
echoing yearning for Eastern European Jewish cultural life that has been interrupted by the
German occupiers and the system of the ghetto. Jakob’s reference to the dish (and his overall
tendency to talk about food) also underscores the fact that the prisoners in the ghetto are all
starving. In the novel, Ashkenaz has a rich past, a quickly eroding present, and no future.
The Yiddish words “Hakoah,” “Tscholent,” and “Goi” serve as components of a code for
Jewish speech that is otherwise primarily rendered in German. They represent Jewish concepts
for which there is no good equivalent in the German language and serve as passwords or
shibboleths that signal linguistic alterity. These Yiddish and Hebrew-derived words, along with a
handful of other examples of Yiddish vocabulary scattered throughout the novel,43 play a
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Rock provides an overview of the Yiddish vocabulary that appears in Jakob der Lügner. He argues that Becker’s
use of words such as “Chassene,” “Schabess,” “Moissi,” “Jontefarbeit,” “Zoress,” etc. serves to “give us a miniature
cross-section of East European culture” (70). He also argues that Becker folds “some of the rules of colloquial
Yiddish [in]to High German” (70), but his assertion remains a generalization. He offers no sentence-level analysis of
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decisive role in deciphering the text’s relationship to and portrayal of language. Becker’s
strategies for deploying language, specifically the German language, can be understood more
fully, I contend, when we consider the signals of linguistic variation provided by the words of
foreign—particularly Jewish—extraction. Yiddish vocabulary words operate as Fremdwörter, or
foreign words, that are contained within the grammar and syntax of German. Thomas Jung
describes how these words can operate as an interruptive force, compelling the average German
reader to seek out additional reference material for explanation. He explains, “Diese Worte sind
in der deutschen Alltagssprache zwar nicht unbekannt, aber dem Durchschnittsleser in ihrer
eigentlichen Bedeutung nicht präsent und mögen diesen veranlassen, den Lesefluß zu
unterbrechen und sich in Fremd-Wörterbüchern zu erkundigen” (109). Here, Jung underscores
the potential power that Fremdwörter such as the Yiddish and Hebrew vocabulary in the text
have in destabilizing the reading experience. These words interrupt the process of reading,
however temporarily, and invite an active engagement with the subject matter, as they contrast
sharply with the otherwise monolinguistic flow of the text. Decoding the “foreign” Jewish words
that exist side-by-side in the text next to “native” German words encourages, I argue, an exercise
in epistemology; tensions and ruptures within the text act as metaphors for the historical and
political tensions depicted in the novel.
But let us return for a moment to the Yiddish word itself. “Goi,” as it appears in Becker’s
narrative, or “goy” as it is commonly rendered in English, is usually translated as “Gentile” or

a passage from the novel to substantiate his claim that Becker weaves Yiddish-specific syntax into his Germanlanguage text in addition to Yiddish vocabulary. While he may be correct in this regard, the lack of detail and depth
in this aspect of his interpretation is in keeping with a larger trend that I have noticed in scholarship by Germanists
who seek to examine the usage of Yiddish in German Jewish post-Holocaust writing. This scholarship seems for the
most part unfamiliar with the specificities of Yiddish language and literary history. If anything, less-thansophisticated analyses of this sort do justice neither to the literary skills and linguistic and cultural sensitivity of the
German-language authors in question nor to Yiddish as a language and literature.
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“non-Jew.”44 The narrator seems to use the term ironically, for it is employed to describe Mischa,
a fellow Jewish prisoner. Mischa’s eyes appear “non-Jewish,” because his face reflects a positive
psychological state—one that is systematically denied the ghetto inhabitants by the Nazis and
their strict system of rules and regulations and the daily threat of violence, deportation, and
death. Sandwiched into a sentence that is otherwise entirely in German, the Yiddish term evokes
the linguistic, social, cultural, and political divide between Jewish prisoners such as Jakob and
Mischa and their German captors. It also performs a metonymical function, standing in for the
larger linguistic particularities that would be at work in a scene such as the one in which Jakob
speaks with a fellow Jew, rather than with a German guard. It replaces what might otherwise be a
depiction or overt reference to Jakob’s need to translate literally from German into Polish or
Yiddish the news about the advancing Russian troops that he overheard in the precinct by way of
a German news report broadcast over the radio. Instead, the Yiddish word strategically indicates
the act of translation in a text that is otherwise primarily monolinguistic. The act of translation is
also displaced onto the mutation of Jakob’s real source for the information he shares with Mischa
into the prevarication about the imaginary radio.
In a 1984 interview that Rock references, Jurek Becker explains that he “had written the
novel in a quite specific language which he had virtually constructed for himself and could not
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Another layer of irony comes to the fore when we observe that the term “goy,” in addition to referring to an
individual person who is not Jewish, can also mean “nation” or “people” and is used at various points in Biblical
Hebrew to describe both Jews (Israelites) and non-Jews alike. Philip Birnbaum explains, “The Torah speaks of Israel
as goy kadosh (Exodus 19:6), a nation destined to be holy. The plural, goyim, is employed in the Bible to signify
thenations of the world. In the course of time, the singular ( )גויwas used interchangeably with ( נכריnokhri) . . . to
designate a non-Jew” (464). Seen in this light, the term possesses a certain amount of ambiguity. Mischa’s eyes
could very well appear both “non-Jewish” and “Jewish” at the same time. In Yiddish, the term is used almost
exclusively to denote a non-Jewish person, and that is the meaning the word carries in this context, but the historical
flexibility of the word opens up interpretive possibilities and hints at parallel linguistic slippages within the German
language. In this respect, the word “Goi” is polysemantic, reflecting linguistic tension within itself as a
Hebrew/Yiddish word and also as it is situated within the German-language text. When we take the larger semantic
field of the Yiddish word into consideration, it emerges as a signal for both the permeability and the possibility
inherent in language in general, and in the German language in this specific context.
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repeat” (70). Given this self-evaluation of the writing process, we ask ourselves how this specific
language operates and how we might identify its features. Sander Gilman contends that the
linguistic landscape of Becker’s novel has a clear historical antecedent. I quote his argument here
at length as he makes a series of rhetorical moves, the analysis of which helps us understand
Becker’s use of language. He asserts,
Jurek’s novel is a continuation of an East German literary tradition that deals with the
fascist past, but in a new and extraordinary way. His book is in a German tradition but is
read as a “Jewish” novel about the East. In Fiddler on the Roof, the English libretto
represented the language of Eastern European Jews. They are all supposedly speaking
Yiddish, even Tevye’s Russified future son-in-law, when they are actually speaking
English. But what language is imagined in the unnamed ghetto described in Jacob the
Liar? The German soldiers speak German, but so do the Orthodox Herschel Schtamm,
the Polonized Dr. Kirschbaum, and the totally assimilated German Jew, Leonard
Schmidt. Indeed, so does Jacob, the owner of a small restaurant with his Polish and
Yiddish-speaking clients, who can also understand the formal German of the radio
without hesitation. What is the common denominator that “German” here represents? It is
the Lagersprache, making a sudden reappearance. The bits and pieces of German
overlying the fragments of all of those languages spoken in the ghettos and the camps
was the lingua franca that was necessary to survive. This is the key to understanding the
novel as a novel of the Shoah. The fragments of Yiddish are not window dressing but part
of a patois that made it possible to understand and simultaneously misunderstand all the
languages in the ghetto. (Jurek Becker 76-77)
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Here, Gilman underscores an autobiographical connection between the specific use of German in
the novel and the author’s complex personal relationship to both language and memory. And
while his argument here opens up an insightful line of inquiry into Becker’s use of language, it
needs unpacking. His analogy between Fiddler on the Roof and Becker’s novel pays compliment
to Becker and situates Jakob der Lügner within the greater context of Jewish literary history. But
his comparison does not entirely do justice to Sholem Aleichem, the author of the Tevye stories
on which Fiddler on the Roof was based. The analogy here obscures to some degree both the rich
history of modern Yiddish literature and Sholem Aleichem’s considerable role in the articulation
of it. The tales of Tevye the Dairyman enjoyed massive popularity in the original Yiddish in both
Europe and the United States (Roskies, “Introduction” 1). Additionally, Fiddler on the Roof,
originally produced in 1964 before being made into a film in 1971, was the result of a particular
level of fame and familiarity that Sholem Aleichem and his stories had attained in the Englishspeaking world (Dauber 340-370).45 The English deployed in the musical stands in specifically
for the original Yiddish of the Tevye stories. The musical’s libretto translates and adapts the
sophisticated literary idiom in which Sholem Aleichem writes. Sholem Aleichem’s development
of a complex, polyvalent brand of Yiddish, which often incorporated “trilingual wordplay”
(Roskies, “Introduction” 1), cannot be accurately characterized as a “patois.”
Gilman’s comparison compels us to consider carefully the specific historical and
linguistic context that provides the backdrop for Becker’s novel. Firstly, the language of Jakob
der Lügner is not the result of a translation from one literary text to the next. Secondly, Becker’s
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Jeremy Dauber discusses the translation and publication history of Sholem Aleichem’s writings for an American
audience. He sketches an overview of the process whereby individual texts by the Yiddish author often reached a
wide English-speaking audience in the context of anthologies, on account of theatrical adaptations, and as a result of
a 1943 biography by Maurice Samuel entitled The World of Sholom Aleichem [sic] (306-353). He explains the
author’s enduring appeal by asking, “What was valuable about Sholem Aleichem’s stories, particularly for nonJewish readers [in the United States]? They showed non-Jews what real Jews were like. And what made an authentic
Jew? Tradition” (326).
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German does not recreate the Lagersprache used by Jews incarcerated in Nazi-run concentration
camps; instead, it gestures toward the very different configuration of languages spoken in a
ghetto in Poland. Gilman appears to assume that Lagersprache, the rough, bastardized language
spoken by people in the concentration camps who didn’t speak German, is the basis for Becker’s
language, but there are significant historical differences between the linguistic worlds of the
ghetto and the concentration camp, respectively. Jews imprisoned in ghettos in Eastern Europe
still engaged with language (or languages) in a manner congruous with “family and community
life” prior to Nazi occupation, “[b]ut the concentration camps proceeded according to different
criteria, linguistic and otherwise” (Rosen, Sounds of Defiance 4). In his Holocaust memoir
Survival in Auschwitz, Primo Levi discusses the tumultuous mélange of languages spoken by
prisoners in the concentration camp, explaining that “[t]he confusion of languages is a
fundamental component of the manner of living here: one is surrounded by a perpetual Babel, in
which everyone shouts orders and threats in languages never heard before, and woe betide
whoever fails to grasp the meaning” (38). The confusion of languages that Levi describes as an
integral component of life in the concentration camp is decidedly missing from the diegetic
world of Becker’s novel.
We must also take care, I argue, to distinguish between the historical phenomenon of
camp prisoners’ need for a linguistic hybrid and Becker’s deployment of what Gilman also
rightly identifies as a sophisticated literary language. In this case, we would have to view
Becker’s use of language as an evocation of the complex of languages spoken in a Polish ghetto,
not of the Lagersprache of the concentration camp. It is more helpful to consider language in the
novel as an aestheticization—rendered in German—of the historical amalgam composed
primarily of Yiddish, Polish, and German. Consequently, the scattered words in Yiddish that
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Becker’s narrator inserts into his narration represent a feature of this aestheticized Polish Jewish
ghetto speak, relatively sparse though they may be throughout the text. It is a fascinating
rhetorical gesture: Becker’s literary German, peppered with Yiddish, represents the complex of
languages of the ghetto. The Yiddish words in the text thus serve an integral role in providing
clues as to the ways in which the narrator positions himself through language as a Holocaust
survivor addressing a non-Jewish, German-speaking post-Holocaust audience.
Considering Jakob der Lügner in terms of the monolingual and the multilingual will help
us arrive at a more nuanced understanding of what is happening in the text with respect to choice
of language. As I argue in the previous chapter, Wander’s use of Yiddish in Der siebente
Brunnen operates according to a strategy that seeks to weave Yiddish into German as part of a
dialogical exchange between the languages. I identify Wander’s relatively sustained deployment
of Yiddish as an example of something bordering on multilingual writing. The deployment of
Yiddish in Becker’s text, however, takes on a different valence. Rather than constituting an
interplay between two discrete languages, Becker’s use of Yiddish signposts ruptures and
tensions inherent in the primary language of the text, i.e. German. The narrator inserts Yiddish
into Jakob der Lügner, I argue, to gesture toward the multilingualism of both the Jewish speakers
depicted in the narrative and the “Jewishness” of the German language, even as the dominant
discourse of the novel indicates no narrative slippage between languages. Viewed in light of the
presence of Yiddish vocabulary and the historical events to which the diegesis refers, the
German of Jakob der Lügner emerges as a particularly Jewish, literary iteration of the languages
of the Polish ghetto, rather than an assortment composed of various Lagersprache parts, as
Gilman argues. As a “novel of the Shoah,” Becker’s novel wrests German from the Nazi
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aggressor and re-appropriates it as a medium for depicting Jewish victimization and the historical
violence and trauma of the Holocaust.
Yildiz’s insightful argument regarding German Jewish philosopher Adorno’s engagement
with Fremdwörter resonates with the Yiddish-sprinkled German of Becker’s novel. Yildiz
describes how Adorno actively engaged in the use of Fremdwörter in his own writing and in an
extended philosophical discussion of them over the course of his career. She contends that
Adorno’s self-conscious use of foreign-derived, often Latinate, words signals the tensions and
ruptures inherent in any language, but especially in the case of the German language. According
to Yildiz, nationalist political leanings in Germany and anxiety regarding maintaining the
ostensible purity of the German language, particularly in the nineteenth and first half of the
twentieth centuries, often underpinned discourses regarding the status of Fremdwörter (74-77).
Though Adorno published almost exclusively in German (with the exception of a handful of
texts written in English during the period of his exile from Germany), his specific deployment of
language gestures toward both recognizing and delighting in the non-Germanic elements of
German and dismantling the assumption regarding language purity and the chauvinistic politics
that accompanied this idea (77-84). She asserts, “this partial adherence to the monolingual
paradigm combined with partial departure from it signals the manner in which Adorno’s practice
partakes of the tensions constitutive of the postmonolingual condition” (93). Yildiz’ insightful
discussion of the Frankfurt School philosopher is especially pertinent to my reading of Becker in
that she underscores the role that the German language and its specific constitutive components
can play for an author and thinker who employs what might at first glance appear to be a
monolingual medium while simultaneously dissecting it and charting in its fissures and tensions
its inherently permeable character. In her analysis of the philosopher’s 1959 essay “Wörter aus
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der Fremde,” Yildiz observes: “In Adorno’s writing, foreign-derived words consistently open up
paths out of an enforced monolingualization of language” (94). In this manner, the German
language is revealed to be an aggregate, composed of linguistic elements not only of Germanic
origin, but also from many other sources, including French, Latin, ancient Greek. Though
Adorno does not explicitly discuss Yiddish-derived words, Yiddish belongs in this list of
languages that have historically had contact with and have exerted an influence on German. With
its Yiddish vocabulary inserted into the text without the benefit of being glossed or explained by
way of footnote, Becker’s literary language operates, I argue, in a manner parallel to Adorno’s
articulation of German contoured with technical, often Latin-derived loan words.
In his sustained analysis of Fremdwörter, Adorno also compares foreign words to Jews.
Following the end of World War II, Adorno “introduces into the Fremdwort discourse the
element of racialization,” describing these foreign and foreign-derived words metaphorically as
“the Jews of language” (Yildiz 84-85). When we view Becker’s use of Yiddish in light of
Yildiz’s discussion of Adorno’s comparison, the Yiddish Fremdwörter in Jakob der Lügner are
put in greater relief. The Yiddish terms and vocabulary that Becker deploys perform a
metonymical function, not only standing in for the Yiddish language as a whole, but also for the
Jews themselves. In addition to the emancipatory potential of German articulated as a Jewish
language, the Yiddish that appears in the novel serves an elegiac purpose. By situating Yiddish
words within the narrative, Becker’s narrator develops a specifically post-Holocaust version of
the discourse of the Eastern European Jew, in which the common denominator is German rather
than Yiddish. But the scattered Fremdwörter are also Fremdkörper that represent the few
surviving examples of an otherwise annihilated population or an otherwise seamless linguistic
integration. Yiddish gestures toward what is irretrievable, not only with respect to the author’s
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traumatic memory, but also with respect to the lives of the millions who perished in the
Holocaust. The Yiddish in Jakob der Lügner is thus a stark reminder of what was lost in terms of
East European Jewish life, language, culture and history—what can be referenced and refracted,
but can never be recuperated—by the German language that the narrator employs to tell his
story.
The Dialogic in the Monologic: Jakob’s Multi-Voiced Radio
The preoccupation with language and the role of Yiddish in the text are also connected to
the novel’s trope of the radio. The plot of Becker’s novel hinges upon Jakob’s purported
possession of a clandestine radio. As a Latin-derived term created to refer to the wireless device
invented by Marconi in 1895 that transmits and receives electromagnetic signals, “Radio” is
arguably the novel’s primary Fremdwort, in this case a foreign-derived word rather than a
foreign word per se. The word also designates a Fremdkörper in the novel’s diegesis, for the
Jews imprisoned in the ghetto are, according to the rules enacted and strictly enforced by the
German authorities, forbidden from owning radios. Any prisoner caught with such contraband is
subject to severe punishment, including execution. Jakob initiates the rumor that he owns a radio
because he fears being unable to convince others that he overheard the piece of news that he is so
eager to share during a scarcely believable episode in the “Revier.” The protagonist lies about his
radio both to legitimate his news and to provide fellow prisoners justification to hope that the
advancing Russian army might also entail liberation of the ghetto. His radio—more precisely, his
purported possession of a radio—proves to be both blessing and curse. Though the otherwise
unremarkable and unassuming Jakob begins to be showered with a great deal of attention from
fellow ghetto inhabitants, he must strive continually to substantiate his claim of owning this
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radio by improvising ways both to provide his curious companions with fresh news and to justify
his reluctance to allow the coveted apparatus to see the light of day.
Additionally, the absence of a real radio provides the impetus for his performance for the
orphaned girl Lina, for whom he serves as avuncular guardian. In a pivotal scene that brings
Lina, and by extension the reader, as close as possible to the desired, but non-existent, object,
Jakob performs the radio that he claims to own and have hidden. The interaction between the
protagonist and the girl in this sequence is made possible on account of two factors: Jakob’s
talent as a performer and Lina’s lack of prior experience with radio technology. Because she has
no clear picture of how a radio might operate and has no knowledge of its possibilities and
limitations, Jakob is free to re-invent radio for his own purposes through his performance, as
long as he can entertain and satisfy his audience of one. Obscured behind a curtain, Jakob crafts
for Lina three episodes that are intended to reproduce the aural experience of listening to a radio.
By altering his voice and mimicking a radio announcer, an interviewer, an interviewee,
musicians, and a fairy tale narrator, he creates his own version of a radio broadcast. His purpose
in this scene is to satisfy the child’s growing curiosity about the radio and convince her of its
“existence” without showing her something he cannot actually reveal. Acoustics, rather than
vision, must provide ontological proof of the radio’s presence in the basement of Jakob’s
apartment building.
During the initial portion of his radio performance, Jakob provides Lina a three-voiced
broadcast involving a radio announcer “mit hoher Stimme,” a news reporter “in mittlerer
Stimmlage,” and, most ingeniously, the ostensible voice of English Prime Minister Winston
Churchill who speaks “mit sehr tiefer Stimme und deutlich fremdländischem Einschlag” (165).
Jakob impersonates these three individuals by splitting and modulating his single voice to take
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on the contours of three separate voices distinct from his own normal speaking voice for the
purpose of creating the illusion of a radio program featuring multiple personalities that all play a
particular role in the mediation of information for the listening audience. In a Bakhtinian sense,
Jakob performs for Lina and the reader the multi-voiced discourse of broadcast radio within the
framework of novelistic discourse. In this episode, Becker’s narrator stages, by way of the
protagonist, a miniaturized version of his larger practice in the novel of gesturing toward his
paradoxical yearning to animate a dialogical interplay with the past—between himself and
perished friends and companions such as Jakob. In this way, Jakob, as storyteller and narrator of
this radio-inspired sequence, animates dialogical interaction with Lina by way of the imagined
radio.
Jakob’s radio performance also underscores the linguistic tension in the novel,
particularly in light of the insertion of the “foreign” English Prime Minister. As the performance
progresses, Jakob, acting as transmitter and receiver, creates a realm of fantasy that apes the
artifice of technological reproduction through his deployment of artifice. The interplay among
the various voices of the imagined speakers whom he conjures for Lina reflects the larger pattern
of rupture within the German language previously discussed. This tension in language and the
ping-ponging back and forth between linguistic registers comes to the fore most clearly in the
guise of a Yiddish-speaking Winston Churchill. Jakob fantasizes a conversation between the
Prime Minister and an ostensibly Jewish reporter who operates outside of the German sphere of
influence and poses questions tailored specifically to the interests and geographical location of
the ghetto prisoners. Universalized in this world, the reporter has the ability to garner airtime
with one of the most recognizable Allied leaders of World War II. Jakob orchestrates the
interview:
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Reporter: “Ich begrüße Sie sehr herzlich in unserem Senderaum. Und gleich zur ersten
Frage: Würden Sie unseren Hörern bitte sagen, wie Sie aus Ihrer Sicht die
augenblickliche Situation einschätzen?” Sir Winston: “Das ist nicht allzu schwer. Ich bin
fest davon überzeugt, daß der ganze Schlamassel bald zu Ende sein wird, allerhöchstens
noch ein paar Wochen.” Reporter: “Und darf man fragen, woher Sie diese schöne
Gewißheit nehmen?” Sir Winston (etwas verlegen): “Nun ja, an allen Fronten geht es gut
vorwärts. Es sieht ganz so aus, als könnten sich die Deutschen nicht mehr lange halten.”
Reporter: “Wunderbar. Und wie steht es speziell in der Gegend von Bezanika?” (166)
Here, fantasy and hope for a swift end to the war combine in the imagined voices of the
interviewer and the figure identified as Winston Churchill. Churchill assures his interlocutor and,
by extension, his radio audience, that the Nazi-led German army will not be able to withstand the
combined power of the Allied military presence on multiple fronts. Churchill discursively
reduces the entire war and the Nazi threat to a series of unfortunate events, referring to it as a
“Schlamassel” (a German word derived from the Yiddish shlimazl, one of whose meanings is
misfortune or bad luck). In using this word of Yiddish origin, Jakob’s Churchill humorously
downplays the events, implying that the entirety of the Second World War was one large mess
caused by the Nazis that the Allies needed to finish sorting out. The purpose of this
understatement is not to deny the reality of the war and the inhumane conditions of the ghetto,
but to take some of the power, at least within the realm of language, away from the Germans.
Imprisoned in the ghetto and members of a persecuted minority, Jakob and his fellow
Jewish prisoners have no access to radio news and announcements of the sort that he provides
Lina (with the exception of the protagonist’s fleeting experience catching a snippet of German
news during the episode in the precinct). Even if Jakob and his companions were to gain access
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to radio at this time in Europe, news reports would likely not speak to the specifics of Jewish
experience. Jakob’s performance of a conversation with Churchill is not only a fantasy of
liberation and an end to Nazi terror, but also serves as an imagined discourse that is particularly
Jewish. And with the insertion of the word “Schlamassel” into the narrative at a pivotal moment
in what is arguably the novel’s climactic scene, Becker’s narrator, by way of Jakob’s
performance, further establishes the linguistic strategy of deploying Yiddish vocabulary to signal
the articulation of a particularly Yiddish-inflected Eastern European Jewish discourse within the
larger framework of the German language. In this way, Churchill is to some extent domesticated
both for a Jewish audience in terms of the novel’s diegesis and for the German-speaking reader.
As a Yiddish-derived word that many German speakers would no longer recognize as a
Fremdwort per se, “Schlamassel” acts as a point of linguistic contact between the Jewish
characters in the ghetto and the post-Holocaust East German reader.
This imagined interview with Churchill also serves as a moment in which the narrator,
framed by Jakob’s understatement regarding his own abilities as performer, places both Jakob’s
storytelling and by extension the entire novel as an inheritor of modern Yiddish literary culture—
a body of work that includes, as we have seen, texts by Sholem Aleichem and Sholem Yankev
Abramovitsh. Anxious that his performance might not have succeeded, and prior to joining Lina
on the opposite side of the curtain, the protagonist mutters to himself, “man ist, das ändert sich
leider nie, kein Scholem Alejchem an Erfindungsgabe, verlangt nicht zuviel von einem geplagten
Mann, für heute wird es hoffentlich reichen” (167). By invoking the name of one of the most
well-known and celebrated modern Yiddish writers, who aestheticized Yiddish storytelling in his
articulation of a modern Yiddish literary idiom, Becker’s narrator, despite Jakob’s negative selfevaluation of his abilities, invites the reader both to draw parallels between the German-language
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text and Yiddish writing and to search for metaliterary links between the novel and Eastern
European Jewish literary predecessors.
On account of this reference in his novel and other rhetorical strategies arguably drawn
from aspects of Eastern European Jewish culture, one question often put forth in the secondary
literature on Jurek Becker is to what extent we can consider his work to be a post-Holocaust,
German-speaking variant of the Eastern European Jewish literary tradition of 20th-century
Yiddish-language authors such as Sholem Aleichem and Isaac Bashevis Singer.46 Grant Henley
discusses how in 1971 German literary critic Wolfgang Werth “was one of the first to comment
on the possible link between Becker’s narrative style and the Fabulierkunst of Jewish writer
Scholem Aleichem. Werth even mentions various Yiddish characters from Aleichem’s work by
name in his brief review of Becker’s Jakob der Lügner” (23). Despite their overt connection
between Becker and Sholem Aleichem, however, neither Werth nor Henley offers a detailed
analysis of the overlap between the narrative techniques of the two authors. Manfred Karnick
argues that Becker’s novel establishes, with the narrator’s technique of mimicking the act of
conversation, a clear metaliterary link to Yiddish literature. He analyzes the novel’s opening
lines and concludes that out of this technique “[e]ine Situation mündlicher Kommunikation
entworfen [wird]” (210). While this observation certainly rings true when one analyzes the
narrator’s staging of his crisis regarding language and representation, as I previously demonstrate
in this chapter, Karnick fails to explain the specificities of the connection between this technique
of portraying human speech in Becker’s novel and rhetorical techniques in Yiddish literature. He
appears to be operating under the assumption that one of the primary features of Yiddish
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See for example, Sander Gilman, Grant Henley, Manfred Karnick, David Rock, et al.
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literature is the representation of conversation, i.e. of the spoken word, but he does not
specifically articulate this particular position.
Though Becker claimed to have read the stories of Sholem Aleichem only after drafting
the manuscript of Jakob der Lügner, Karnick nevertheless insists on the intertextual connection,
asserting, “[d]er Hintergrund ist aber trotzdem da. Und Becker mag sich bei der Vorbereitung
des Buches wohl auch gekümmert haben. Es ist die Lebens-, Denk- und Sprechform der
osteuropäischen Schtetlwelt” (211). Karnick argues for a continuity between Jewish literature
written about shtetl life in Eastern Europe and works such as Becker’s novel that depict Jewish
life and suffering in the ghettos and concentration camps. In drawing a connection between
Yiddish literature and Becker’s novel, his analysis fails to take into account the historical
differences between the shtetl to which he refers and Łódź, which was the third-largest city in
Poland and is the setting of the novel. Missing from Karnick’s argument is a detailed analytical
comparison that illuminates the specific metaliterary links between pre-Holocaust Yiddish
writing and Becker’s post-Holocaust German-language novel. It is clear that the novel, as we see
in Jakob’s comparison of himself to Sholem Aleichem, gestures toward the rich tradition of
Yiddish storytelling and literature in its citation of perhaps the best-known Yiddish-language
author. But I argue that Jakob der Lügner is more preoccupied as a text with articulating an
elegiac position in the German language with regard to Eastern European Jewry and its near total
destruction as a result of the Shoah. Jakob’s Winston Churchill is a fantasy about and from the
perspective of the Yiddish-speaking world—in German—precisely at a moment when this world
is on the brink of extinction. Becker’s novel depicts this tension on purpose as a strategy for
demonstrating just what is lost as a result of the Holocaust. The shtetl world that was already
undergoing immense transformation in the works of Yiddish literary giants such as Sholem
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Aleichem is largely erased from the European landscape by the time the narrator tells the story of
Jakob. Becker’s novel tempers its overtures to Yiddish literary predecessors with harsh historical
reality, recognizing that it can act only as a palimpsest that scribbles over the absence of
Ashkenaz by mourning its loss.
Jakob’s disavowal of storytelling abilities similar to those of Sholem Aleichem
nevertheless sets up an intertexual link to Yiddish literature. Jakob’s dialogical engagement with
Lina and his metaleptic shifts from diegsis to the metadiegesis of the radio program that he
narrates and performs are reminiscent of a narrator-character in a modern Yiddish literary text,
such as Abramovitsh’s Mendele the Book Peddler, who engages both the reader and the
characters in the story world. Following his performance of the radio interview with Churchill,
Jakob, anxious about being able to maintain the artifice, endeavors to wrap up the evening’s
entertainment. Lina nevetherless convinces him to turn the radio on again for another segment of
listening, which forces Jakob to engage in additional mimicry. Before commencing with a
second act, he inquires as to what Lina might want to hear (“‘Was willst du denn hören?’”
[168]), as if she had the ability to make particular requests, were the evening of radio
entertainment composed of a mere flipping of a switch. The lines between radio and
ventriloquism become blurred as Jakob’s second act involves his impersonation of a music
ensemble. Recalling his father’s ability to imitate with astonishing accuracy a wide variety of
musical instruments, Jakob allows muscle memory to take over, and he mimics a group of
klezmorim, modulating his voice to sound like the brass, percussion, and woodwind voices of
Eastern European Jewish music. In doing so, loses his inhibitions regarding his abilities to
perform convincingly (“Jakob verliert, wie es heißt, alle Hemmungen” [168]). As Jakob’s
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musical interlude reaches its conclusion, Lina once again enthusiastically and successfully
appeals for more, arguing that “aller guten Dinge sind drei, jetzt erst recht” (170).
The dialogical interaction underpinning this scene as a whole reaches a crescendo when
Jakob and Lina discuss the fairy tale that makes up the third portion of her benefactor’s act.
Jakob pretends to adjust the dial, and Becker’s narrator explains that, as luck would have it, he
lands on a station with programming tailored to the interests of children: “Lina hat großes Glück,
Jakob findet bald die Rundfunkstation, in der Märchen erzählt werden, von einem freundlichen
Onkel, der sagt: ‘Für alle Kinder, die uns zuhören, erzählt der Märchenonkel das Märchen von
der kranken Prinzessin” (170). In his zeal to satisfy his interlocutor, Jakob interrupts his
metadiegetic narration of the fairy tale and metaleptically slips back into the diegesis with Lina,
asking her, “‘Kennst du das?’” (170). This subtle slippage between narrative levels is crucial: in
a moment of forgetfulness, Jakob defies what would otherwise be the technological limitations of
the medium of radio. Lina does not appear to notice this moment of dissolution in the artifice and
subsequently engages her radio-performing uncle in a brief exchange about the purpose of a fairy
tale narrator for children and the logic of the ghetto prohibition against radio (170-1). And when
Jakob takes advantage of too long a caesura in his performance in his attempts to reconstruct the
fairy tale from memory, Lina interrupts his reverie and goads him into begin narrating (“‘Wann
fängt es denn endlich an?’ fragt Lina” [171]). As a result of this performance, radio, according to
the fantasy version that Jakob creates, takes on the contours of dialogical interplay, allowing for
interaction and mutual reciprocity between radio announcer and listener. The fantasy version of
radio that Lina enjoys is tailored specifically for her; she is offered an animated performance in
which she has agency to make active requests that the “radio” in turn fulfills. The monological
elements of radio are downplayed in favor of highlighting its dialogical potential. In Jakob’s
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fantasy version, radio’s otherwise primarily monologic form allows for the listener to engage
with it dialogically. In Jakob and Lina’s dialogue about the performance before and in between
the three radio acts, we also observe, I argue, a kinship akin to the Buberian model of the “IThou” relationship, similar to the dialogical interaction between the narrator and Mendel
Teichmann in Wander’s Der siebente Brunnen. Lina and Jakob share a connection that is
underpinned both by joint storytelling and dialogical exchange, in which both subjectivities are
transformed by way of sustained interchange. Becker’s version of the “I-Thou” relationship
comes to the fore in the form of a child asking questions of an adult and learning from him, and
an adult gaining new insight and experience as a result of interacting with an inquisitive child—
all against the backdrop of the daily horrors of the ghetto and the struggle to survive and
maintain some sense of normalcy. Jakob and Lina provide each other a necessary counterpart in
an ongoing dialogical exchange that allows a degree of intellectual and emotional respite from
their bleak surroundings. This dialogical relationship continues to the end of the novel, when the
narrator finds himself in the proximity of Jakob and Lina in the railway car during deportation
and in the position to relate details of their dialogue with one another. The narrator’s ability to
provide elements of an eyewitness account of Jakob and his radio-inspired activities provides the
narrative conceit. Neither Jakob nor Lina survives to tell the story of their relationship in their
own words.
Jakob’s telling of the fairy tale of the afflicted princess also exists in dialogical
interaction with the rest of the novel, between the imagination and fantasy that characters such as
Lina and Jakob possess and the ontological realities of the diegetic world that they inhabit in the
ghetto. The scene also represents a fantasy with regard to the process of listening to the radio.
With the exception of instances in which listeners make telephone calls to radio stations and find
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themselves on the air, speaking to a radio announcer or host, listening to the radio is monological
in that the listener receives the radio program and cannot engage it in dialogue. While the
medium of radio often features dialogue between speaking partners who are both (or all) on the
air simultaneously and addressing an audience of listeners, the listener cannot normally intercede
in any direct manner and participate in the “conversation” that she hears. But in this scene, Lina,
unaware of how radio normally operates, assumes that she can engage in a dialogue with the
radio as she does with Jakob. For her, there seems to be no difference between her dialogical
interaction with Jakob as radio and the staged conversation she hears between the radio
announcer and Winston Churchill. Jakob does not disabuse her of this notion and endeavors to
give his sole listener what she desires, to the best of his vocal and theatrical abilities. Jakob’s
fantasy version of radio articulates an imagined alternative to the suffocating reality of the
ghetto.
A Double-Voiced Conclusion: The Novel’s Two Endings and the “Almost Lost Story”
But this fantasy is fragile and fleeting. Ultimately, fantasy cannot alter the conditions or
subvert the limitations of radio technology, nor can it accelerate the advance of the Russians and
the liberation of the ghetto before the Germans deport the remaining Jews. Nevertheless,
Becker’s narrator offers readers both fantasy and reality at the close of the novel. Jakob der
Lügner concludes with the presentation of two endings, an imagined one that involves the
liberation of the ghetto and Jakob’s death, and a real one that entails the narrator being deported,
along with Jakob, Lina, and the others, to a concentration camp. Becker’s narrator is sole
survivor, the only one remaining who can tell his story, Lina’s story, and the story of Jakob’s
radio. Just as Jakob indulges Lina by relating a fairy tale about a sick princess who is cured by
the power of imagination, the narrator indulges our (and his) desire to experience an ending
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different from the one that involves the liquidation of the ghetto and the deportation of its
remaining Jewish prisoners. Becker’s narrator bemoans his inability to alter the story of Jakob’s
fate and that of the other prisoners in the ghetto, including his own (“Jakob kann tausendmal
wiederfinden berichten Schlachten ersinnen und in Umlauf setzen, eins kann er nicht verhindern,
zuverlässig nähert sich die Geschichte ihrem nichtswürdigen Ende [257]); nevertheless, he
proposes an alternative. The narrator is careful not to obscure the ontological reality of the “real”
ending, which entails liquidation of the ghetto and deportation of all remaining Jews. But his
imagination and desire for something idealized compel him to consider another possibility (“Ich
[...] erfinde […] ein Ende, mit dem man halbwegs zufrieden sein kann, eins mit Hand und Fuß,
ein ordentliches Ende läßt manche Schwäche vergessen” [258]). According to the imagined
ending, Jakob attempts to flee the ghetto and is shot by a guard while doing so. But his act of
apparent suicide, ostensibly to avoid the necessity of admitting that he has been lying about
possessing a radio and thus crushing the hopes of all the ghetto prisoners who have been buoyed
by his prevarication. While reflecting on the two endings, one real and one imagined, Becker’s
narrator foregrounds a sense of conflict in his desire to fabricate an imaginary ending and the
need to tell the true ending as he personally witnessed it. Out of this conflict arises, I argue, a
dialogical interaction between the two endings. The narrator weaves the two narrative strands
together, each informing and shaping the contours of the other. Without historical reality, fantasy
would be an empty gesture. And the possibilities provided by imagination allow the narrator a
degree of agency in the formulation of this particular act of memorialization and in the
representation of the violence of the Holocaust. This conflict, or tension between the real and the
imagined, also constitutes a variation on the “almost lost story.” Without the intervention of the
narrator, there would be no story of Jakob and his radio, as it would be lost to oblivion. And the
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dialogical interplay between the two endings gestures toward the contours of narrative,
reminding us of its possibilities and limitations.
Jakob der Lügner presents a nearly entirely monolingual text that communicates the
narrator’s and all characters’ speech and thoughts in the framework of literary German. There is
no direct mention in the text of the historical configuration of languages that existed in a Polish
ghetto, whose prisoners were primarily Jewish, and no meta-textual reflection on the part of the
narrator regarding the need that figures such as Jakob would have had for code-switching back
and forth between German as the bureaucratic language of authority under Nazi occupation and
the combination of Polish and Yiddish (and potentially some German) that Polish Jews would
have used for everyday discourse, particularly when speaking not to a guard but among
themselves. In this respect, the novel is monolingual. Becker’s novel thus deploys a particular
version of German that elides the complex of languages spoken in Polish ghettos. The primarily
monolingual system presented in the novel overlays the historical reality of multilingual Łódź.
Nevertheless, the text contains moments of tension, fissures in the monolingual paradigm. These
fissures become evident, I argue, in the novel’s deployment of a handful of Yiddish words and
concepts. The words of Yiddish derivation provide the sole “visible traces of internal
multilingualism—that is, traces of constitutive contact with an other” that appear in the text
(Yildiz 77). These Yiddish words must bear the majority of the weight of gesturing toward both
the multilingual tension inherent in the German language and the multilingual life and milieu of
Polish Jews, both prior to the Holocaust and while under occupation in Nazi-run ghettos such as
the one in Łódź.
With my discussion of the deployment of language in Jakob der Lügner, I do not wish to
imply that I find fault with how Becker renders the historical multilingualism of the Polish
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ghetto. Becker’s novel is a diverse and rich text in its own right. But the ways in which Becker
shapes the German language to tell a story about the Holocaust do illuminate crucial issues
related to representation. What is striking about this literary text is how German is placed in
mouths of both perpetrator and victim alike. In the novel, German soldiers and Jewish prisoners
communicate seamlessly—contrary to the historical experience of many, if not most, Eastern
European Jews incarcerated in ghettos. However, the occasional Yiddish words employed
throughout the text remind us, albeit subtly, that, despite the presentation of a nearly
homogenous linguistic environment, Polish Jews in Łódź and by extension Eastern European
Jews in general, “had a long history of multilingualism” (Rosen, Sounds of Defiance 2). In the
act of disnarrating this multilingual pre-Holocaust history and culture, the novel gestures toward
the staggering extent of what was lost as a result of the Shoah, in terms of individual human
lives, as well as the language and culture. Becker’s novel thus employs German, along with a
smattering of Yiddish, as a medium for memorializing the dead and articualting an elegy for
Ashkenaz.
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Conclusion:
Narrative Voice and Regulating Rhetoric
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Literary texts often provide signposts that assist in indicating an approach to reading
them. These signposts can be expressed in many forms and combinations. Sometimes these
interpretive clues come to the fore in the act of narration itself, such as in the narrator’s depiction
of and relationship to characters in the diegesis, or story world; in the narrator’s extradiegetic
reflections on events or episodes that take place in the diegesis; or in the narrator’s engagement
with the narratee, or implied audience. In a point of departure in analyzing Jossel Wassermanns
Heimkehr, Der Nazi und der Friseur, Der siebente Brunnen, and Jakob der Lügner, I have
endeavored to identify and unpack some of the narrative signposts in these texts and to
demonstrate how their subject matter and structure of narrative operate in tandem, mutually
informing one another. In this vein, my investigation has concentrated on how the narrators in
these post-Holocaust German Jewish novels position themselves with respect to the events and
characters that they narrate in the context of diegetic worlds inflected by historical events
associated with the Shoah. The narrators of these novels interact with the characters and the
narratee, constructing dialogical interplay—or the illusion of dialogical interaction—on various
levels of narrative structure. In keeping with this emphasis on dialogical exchange, they evince a
preoccupation with modulating voice, in the form of both represented human speech and
narrative perspective. This emphasis on voice and the multiplicity of voices offers readers insight
into how these novels operate. Through the careful observation of the implementation of voice,
we open up productive avenues for understanding how these texts position themselves with
respect to both the subject matter and the reader.
Jossel Wassermanns Heimkehr, Der siebente Brunnen, and Jakob der Lügner articulate
acts of elegiac memorialization, expressing lamentation over individuals who perished in the
Holocaust. The narrators in these three novels endeavor to lend voice to those who can no longer
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speak for themselves. In Jossel Wassermanns Heimkehr, the unnamed narrator presents the
voices of the Pohodna Jews in the moment of their deportation on board a train car. Through an
intervention in the form of the “Quasselstimmen,” every utterance of every individual in the train
car is recorded. These non-corporeal narrative agents rescue the voices of the Jews of the shtetl
Pohodna from oblivion. Wander’s character-narrator in Der siebente Brunnen positions himself
as a Holocaust survivor and as something of a human Sprachrohr that channels the voices of
murdered comrades and fellow concentration camp inmates, using his voice as a medium for
representing their voices. Wander’s narrator reproduces the speech and stories of perished
friends who did not survive Auschwitz, Buchenwald, and other Nazi-run concentration camps.
Similar to Wander’s narrator, the unnamed character-narrator in Becker’s Jakob der Lügner
highlights the voices and stories of fellow prisoners of a Nazi-run ghetto in Poland. Instead of
providing an account of his own persecution and victimization at the hands of the Nazis,
imprisonment in the ghetto, and subsequent survival, Becker’s narrator relates the story of an
acquaintance in the ghetto named Jakob who claimed to own a forbidden radio. Jakob does not
survive to provide his own account of the radio; the narrator’s words must provide a proxy for
what Jakob might tell had he survived. All three of these novels present the reader with a sense
of immediacy; the stories told could have just as easily been lost rather than recuperated (at least
partially) in the form of the narrators’ portrayal of them. The stories of these characters who do
not survive, but whose voices are preserved to some extent through the act of narration provided
by the narrator-witness, are all “almost lost stories.” Their “almost lost” or rescued stories
operate as a metonymical proxy for the innumerable stories and testimonies associated with the
victims of the Holocaust whose voices and identities have been otherwise effaced from history
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and memory. These three novels model for the reader a method of mourning and memorializing
lives lost as a result of the Nazi Judeocide.
One component of this mourning and memorialization is the use of Yiddish. To varying
degrees and in various permutations, these three novels employ Yiddish linguistic and literary
elements as a narrative strategy for gesturing toward Eastern European Jewish culture. The
deployment of Yiddish vocabulary, as well as intertextual references to Yiddish literature, in
particular to oral storytelling as a device in modern Yiddish literary texts by authors such as
Sholem Aleichem and Abramovitsh, represents an avenue for these authors to confront the
challenge of gesturing toward what was lost as a result of the near destruction of Ashkenaz,
perpetrated by the Nazis and their collaborators. The connections created in these works between
German and Yiddish serve as part of a larger act of mourning and a project of commemoration.
The Yiddish words, couched within these primarily German-language texts, serve, on one level,
as reminders that the characters and narrators who utter these words are Eastern European Jews
(or German-speaking Jews familiar with the language). The Yiddish that we encounter in these
novels serves to reproduce, to some degree, the acoustic and linguistic particularities of Yiddish
speakers and their voices. In Jossel Wassermanns Heimkehr and Jakob der Lügner, Yiddish is
placed into the mouths of characters as a way of identifying them as Jewish and of signaling the
presence of linguistic difference and variety within the German language. Yiddish serves to
complicate these otherwise predominantly monolingual texts. In Der siebente Brunnen, the
sophisticated and sustained employment of Yiddish interacts dialogically with German. This
interplay, which comes to the fore in multiple episodes, echoes the multilingual environment of
the Nazi concentration camp system, as well as the historically complex (and sometimes tense)
relationship between German-speaking Jews and Yiddish-speaking Ashkenazi Jews. These three
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texts seek to galvanize the German language as a post-Holocaust medium for the representation
of traumatic memory, specifically the memory of Ashkenaz.
Hilsenrath’s Der Nazi und der Friseur is in some ways an outlier within this cluster of
novels that I have analyzed. The principal narrators in the other three novels position themselves
in close proximity to the Holocaust victims depicted in the narration. This proximity seems to
possess ethically responsible dimensions, particularly in Der siebente Brunnen and Jakob der
Lügner, whose character-narrators are fellow prisoners and victims of the Holocaust. The
principal narrator in Jossel Wassermanns Heimkehr, though more distant from the diegesis, as he
(or she) is not also a character in the novel, expresses concern about finding adequate means for
memorializing the Pohodna Jews. The character-narrator in Der Nazi und der Friseur presents an
entirely different case altogether. As a Holocaust perpetrator who disavows responsibility for the
murders he once committed, the novel’s narrator Max Schulz provokes and prods readers, rather
than directly inviting them to participate in an act of mourning. Max employs narrative voice
according to a series of rhetorical strategies that allow him to defer guilt and obscure his true
intentions. In keeping with these strategies for deferral, the novel’s narrating-I shifts constantly
back and forth between names and subject positions. But despite this pattern of evasion, Max
appears to relish the presence of an audience, often addressing the reader directly in the form of
ostensibly amiable asides. It is as if he desires an accomplice or co-conspirator. At turns, Max
invites the reader to empathize with him, to see his past deeds from his skewed point of view.
While other mechanisms are in place in the narrative for undermining his credibility and our
potential positive emphathetic connection with him, he nonetheless attempts to bring us within
the field of his discursive influence. The story of Itzig Finkelstein, in contrast to the “almost lost
stories” in the other works, appears to be “almost lost” and “rescued” by Max, but in reality it is
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totally effaced. I have included Der Nazi und der Friseur in this project specifically because it
offers, in contrast to the other three novels, a radically different take on Holocaust representation
and the potential for employing voice not as a means for memorializing Holocaust victims per se
but as a way of satirizing postwar West Germany and exposing the fissures and tensions in a
culture that, similar to the one in which Hildesheimer’s narrator in Tynset engages, was perhaps
all too eager to suppress the voices of Holocaust victims (and survivors) and their testimonies in
favor of allowing former perpetrators to retain a certain degree of discursive control.
In addition to their narrative complexity and sophisticated use of narrative voice, these
four novels partake in the search for an audience. As a parallel to the dialogical interactions that
they construct in various configurations and on various levels of narration, these novels seek a
form of dialogue with the reader—or at least with an imagined reader. What is striking is that
this search has taken place despite a cultural climate that was often less than receptive to
narratives penned in German by Jewish authors about the Nazi persecution of European Jews.
Jossel Wassermanns Heimkehr, Der Nazi und der Friseur, Der siebente Brunnen, and Jakob der
Lügner were composed within the context of rhetoric that might otherwise appear as if to
regulate rather than promote imaginative literary engagement with the Holocaust. For my
purposes here, I situate these four novels with respect to two interrelated strands of this
regulating rhetoric. Rather than functioning as some form of official or legal set of rules and
regulations, this regulating rhetoric has discursively contoured, at least in part, the social and
cultural landscape in which these novels were penned and published.
The first strand of this rhetoric pertains to Theodor W. Adorno’s famous and much
debated dictum regarding Holocaust representation. As Michael Rothberg has demonstrated,
scholars have often quoted and misquoted what has been interpreted as the philosopher’s
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formulation of a prohibition (“After Adorno” 46). First published in his 1951 essay “Kulturkritik
und Gesellschaft,” Adorno’s dictum has often been distilled from the words, “[n]ach Auschwitz
ein Gedicht zu schreiben, ist barbarisch” (30). Some have interpreted this opinion as a general
prohibition against representations of the Holocaust, particularly with respect to works of art that
employ literary or fictional discourse to depict events associated with the Shoah. According to
Sigrid Weigel, Adorno’s ostensible prohibition against imaginative or aesthetic representations
of the Holocaust has had significant consequences for postwar German philosophy and cultural
production. She argues:
Der Topos eines Sprechens nach Auschwitz, der über lange Zeit den kulturellen Diskurs
im Nachkriegsdeutschland bestimmte, hatte dabei durchaus dazu beigetragen, daß eine
radikalere Konfrontation mit zentralen Momenten eines ‘Denkens nach Auschwitz’ durch
eine Redeweise aufgeschoben blieb, die mit universellen Kategorien wie der des
Unaussprechlichen von der Spezifik der Shoah immer wieder absah. (130)
Weigel depicts a cultural landscape in postwar (West) Germany that clung to an interpretation of
Adorno’s ostensible prohibition that it made possible, at least for several decades, to consider the
Holocaust as fundamentally out of the reach of human comprehension, thus rendering it
ineffable. This interpretation in turn provided an excuse for Germans to largely ignore not only
aspects of the Holocaust, particularly with regard to Jewish suffering, but also to overlook artists
and writers who, working against or in reaction to an atmosphere colored by this “prohibition,”
portrayed events and experiences related to the Holocaust. Weigel describes a culture that was
often less than receptive to authors—particularly Jewish authors—who penned texts about the
Nazi Judeocide, especially prior to a renewed discussion of the Shoah in the mid-1980s in West
Germany, sparked in part by the Historikerstreit (130).
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The second strand of regulating rhetoric is in regard to writing about the Holocaust
specifically in the German language. Following World War II and in light of Nazi atrocities,
some have viewed German as an inappropriate, even impossible, vehicle for artistic
representation. For example, in his 1959 essay “The Hollow Miracle” (later included in the
collection Language and Silence), George Steiner claims that “the post-war history of the
German language has been one of dissimilation and deliberate forgetting” (109). According to
Steiner, the Nazis corrupted the German, employing it as the bureaucratic language to administer
“hell” (100). His appraisal of the detrimental influence that the Nazis exerted over German went
so far as to arrive at the conclusion that the language has as a result “gone dead” (96).
Consequently, according to Steiner’s interpretation, Nazi instrumentalization left German, at
least as he saw it in 1959, incapable of being employed as a literary or aesthetic language.
Following his line of reasoning, Jewish authors writing literary texts about the Holocaust in
German might find themsleves in a difficult position, perhaps even in the double bind of being
destabilized with respect to and displaced from both language and an audience to whom they
might communicate.
And yet, German Jewish post-Holocaust writing has been produced within the context of
these strands of regulating rhetoric. While Adorno and Steiner were not in a position to prohibit
German Jewish writers from writing as they saw fit (and perhaps never actually wished to do so),
their ideas, along with others, circulated in such a way that contributed to a cultural landscape
that was often indifferent or at times even hostile to the writing of German Jews. Authors like
Becker, Hilsenrath, and Wander, as well as many others such as Jean Améry, Paul Celan,
Wolfgang Hildesheimer, Jakov Lind, and Nelly Sachs, have been in a position to push against
the strictures of this rhetoric, to write against and around it, in social, cultural, and political
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environments not immediately receptive to the representation of Jewish suffering in the
Holocaust. The picture I wish to paint here is not one of strict opposition. Rather, Jewish authors
writing in German have often composed their works in ways that engage with and dispute this
kind of rhetoric. Within the framework of various strands of regulating rhetoric that might
otherwise mute or downplay works in German depicting Jewish suffering in the Shoah, these
authors have actively engaged in ways of problematizing problems associated with this rhetoric,
of finding ways to express their voice, their perspective.
And because they have composed their texts in the less than receptive atmosphere that
Weigel outlines, these authors often wrote, with respect to readers at least in the German context,
in a vacuum. Nevertheless, the novels that I have analyzed in this dissertation—perhaps more
Germanophone than “German” per se—all endeavor to communicate, at least with their initial
publication, to a German-speaking audience or at least the idea of a German-speaking audience.
And these audiences were, prior to the Wende, geographically specific: Hilsenrath encountered
specific challenges in attempting to address an audience in West Germany, while Becker and
Wander navigated the political vicissitudes of publishing in the German Democratic Republic
literary works that possessed a particularly Jewish inflection. But the story of these novels, with
their articulation of voice and their search for an audience, also entails a transnational
component. How these novels have been published and received both within the Germanspeaking world and outside of it is a tale that involves a both/and, rather than an either/or,
configuration. These novels, all of which have been rendered into excellent English translations
(as well as in many other languages), speak in a variety of registers, gesturing toward the
magnitude of what was lost as a result of the Shoah, underscoring both possibilities and problems
associated with post-Holocaust attempts at memorializing and mourning those who perished.
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